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The unpaid domestic sector is surprisingly understudied in economics. In
order to fully understand the functioning of the economic system, unpaid
and voluntary work in the process of social reproduction needs to be taken
into account and afforded the same analytical visibility as paid activities.
This book constitutes a rigorous economic analysis. Using a gender
perspective to analyse standards of living and well-being it covers, in a very
innovative approach, unpaid work and its major ramifications for the
modern economy.
The unified vision that is offered by the leading array of contributors
makes for a work of excellent quality. There is every chance that this book
will become a seminal study on unpaid work and as such will provide a
useful reference for students and academics involved in gender studies, well-
being, the labour market, public policy, econometrics, and consumption
studies.
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Unpaid work and living conditions
Unpaid domestic work comprises the labour involved in maintaining living
spaces, buying and transforming the commodities used in the family, sup-
plementing services provided to family members by the public and private
sectors (e.g. health, education, transport, administration), and managing
social and personal relationships. To this, which represents the great bulk of
unpaid work, the care of people has to be added.1 By revealing the quantity
of unpaid work we bring out: (1) the extent and persistence of major
inequalities between men and women in the distribution of time, activities,
economic resources and social responsibilities; (2) a necessary and dynamic
component of the economic system represented by the process of social
reproduction of the population and of the working population in particular.2
Living conditions, however defined and measured, represent a state within
the process of social reproduction.
With regard to the first point, the data show that differences between
men and women in the distribution of unpaid work are in general highly
significant and in Italy in particular – a great, persistent inequality that
‘spreads’ into the labour market and the distribution of income, affecting
both the level and type of income. Because of the systematic interrelation-
ship between paid and unpaid work, the usual analysis of the labour market,
limited to activity rates, employment, sectors and so on, needs to be
extended. For this purpose, in this research we introduce new concepts such
as total work, i.e. the sum of paid and unpaid work, and extended income, i.e.
the sum of money income and services derived from unpaid work. This
extension is calculated not only to bring out crucial differences between men
and women in the family and in the market, but also to deepen the analysis
of the whole economic system. It is merely a first step, since much remains
to be done to provide an adequate view of the economic implications of
unpaid reproductive work and to acknowledge that the process of social
reproduction of the population is one of the basic issues, along with the pro-
duction, distribution and exchange of commodities. In particular, the repro-
duction of the working population has to be considered a necessary input of
the productive process as acknowledged in classical political economy
(Picchio 1992).
The process of social reproduction is here taken to include the reproduc-
tion of bodies and minds located in historical times and geographical spaces.
As such it includes the provision of material resources (food, clothing,
housing, transport) and the training of individual capabilities necessary for
interaction in the social context of a particular time and place. At the level
of education, for instance, it includes not only formal education and voca-
tional training, but also, with increasing visibility, the formation of indi-
vidual and collective identities to carry out new tasks and take advantage of
new opportunities – involving mobility, job changes and mass communica-
tion. These new tasks lead, among other things, to changes in social conven-
tions and consumption patterns, whose stimulating and disorienting effects
require continuous adaptation of individual identities and social relation-
ships. In this process, in fact, the conditions of sustainability of the whole
system have to be continuously reconstituted.
The formation of identity begins in early infancy in a personalised, multi-
dimensional relationship in which emotions, languages (of body and mind),
socialisation and vast amounts of care work are all interwoven. In addition,
adults have to receive – and to some extent give – a certain amount of per-
sonal services necessary to activate capabilities and social functions. The
analysis of the unpaid work of social reproduction shares problems with the
concept of well-being as studied by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.3 It
is a dense concept related to individual and social choices about practices of
living in given social contexts. In this book the concept of well-being as
capability and effective individual functioning is extended to include unpaid
reproductive work that plays a fundamental role in forming capability and
sustaining effective functioning. This inclusion leads to a definition of well-
being as a state of a process of social reproduction which requires material
goods and commodities, personal services provided by paid (state and
market) and unpaid work (in the household and in the community). This
process takes place within an institutional context, which involves families,
state institutions, firms, markets and communities.
Some of the difficulties involved in developing and calibrating the empir-
ical tools required for measuring unpaid work, and its division between men
and women, arise from the analytical opacity of the whole question of social
reproduction of the population. This tends to conceal the role of unpaid
reproductive labour in the economic structure. The standard of living is
usually conceptualised as a stock of commodities and services. In fact, a his-
torically given bundle of commodities and services may be used as an indica-
tor but the whole process cannot be reduced to it. That would be equivalent
to analysing productive processes solely in terms of technical indicators.
Without an adequate conceptualisation and analytical location of the process
of social reproduction of the population as such, we lose sight of a dense and
multidimensional core of the structure of any economic system, where both
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equity and efficiency are rooted. The term ‘structure’, although out of
fashion, implies a necessary component whose changes affect the conditions
of reproduction of the whole system. The living conditions of the working
population, in fact, have a crucial impact on the efficiency of production, the
dimension of markets and the distribution of income.4 Thus unpaid work as
a major component of the process of social reproduction has a structural role
which still needs to be adequately analysed and conceptualised.
In this tangle of questions, statistical language may offer a few useful
signposts to avoid getting lost in complexity. When unpaid labour is
revealed and quantified, it can be seen in its social and historical features.
Moreover, we can escape the reductionism of a purely demographic approach
that seems to take into account only sex, age, number of children and family
composition, as if the position of women (young and old) and of the young
and old (men and women) depended only on natural characteristics such as
sex and age and not on the division of labour, income and social respons-
ibility based on the social power of the different segments of the population,
both in society and the family.
Despite historical changes in economic contexts, technologies, fertility
rates, forms of sexual and generational relationships, the quantity of unpaid
socially reproductive labour and its distribution on the basis of sex and age
is proving slow to change. This, however, is a fact that needs to be
explained; it cannot be attributed to an immutable self-sacrificing female
nature. The unpaid work of reproduction bears the burden of many contra-
dictory demands both for modernisation and the defence of tradition; for
recognition of equal opportunities and for the maintenance of historical hier-
archies between men and women; for the opportunity to leave home to earn
an income and the stability required to manage everyday life. The tensions
can be disentangled and the blob given a shape only by starting from a
perspective of women’s agency in disclosing real processes, setting priorities
and in finding a sense in the relationship between the individual man and
woman and society. Their agency defines a social space, which includes the
three fundamental economic institutions – family, state and market – and
both paid and unpaid work.
The necessary reductionism of statistical measurement enables us to stand
back and distinguish, for example, housework from the work of personal care
and the work of financial and bureaucratic management. Statistics assume,
among other things, a symbolic role, which makes it possible to confront the
problem in less dense and private terms. The tensions in the real world over
the distribution of work and resources between production and social repro-
duction can lead economists to shut their eyes to the problem. The trouble is
that in this defensive blindness many important questions disappear from
view, so that problems which are important in economic reality drop out of
the analysis, and those that remain are distorted. This has more than mar-
ginal implications for the failure of economic policies.
In the case of women, the removal of the relationship between paid and
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unpaid work from the analysis of their position in the labour market patently
lacks sense. The female labour market is marked by the very interweaving of
paid and unpaid work; the distribution of time between these two kinds of
work is continually adjusted in the life cycle, week and day, depending on
conventions rooted in time and class and gender power relationships. This
experience, largely female, has finally acquired empirical visibility in official
statistics at international level; for example, the Canadian Statistical Institute
has published a satellite account on ‘total work’ that includes all the activ-
ities, paid and unpaid, of men and women (Statistics Canada 1996).
The fact that unpaid work does not meet the golden rules of substitution
between activities on the basis of relative prices given the income and time
constraints, but depends instead on conventional rules, power relationships
and responsibilities, is not due to backwardness. In fact, it is strongly
present even in industrialised countries, as shown in the UNDP Human
Development Reports.5 If one looks beyond the traditional indicators of equal
opportunity (activity rates, political representation, public and health ser-
vices), the contradictory link between paid and unpaid work emerges even in
Sweden, where inequalities between men and women, in the labour market
and in relation to the state, remain strong with regard to part-time jobs,
wages and salaries, and incomes (in level and type). Even in Sweden, persis-
tent gender differences in the distribution of unpaid work between men and
women may be seen in hours of work, careers, sectors, qualifications and
public transfers (Nyberg 1998).6
In Italy, in the Region of Emilia Romagna, where women’s activity rates
are the highest in the country and the standard of childcare services is relat-
ively high in quality and extent, we find a persistent solid amount of unpaid
work.7 The result is that Emilian women have the highest total workload in
Italy, thanks also to male behaviour similar to that in the South. It is inter-
esting to note that even the high quality of services has the effect of increas-
ing unpaid work – on the one hand, because working time is increased, for
example, by travel and school meetings, and, on the other, because when a
child is at home the relationship dictates new priorities with respect to other
domestic activities (Osservatorio 1997: Chapter 9).
Structure of the research
This research uses the visibility of unpaid work, made possible by the data
from the Italian Statistical Service (ISTAT) Time-Use Survey, to investigate
the question of the living conditions of the working population and their
productive role in the functioning of the economic system. The ISTAT
survey lays the groundwork for beginning to answer questions such as ‘How
much unpaid work is done?’ and ‘Who does it?’ Nevertheless, there still
remains the problem of where and how to use the information within the
economic system to give an adequate reflection of its quantitative and
qualitative importance. For this purpose, this study is based on the connec-
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tions identified between the economic system and unpaid work. On the basis
of these conceptual and quantitative connections, it may be possible to start
thinking of economic policies to address the problem directly, rather than
continually tracking down its perverse and unexpected effects. This is a new,
undeveloped field in which one can proceed only by trial and error, and
hence with caution and modesty, to consolidate analytical and empirical
tools that may help to yield an advance in the state of the art.
The research proceeds on three levels: (1) the conceptualisation of links
between unpaid work and the structure of the economic system; (2) the
formulation and calibration of some tools for bringing data on unpaid work
into direct relation with incomes, consumption and the labour market; (3)
the indication of possible areas in which to assess the gender impact of eco-
nomic policies, focusing on total work and extended incomes.
The connection between unpaid work and the economic structure is iden-
tified in the living conditions of the working population, conceived of as a
process in which goods, services and work (paid and unpaid) are used to
socially reproduce the population and enable it to keep the system going.
Unpaid work is inserted into a circular flow of production of goods and ser-
vices in which the space for human development is defined by the living
conditions and well-being of the working population. This is a macroeco-
nomic analytical picture that goes beyond the traditional microeconomic
approach of analysis of the family. However, when the compact family
nucleus is opened up by the analysis of the intra-family distribution of work
and the consequent extension of the economic analysis, there is a risk of dan-
gerous economistic reductionisms. To avoid these, at least in part, we also
proceed to expand the meaning of individual and collective objectives and
behaviour. This expansion is tied up with the concept of well-being, under-
stood not in the traditional utilitarian sense of individual maximisation of
utility within given constraints of time and income, but as the result of
individual and social real practices which develop human capabilities for the
exercise of vital social functionings, expressing and shaping the quality of
men’s and women’s lives. The multidimensionality of these functions
‘expands’ the analysis to a field different from that of the traditional eco-
nomic analyses focused exclusively on the exchange and allocation of scarce
commodities. In this way we can bring to light certain qualitative modifica-
tions in the relation between (sexed and gendered) individuals and society,
and make visible certain tensions inherent in the labour market, and
through it the production and exchange of social wealth.
Placing unpaid work within a macroeconomic circular flow makes it pos-
sible to raise the question of the quality and adequacy of living conditions
and well-being of the working population, not as women’s responsibility but
as a central and general problem of the system, thus redefining the traditional
view where the functioning of the economic system is reduced to monetary
exchanges. The point is not to reduce the work of social reproduction to an
economistic dimension by stripping it of the complexity and richness of
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other anthropological, cultural and emotional dimensions, but to find an
approach that does not relegate it to the margin of the analysis of the eco-
nomic structure and its dynamics. This inclusion could lead to a different
view as to what is meant by ‘economic’, since economic reductionism derives
largely from the very removal of the many dimensions of the process of
social reproduction of the population.
Traditionally in economics, conceptualisations must go hand in hand
with measurements, because this makes it possible to create a ground for
reasonable consensus.8 At the empirical level this study carries forward
experimentally the integration of unpaid work and incomes, combining the
data made available by the ISTAT Time Budget Survey with another
important data-set, that of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income
and Wealth. The availability and adequacy of data on unpaid reproductive
labour are still far from being satisfactory, but even more needs to be done
to develop essential tools for empirical analysis to link the data on total
labour (paid and unpaid) with data on income. This is not surprising, since
even data on wages and incomes disaggregated by sex are still scarce.
In their collective research in this volume the authors of the different con-
tributions:
• Measure the distribution of total working time and resources between
men and women in Italy, by an innovative econometric model matching
time-use data with other standard data-sets.
• Explore alternative ways to measure the contribution of unpaid work to
welfare, using a new, fuzzy logic approach.
• Analyse the links between use of time, consumption of goods and con-
sumption of time-saving goods.
• Link use of time in paid and unpaid work and demographic variables
(fertility and presence of children in the household).
• Study how the choice between paid and unpaid work is affected by taxa-
tion and subsidies, and then assess the impact of some policy measures
on this choice.
• Recommend public policies that explicitly take into account the eco-
nomic value of unpaid work.
Different authors have written the following chapters, but the book is the
result of a closely coordinated research effort which lasted for more than two
years, focusing on unpaid work and its contribution to the economic system.
Very different approaches and quantitative tools are used derived from
various intellectual traditions in economics to investigate the same subject: a
classical institutional circular macroeconomic approach, a microeconomic
neoclassical analysis, a capability framework, econometrics and a non-
standard mathematical methodology. The result is that by making all of
women’s work visible, new dimensions of the economic system are disclosed
such as a process of social reproduction, the role of social conventions and
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historical power relationships, and the structural interlinkage between
family, state and markets. It is an advance in terms of realism, which
requires further discussion to lead to a theoretical framework of relative
prices and distribution of incomes and resources capable of reflecting the
relevance and nature of these problems. The techniques and tools used here
are different, but the choice was to allow each researcher to confront the
problem of unpaid work using her or his own ‘tool-box’ without being con-
strained, in this experimental phase, by attempts at theoretical uniformity.
This means that the work is not only pragmatic but also eclectic. All the
contributors, however, share common objectives and focus, and all succeed
in producing a shift of perspective.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the overall theoretical framework of the
research using a circular macro framework containing unpaid work and
revealing its contribution in the family, in social well-being and in the labour
market. In fact, Figure 1.2 may be used as a guide to placing the various con-
tributions of the different authors in a sequence that follows the basic func-
tions of unpaid work. First, it starts with the process of extending standards
of living from a bundle of commodities and services acquired through the
paid economy into its transformation by unpaid work into an actual standard.
Second, it follows the process of expanding the actual standard of living into
a state of well-being which focuses on the formation of individual capabilities
and their use in social functioning. Third, it shows the function of unpaid
work in supporting the waged labour market in its selection of people.
Finally, Figure 1.3 provides a broader picture that covers the monetary and
non-monetary economy necessary to assess social policy, taking into account
unpaid work. In Chapter 2 Addabbo uses ISTAT Time Budget Survey data
(TBS) in order to measure the amount of unpaid work undertaken by people
of different sexes in households of different composition; on different days of
the week a woman’s unpaid work increases in the presence of children, and
also, independently, in the presence of a husband and other adult members of
the household.9 In Chapter 3 Addabbo and Caiumi match two different data
sources (ISTAT TBS and the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and
Wealth, SHIW) to measure the monetary value of unpaid work, by imputing
unpaid work estimated by using ISTAT TBS data to the Bank of Italy SHIW
data. Addabbo and Caiumi present computations according to two leading
methodologies (service price and opportunity cost). Finally, they add the
monetary value of unpaid work to money income, to obtain an econometric
measure of ‘extended’ household income. This is a better measure of total
resources accruing to the family than monetary income alone, and therefore a
more accurate tool in measuring welfare and its distribution. In Chapter 4,
Caiumi provides some technical background on how equivalence scales
change when household production is included in the selected bundle of
conventional necessities. The results show that the age profile of the cost of
children is significantly affected and that data on unpaid work are essential
in order to analyse infra-household allocation of resources. In Chapter 5,
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Chiappero-Martinetti takes a very innovative approach, pointing to the
concept of ‘capabilities and functioning’ introduced by Amartya Sen, making
it operational by means theory of fuzzy sets, and underlying the strong
gender inequality in the provision of basic functioning found in Italian data.
Campanelli (Chapter 6) studies the complicated pattern of ‘convenience con-
sumption’ of time-saving commodities. The availability of such commodities
does not increase leisure time, since social conventions change the normal
standards of living. In Chapter 7, Giannelli and Monfardini analyse the
gender impact of adult children co-residence with their family on their
labour supply and on unpaid work. Addis (Chapter 8) compares the role of
different welfare state ‘regimes’ (Nordic, Liberal and Bismarckian) in deter-
mining the amount of unpaid and paid work undertaken by men and women;
she also shows how some types of welfare programme foster women’s low par-
ticipation rates, high unemployment rates, dependency and low fertility,
while others do not. Finally, Addabbo and Baldini (Chapter 9) use the data
and the econometric tools developed in Chapters 2 and 3 to measure the
impact of the recent Italian minimum insertion income policy, taking into
account total work and extended income.
The research proceeds by partial but significant examples, seeking, on the
one hand, to conceptualise the question of living standards in terms of com-
modities, services and unpaid work. On the other hand, it aims to elaborate
certain quantitative tools to measure the impact of unpaid work at policy
level. The initial objective of extending and deepening the analysis showing
the importance of unpaid work on certain important dimensions of the eco-
nomic system seems to have been achieved with regard to:
• the distribution of income;
• the distribution of work and incomes within the family;
• the analysis of well-being as the generation and exercise of human cap-
abilities and functionings;
• the elucidation of certain links between unpaid work and the consump-
tion market;
• the importance of an extended approach for evaluating the impact of
economic policies.
As the person responsible for directing this study commissioned by CNEL
(Consiglio Nazionale Economia e Lavoro) from the Department of Political
Economy of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and as editor of
this book, I must thank the whole research group. Their enthusiasm and
sense of involvement has made the work very gratifying and productive for
the common purpose of adapting analytical and empirical tools to reality –
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I would like to thank my very dear friends Ann Johnston and Joan Hall.
Ann has copyedited the whole book with her well-known competence and
kindly took upon herself all the tensions arising from inaccuracies in the ori-
ginal; Joan has, once again, generously supported me with her expertise in
languages, translating the Introduction and Chapter 1 with great improve-
ments to my style and thoughts.
Finally, I am very grateful to Adriana Buffardi and Caterina Guarna,
respectively, at the time, Counsellor and Senior Officer of CNEL, who used
their influence to open an institutional space for this research and supported
it warmly all the way. I also thank CNEL for having financed the research
and for allowing permission for its publication.
Notes
1 To indicate the whole range of activities listed we shall often use the term ‘work of
social reproduction’.
2 The term ‘working population’ denotes that part of the population which has access
to the means of subsistence through income from work, not property. Obviously
this is not a clearly defined category, since the working population may also have
access to some income from property (e.g. home ownership, pension funds). Never-
theless, there remains a large part of the population which depends principally on
wages and other forms of paid work, either directly or indirectly as family depen-
dants.
3 The capabilities approach is becoming a wide field of research. For some basic refer-
ences see Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1987, 1993.
4 It is worth remembering that the classical political economy focused on the struc-
tural dynamics of the social system. In its analysis the questions of money, inter-
national trade, value, capital, distribution of income and, last but by no means least,
the subsistence of the population are all fundamental blocks of its foundations. In
the analysis of the classical economists subsistence did not mean survival, but the
materially and socially sustainable conditions of life (Picchio 1998). As social theo-
rists and economic thinkers become aware that capital is constituted essentially by
waged labour, the question of subsistence – i.e. of the social and reproductive ade-
quacy of wages – is progressively removed, reappearing later only as separate and
marginal, i.e as a demographic problem, wage rigidity, poverty and social exclusion.
5 See in particular Human Development Report 1995 and the ones following.
6 Even in the case of the Swedish Institute of Statistics, definitions have a strong sym-
bolic value. For example, the concept of ‘independence’ is interpreted differently for
men and women: a woman is defined as ‘independent’ when she earns a living wage,
while a man is considered ‘independent’ when he can live without working for a
wage. For the woman, in other words, it is mainly a question of independence from
men, while for a man it is independence from waged work (Nyberg 1998: 3).
7 In spite of an activity rate for women between the ages of 25 and 55 at 60 per cent,
Introduction 9
and the lowest percentage of housewives in Italy at 9.1 per cent against a national
average of 14.9 per cent (Osservatorio 1997: 98, 125).
8 On the question of measurements as a key to confirm theories, i.e. making them
acceptable by the profession, and thus as part of a rhetorical practice in scientific
language, see Kuhn (1977: 178–92).
9 The research uses the 1989 ISTAT Time-Budget Survey (TBS), because it is the
most detailed, and it collects on a daily basis the allocation of time for each house-
hold member over the age of 3. These time budget data provide more precise
information on paid and unpaid work because they allow for simultaneous use of
time and are less affected by recall errors than other types of data. At any rate, the
imbalance in the distribution of time-use by gender is also confirmed by more
recent time-budget data which report only weekly average hours of unpaid work
(ISTAT Household Survey 1994, 1998; Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income
and Wealth 2000). In the Bank of Italy Survey in 2000, some questions on unpaid
work were inserted for the first time, following the advice of Tindara Addabbo and
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti.
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1 A macroeconomic approach




The statistical quantification of the unpaid work of social reproduction
requires a conceptualisation of the economic system capable of containing it,
taking account of its dimensions and its quality. Unpaid work involves the
upkeep of living spaces and domestic goods, care of the health, education
and psychological needs of family members, and the maintenance of social
relationships. According to statistical classifications, it is divided into
domestic labour (transformation of goods and care of living spaces), care of
persons, and work required to link the domestic and public spheres arising
from family responsibilities (e.g. taking children to school, paying bills).
Data show, at international level, that these three components may change
in weight, but the total does not alter. For example, in some types of family
less time is spent preparing meals and more time is spent on childcare and
servicing (e.g. taking them to the swimming pool, to school).1 Quantita-
tively, unpaid work, measured in units of time, in Italy and in other coun-
tries, slightly exceeds the total amount of paid work done by men and
women, while, qualitatively, it is essential for the maintenance of the system
as a whole. Thus, this work constitutes one of the major aggregates of the
economic system. In its specific activities and their relative weights it
reflects historical and cultural changes; its basic functions, along with public
services and the provision of market goods and services, are central to the
process of social reproduction of the population.2 Unpaid work is essential,
both for those who benefit from it and for those who do it; it is part of the
basic organisation of living conditions, and it reflects historical relationships
between men and women, classes and generations.
Data on the use of time show that it is simplistic to believe that children
and the old are the only ones to benefit from domestic and care work.
Behind these groups are stronger ones, especially adult men, for whom
women’s housework and care is a basic support for living, not only at times
of crisis but also, and especially, in normal, everyday life. Daily reproductive
activities are interwoven with the labour market which regulates mobility,
times and conditions of paid and unpaid work. The division between men
and women of the unpaid work of social reproduction within the household
constitutes the kernel of gender difference. In fact the data show a macro-
scopic difference in men’s and women’s use of time, which in Italy is greater
than in other countries (Picchio 1992, 1999; Sabbadini and Palomba 1995;
Addabbo, Chapter 2, this volume).
This study, while adopting gender difference as a tool of analysis, uses
the experience and awareness of this difference to reveal some basic aspects
of the economic system, and the persistence of certain profound tensions
within it. The analytical link between gender difference and the economic
system is indicated in the living conditions of the working population
and in their role as social capital. The argument for integrating the unpaid
work of social reproduction into the view of the system, and hence into
macroeconomic analysis, is here articulated in three circular-flow diagrams
linking, first, families and firms, and then families, firms, the state and civil
society.3
The major functions of reproductive labour at systemic level are to ensure
the quantity and quality of the population: (1) to extend income from a
monetary value to a standard of living that includes the transformation of
goods and services through unpaid domestic labour; (2) to expand the
extended standard of living into a condition of well-being which involves
the enjoyment of specific, conventionally established levels of education,
health and social relations; (3) to sustain the filtering process of the labour
market (young and old, women and men, able and non-able); in this case,
the unpaid work done in the home serves to underpin the selection of indi-
viduals for the labour market and the personal capacities used. Thus, unpaid
work both materially and psychologically facilitates the processes of adapta-
tion to the waged labour market, absorbing its tensions.
From the statistical point of view, extending the definition of income
means counting unpaid work as one of the components of wealth. A grilled
steak is more enjoyable and digestible than a raw steak; how it is cooked and
how it is eaten depends on the cultural and historical context, but cooking
meat is as much a part of economic reality as producing and selling it, all
the more so as the one who produces (the waged worker) needs to eat
enough, if possible in company, to be productive. Hence the extension
affects both the accounting of a contribution to the production of wealth and
the accounting of a cost necessary to produce adequate living conditions for
labour efficiency. The absence of a commercial exchange in the case of
socially reproductive work in the family has made a basic contribution to
social wealth invisible, and has also obscured an important part of the costs
of production.4
Whereas extension takes account of the quantitative aspects of the unpaid
work of reproduction, adding these to monetary income to define the stan-
dard of living in terms of goods and services in their effective form, the
expansion of the standard of living (as an extended bundle of goods and ser-
vices) to include well-being takes account of the qualitative aspects of the
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work of social reproduction, and recognises the change of priorities and
direction inherent in caring for people. That is to say, the primary aim of
this work is the well-being of persons in terms of their quality of life. This is
a material, social and cultural process based on trust, affection, friendship
and social relations, which requires a sense of responsibility in order to
achieve results. The expansion of income into well-being depends on actions
and practices directed towards the well-being of persons. This perspective, as
in the case of the approach used by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Sen
1987, 1993; Nussbaum 2000), involves a change of priorities and direction:
instead of using human labour as a means of valuing commodities, we use
commodities as means in a multidimensional process of social reproduction
at individual and collective level. This reversal has been analysed by
Amartya Sen in a microeconomic context focusing on the actual freedom of
individual non-utilitarian choices in given social contexts.
In this study, on the one hand, we make unpaid reproductive work
visible; on the other hand, we locate well-being in a macro surplus approach
and see it as a state within a process of social reproduction. In this approach,
the exogenous distribution between wages and profit is centred on the very
tensions between the living conditions of the working population and profit
accumulation (Picchio 1992, 1998, 2000). Thus we follow a macroeconomic
approach in which well-being is conceived of not in terms of individual
choices, but as part of a structural framework that includes the material
processes of production, distribution and exchange of wealth together with
the process of social reproduction of the working population. Inserting an
inherently institutional, historical and symbolic process such as that of social
reproduction into the basic structure leads to radical modifications in the
way the whole system is conceptualised. Moreover, class tensions are seen as
centred on the historical social quality of the relationship, and the inter-
action between working and living conditions of waged labour.
Finally, the work of reproduction – besides making the living conditions
of the working population sustainable – facilitates the functioning of the
filter through which the population gains access to wages through the
labour market. This involves a great flexibility of adaptation. At present, for
example, in a context of variable work hours, increasing geographical mobil-
ity and intermittent access to wages, the family acts more and more as a
filter compensating between disposable incomes and aspirations to socially
adequate standards of living and rising expectations.
Important information on current changes in the functioning of the
labour market as a filter of access to income may be found in the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) in which one can study and make
comparisons among European countries with regard to changing types and
distribution of incomes, rates of poverty, long-term unemployment and
levels of family satisfaction. Changes in access to the labour market are com-
bined with changes in the form of labour contracts. Among other things, the
Panel’s data show an increasing tendency towards workers being trapped in
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low wages and a growing rate of poverty within waged labour (Lucifora
1997). There is also a rise in the rate of dependency in terms of the number
of people dependent on one wage. The growing tension within the family
between the distribution of income and living standards, rooted in habits,
tastes and social conventions, suggests that current restructuring in the
labour market and welfare systems is being translated into an increased
burden of unpaid work mostly done by women within the family. Neverthe-
less, economic policies devote very little attention to the problem of the ade-
quacy of income with respect to conventional living conditions, and this fact
leads, in present structural adjustments, to an intensification of unpaid
labour that hides a withdrawal of firms and the state from their social
responsibilities towards the quality of life.
Although research on family incomes explicitly studies the contributions
made by different family members, the contribution of reproductive work
continues to be ignored. In its questionnaire the European Panel asks one
question about the care of the respondent’s own children and about the
unpaid care of other people’s children, and one question about the daily
unpaid activity of attendance on elderly, ill or disabled people. These two
questions belong to a group of seven under the title ‘Responsibilities and
social relations’. While recognising that the questions are burdensome in
terms of survey costs, we must note that in other areas the questionnaire
goes into greater detail – for example, there are twenty questions on courses
of study. This difference in the amount of attention indicates that only pro-
fessional training and education are considered, not the long and delicate
process of formation of individual capabilities. This takes place mostly in the
family, and serves increasingly as the basis of working capacities, especially
in new jobs with a high relational content.
One way of beginning to break this analytical ground is to insert the
great mass of unpaid labour of social reproduction into the basic analytical
framework of the economic system. We can begin with a diagram, usually
used in economics textbooks, here called the ‘simple co-operative circular
flow’, which shows a relationship of circular interdependence between famil-
ies and firms (Figure 1.1). In this circular flow are shown relations of
exchange, both monetary and real: the firms buy labour and sell goods, the
families provide labour and buy goods. It is assumed that this flow is repro-
duced on the basis of co-operation between the two institutions for the reci-
procal interdependence of their interests.
The first step is, then, to extend this circular flow to include unpaid work
of social reproduction, in its quantitative and qualitative aspects (Figure
1.2). Using data on unpaid work one can study the distribution of work
within the family, and ‘extend’ the notion of living conditions now seen as
the result of a process that uses market and non-market goods and services
and unpaid reproductive work. This process operates in social contexts,
given in historical time and geopolitical space, which define adequate stand-
ards of living, and the social norms that regulate the division of labour and
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personal responsibilities. The extension leads us into a space defined as human
development (Figure 1.2). Using this concept of ‘human development’ one
can carry out measurements which do not necessarily overlook the complex-
ity of the process of social reproduction, and which make it possible to deal
with some of its dimensions. This is done partly in the UNDP Human Devel-
opment Reports, both in their indexes and in their indicators of living con-
ditions. Here, we propose to extend the human development approach to
include unpaid labour and to place it in a classical political economy macro
approach. In doing so we juxtapose it to a neoclassical analytical framework
that is basically ahistorical and spatially non-specific, with human subjects
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freed from bodily needs. Thus conventional necessities are treated as simple
‘frictions’, i.e. non-necessities for the economic system. Moreover, in the
neoclassical framework, social conventions and power relationships may be
seen only as rigidities. In fact, they cannot be included as a general feature of
the economic system without contradicting the basic generalisations of the
theory embodied in its axioms. The problem is that in the process of social
reproduction, by definition, conventions, personal interrelationships and
social power relationships are fundamental persistent features. In the process
of social reproduction the micro and macro aspects interact dynamically and
cannot be separated, although there are many potential tensions which
operate at both individual and collective level.
Finally, the potential tensions inherent in the distribution of work,
resources and personal responsibilities are visualised in the third diagram
entitled ‘Social Wealth Flow’ (Figure 1.3). This flow shows both the rela-
tions between the monetary and the non-monetary economy and their ten-
sions with respect to aims and social practices.
A simple co-operative circular flow
The exchange relationships shown in Figure 1.1, as we said, are real and
monetary: firms give money in exchange for labour, and families use the
money to buy goods produced by the firms.5
The circular flow may be reproduced continuously if the reciprocity of the
exchange enables the two institutions, which organise the production of
goods and the reproduction of labour respectively, to have the necessary
resources to carry out their functions again. This scheme indicates explicitly
that the market for labour and goods is based on institutions (family/firm),
but does not include the state, which enters only in Figure 1.3. However,
the bipolarity between families and firms could be useful in bringing out the
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adjustments between the two institutions and the two processes – produc-
tion of goods and social reproduction of the working population (Picchio
1987, 1992). In the analytical structure of classical political economy, the
lack of adjustment was considered normal, and the study of effective rela-
tions was referred to the historical and anthropological analysis of social
behaviour. The classical approach to long-term positions took as given the
population (in terms of quantity and living standards), production and tech-
niques, and defined the conditions of reproducibility of the system via
market exchange.6 On the basis of these data the classical economists put
forward a system of relative normal prices. There are certainly links between
production, distribution and exchange of wealth, on the one hand, and pro-
creative behaviour and social and individual relationships, on the other. The
question is how these relationships should be regarded: should they be seen
as unidirectional, continuous, automatically interdependent and foreseeable,
as the neoclassical theory would have it, or should they be studied histori-
cally, navigating between visions, conceptualisations, possible measurements
and short causal chains?
If we are seeking plausible and realistic conjectures, we can proceed by
looking further into some elements of the first diagram, sacrificing part of its
simplicity while largely maintaining the clarity on which its effectiveness is
based. First of all, note that the income of firms is different in kind from that
of families. In the former case it is profit, in the latter, wages. The former
derives from ownership of the means of production, the latter from labour.
While certain complications are inessential and can be left out of the picture,
such as the fact that incomes from labour may have different typologies, the
difference between firms’ income and family income is fundamental.
Given the nature of the difference between the two types of monetary
income, the conditions of reproduction of the system require, as shown in
Figure 1.2, that the wages fund be smaller than the value of production, so
as to leave a residue for profits (S  P  W). For the reproduction of capital,
the wages fund must be adequate for the living conditions laid down over
time and generally considered acceptable by the working population. This
idea of conditions of subsistence of workers and their families as capital,
which belonged to the core of the classical economists’ theory, has not only
been dropped by neoclassical economists who see wages merely as net wages,
but also overlooked by present critical economists. None the less, this is a
crucial concept in grasping the role of the living standards of the working
population and disclosing some inherent tensions in the basic conditions of
reproduction of economic systems. It is important to realise that what
appears as a problem of basic needs of some sections of the population is, in
fact, a reflection of a lack of clarity about the basic needs of the economic
system. The capitalist system treats labour as a commodity and, in reality
and in theory, needs to assume that it is a producible commodity, but it
excludes its process of reproduction from systematic analytical scrutiny. The
reason for this removal from theory of the analysis of a fundamental process
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has to be found in the deep tensions and contradictions inherent in the
capitalist relationship between the process of the social reproduction of the
working population, as individuals with sex and class, and the production of
commodities.7 The unpaid work of social reproduction reflects all of these
tensions.
Here the standard of living of the working population is studied, taking
into account the household resources and the behaviour of men and women
within the family with regard to the division of labour, income and repro-
ductive responsibilities. This means that population enters not only as a
quantity and a purely demographic datum, but as the result of a complex
social process requiring goods and labour, a process regulated by social
norms, given in historical time and bearing local characteristics. In doing so
we restore to analytical attention one of the great themes of economic
science, most prominent at the moment of its foundation.8
The dynamic tensions inherent in the process of human social reproduction
have led historically to profound changes in production and in the use of
natural resources. The very concept of nature has changed continuously. The
Scottish Enlightenment theorists, including Smith, considered the forces
inherent in human subsistence to be deeply dynamic and capable of determin-
ing epoch-making transformations. For a certain period a subsistence crisis can
lead to destructive adjustments, but in the end insatiable wants and the sur-
vival instinct manage to find effective ways of modifying the modes of produc-
tion of resources and reaching a new sustainable system (Meek 1976). In the
history of these changes women have always played an important active role,
though this is generally ignored and usually taken as simply adaptive.
The extended income circular flow
The process of social reproduction of the population defines what we have
called, in Figure 1.2, ‘human development space’, characterised by indi-
vidual and social action aimed directly at living conditions.
The concept of human development is different from that of ‘human
capital’, which is close but in fact is in tension with it. By human develop-
ment we mean the analysis of conditions of sustainability of the process of
social reproduction of the population, while the concept of ‘human capital’
implies an instrumental use of people as tools of production. Obviously to
live one must produce, and to produce one must live; but to understand the
functioning of any economic system we need to grasp the specific historical
relationship between ends and means. To do that it is necessary to specify
priorities and reveal the power relationships between subjects – relationships
that affect what, how much, how, why and for whom production takes place.
We approach these deeper aspects by extending Figure 1.1 and convert-
ing it into an ‘extended income circular flow’ (Figure 1.2). Here, in quanti-
tative and qualitative terms, the mass of unpaid reproductive labour is seen
in relation to firms and the system of production.
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First of all, note that the wages fund (W) paid to workers is given by the
number of labour units, workers (L), for the hours of work (h), for the
average unit wage (w). The wages fund can increase or decrease through
variation of any of these variables, or, in a supply-and-demand approach,
with given variable capital, these variables can change only if the wages fund
changes. The question is the direction of the causal relationship. Economic
theories differ on the determination of the wages fund because they disagree
on the theory of wages, distribution and relative prices. The theoretical dif-
ferences constitute a line of demarcation between paradigms, the line runs
along the definition of wages and their position in the theory of distribution
and the system of relative prices. Wages are treated either as costs of social
reproduction or as marginal productivity of labour. Thus how the process of
social reproduction of labour is seen becomes indeed a crucial question, for
the real system as well as for the analytical vision.
When we come to the family we note some differences in the explanation
of the family’s role between the first and the second circular flows. In the first
it is assumed, for simplicity, that the family co-operatively reproduces the
right quantity and quality of labour. Theories also differ on the explanation of
this matter. Classical political economists considered the reproduction of the
quantity and quality of labour exogenous to the theory of relative normal
prices. In the neoclassical theory, wages are determined simultaneously with
profits and relative prices, and the standard of living of the working popu-
lation is endogenous. The theoretical abstraction is matched by an idealisa-
tion of reality, which assumes that the daily life choices are also a continuous
well-behaved function of wages and relative prices. Of course if reality does
not fit the theory and changes in relative prices do not systematically change
individual behaviour, the problem of adapting the reproduction of the popu-
lation in quantitative and qualitative terms to numbers and characteristics
required by firms becomes crucial, both for people’s lives and for the effi-
ciency of the system. This problem relates not only to formal education and
training, usually acknowledged by human-capital theory, but also to the far
more complex problem of social reproduction in the widest sense, taking in
bodily needs and desires, expectations, culture, personal capabilities, social
functioning, sense of responsibility, character and identity.9
In Figure 1.1 families are assumed to act co-operatively with firms in a
natural social division of labour; this also means that internally the families
are harmonious, with an equally natural division of roles between their
members on the basis of sex and age. In Figure 1.2 the analytical scheme is
‘extended’ to include unpaid work. In this context the family becomes com-
plicated and perhaps less harmonious, as always happens with division of
labour. This may be why people try through innovative relations, escaping
fixed institutional frameworks, to reduce the tensions inherent in the ide-
alised and institutional family.
In economic analysis unpaid work disappears, partly because this aggreg-
ate counted in terms of workers and hours (Ld and h), does not emerge as a
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monetary transaction. If the wage for domestic work is zero, its wages fund
(Wd) is also zero in spite of a large number of domestic workers (Ld) and
hours (h). To work in terms of extended income we must therefore assign a
monetary value to the task of social reproduction. This does not imply an
actual redistribution of income – the point is merely to make visible an
important component of the circular flow. Introducing a monetary element
can be compared with introducing a chemical reagent which does not create
a new element but makes evident one that already exists. The extended stan-
dard of living, composed of transformed goods and services, is different from
the standard of living composed of a package of goods and services acquired
directly in the market. To give some dimension to the extension, it is worth
remembering that the extended standard incorporates a slightly greater sta-
tistical quantity of labour than the total paid work used in the production of
market goods and services (see Addabbo, Chapter 2, this volume).
The extension of income has qualitative as well as quantitative dimen-
sions. For example, a microeconometric analysis of the Italian case carried
out by Addabbo and Caiumi in Chapter 3, this volume, shows that the per-
sonal distribution of extended income is less unequal than effective income.
This result obtains whether the monetary value assigned to unpaid work is
equated to the cost of generic domestic services, or whether the amount is
differentiated according to the market-earning capacity of the person who
does the work.10 Whatever monetary weight is adopted, the reduction of
inequalities emerging in the analysis of extended income corresponds to a
real process of absorption of the impact of inequalities made possible by
unpaid domestic work. While in terms of income and wealth, inequalities
are marked with clear effects on spending and social participation (Bran-
dolini 1977), unpaid work is distributed much more evenly among classes.
Part of the responsibility of caregivers is to try to counterbalance the dif-
ficulties and the frustration of a disadvantaged social situation. It is precisely
the analytical recognition of needs, capabilities and expectations on the basis
of common humanity that characterises what we call the process of ‘expan-
sion’ of income to include well-being. Well-being is seen as a space of
human development for the whole working population and not only of the
wages and working conditions of those employed. Within the household it
is not feasible to reproduce the pattern of exclusions typical of the labour
market. Though there are hierarchies among family members, rooted in
time on the basis of sex and age, given the common relationships of affection
and solidarity, it becomes difficult to eliminate and abandon the family
members excluded from the market. That would in any case be illegal since
the law, in Italy and in other countries, fixes the degree of personal respons-
ibility for family members and relatives. Moreover, the same normative
responsibilities are referred to explicitly in the formulation and implementa-
tion of economic and social policies.
At present, access to the labour market and to employment is undergoing
major restructuring, and the institutional forms that regulate it are chang-
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ing, in Italy as well as elsewhere in Europe. Hence it becomes important to
keep track of functional income distribution, living standards, public ser-
vices and the unpaid work of social reproduction, together with activity
rates, unemployment and labour rights.11 The level of wages also has to be
monitored as an increasing number of people are trapped at low wage levels,
to the point where the European Commission had to refer to a ‘threshold of
decency’ and the existence of poverty among employed people is already
noticeable (OECD 1996; Lucifora 1997). However, while it is common
sense that the structure of the labour market with regard to access, levels of
wages, dependency rates and so on has an impact on the standard of living,
data on the labour market are usually not shown in direct relation to real
living conditions of the working population.
Economists take account of living conditions only in a sporadic and un-
focused way. There is no explicit reference to the classical concept of a con-
ventionally necessary standard of living that once belonged to the analysis of
value, capital and income distribution. It is a dense multidimensional
concept combining equity and efficiency; its material and symbolic density
is a reflection of the complexity of labour as a human factor of production,
necessarily relating to real people with bodies and minds, therefore located
in time and space and embedded in social and personal relationships.
To guarantee the stability of the household and of the productive system
the work of social reproduction needs to be very flexible, but its elasticity is
not infinite, and at present it is strained to the limit by the breakdown of
the old so-called Fordist social compact based, at least theoretically, on an
adequate wage for the head of the family, a stable job, a wife at home and
access to mass consumption (Anderson et al. 1994). That system has col-
lapsed for various reasons, such as the restructuring of firms at global level,
technological development of the communications sector, rising expecta-
tions, changing tastes and recurrent national fiscal crises. Moreover, the col-
lapse of the Socialist bloc allowed Western countries to revise the role of the
state and its agency as mediator of the class conflict. Last but not least, the
old compact has also been ruled out by changes in power relationships
between the sexes. The opening up of new opportunities for women, the
adding together of men’s and women’s incomes for the maintenance of the
family, an increase of consumption financed by an increase in paid work
(Shor 1992), mask a degree of decline in the quality of life. The increase in
total labour (paid and unpaid), the growth of job insecurity, growing
poverty, are exacerbating the tense relationship between production of com-
modities and social reproduction of labour. Priorities are changing, placing
cuts in public spending and increased labour–market flexibility at the top of
the list. The result is that governments are reducing their welfare expendi-
ture. The visibility of unpaid work could help to reveal the effects of this
reduction and the real costs of structural adjustments not only in terms of
poverty but also in terms of normal conditions of social sustainability and
social capital.
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Unpaid work is under continuous pressure, because it is expected to close
the gap between distributed income and conventional consumption and
necessities. Incomes are effectively extended through unpaid work in order
to fill gaps between resources and normal expectations. Women continue to
be frustrated because all the tactics used to reduce unpaid work and to shift
part of their responsibilities are not effective, in spite of all the major
changes occurring in society and in the relationships between sexes and gen-
erations. As a matter of fact the problem of the tensions between living and
working conditions cannot be solved by urging women to make better use of
their capabilities or by subsidising the family. Governments need to address
the tensions and the contradictions of the whole system with respect to
access to income, adequacy of resources, security, basic social services, expec-
tations of a better quality of life, and individual and collective rights. In
order to understand the labour market as a matrix of social relations that
involves the different institutions in which people work and live, the differ-
ences in objectives need to be recognised. Thus we should adopt a broader
view that includes the family, the state, firms and civil society in a perspect-
ive that also takes into account unpaid work. In order to do so, the first two
circular flows have been broadened to include the state and civil society to
complete the picture of all the institutional actors that participate in deter-
mining the quality of living conditions.
The circular flow of social wealth
Figure 1.3 comprises two sections (monetary and non-monetary) and three
institutions (family, state and firms). The voluntary sector is included in the
non-monetary section, and non-profit firms in the monetary section. The
chart shows the interdependence of all these elements and the role of the state
as mediator. It also shows two lines running vertically across the family and
the state, and a horizontal line between profit and non-profit firms. These
lines are meant to show the presence of unsolved tensions reflecting a basic
tension inherent in the capitalist system between the production of com-
modities and the process of social reproduction of the working population.
The institutions define a social context in which individuals, both men and
women, move in order to achieve their objectives. Given their location in the
social context, individuals have different and often conflicting objectives. The
main division is between reproductive and profit objectives. There is space for
co-operation but there are also deep tensions inherent in the system of waged
labour because insecurity of subsistence is used as the key to control labour
and because of the structurally endemic conflict between wages and profits.
Workers like horses and machines, are means of production in the view of
classical political economists. As such, they need food to be efficient just as
the other means of production need hay and fuel. The reductionism of the
meaning of living inherent in the capitalist modes of production can be
covered up by an increase of consumption but it cannot be solved; it re-
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emerges in the unequal income distribution, in overwork, both paid and
unpaid, in interpersonal tensions and individual frustrations. From a
woman’s perspective the system’s cracks are visible but they are too deep and
complex to be faced effectively.
In the case of the family we have already seen how the division of labour
creates disparities and dependencies, and how women’s unpaid work is regu-
lated by their responsibility for adapting resources to norms of consumption,
development of capabilities, and expectations of family members, adult
males included. For the state the role of sustaining both the interests of
profit-holders and rentiers and those of the working population in terms of
quality of life can become clearly contradictory, creating tensions that, at
times, call for a radical restructuring of the welfare system (Picchio 1987,
1992). One way of coping with these tensions is to restructure the state
itself in order to regain control. At the level of firms, the clearly emerging
dynamic character of the non-profit sector has deprived profit-making firms
of their monopoly of initiative and innovation, and that is no small loss at
symbolic level. In fact, the quality of life and social equity have themselves
both become objectives and tools for the organisation of enterprises at local
and global level. This awareness stimulates enterprises – even financially
viable ones – as well as an increase of social wealth.
Once the household, the state and the non-profit sector are included in
the analytical framework, the relative size and relevance of the monetary
profit economy is put into a different perspective. Moreover, if we were to
introduce the grey area of the informal economy, we might find it difficult
to define the borderline between firms operating in a market economy with
the aim of providing subsistence for the family and firms integrated in pro-
duction for profit. Aims and responsibilities should be indicated and sub-
jects made accountable for the results of their social activities and individual
actions. In this way the material and moral burden of women’s work would
also acquire a new dimension and social sense, becoming more sustainable.
The assessment of economic policy
Inserting unpaid work into a macro approach opens up new perspectives on
economic policy. First of all it makes visible an area of wide inequalities
between men and women with regard to responsibilities, work and incomes.
In this respect it belongs to equal opportunity policy. However, when it is
viewed from a macroeconomic perspective, unpaid work loses its exclusively
female and familial connotation – not because it becomes neutral, but
because it proves to be a question of the efficiency and sustainability of the
whole economic system. For instance, in the labour market – definitely a
macro market – there is no dichotomy between equity and efficiency. Equity
in the sense of adequacy is a question of reproduction of human and social
capital; in the sense of fairness, it is a key to efficiency because it is the basis
of consent to work and trust.
An extended standard of living 23
Economic theory does not indicate mechanisms for adjustment between
disposable income and living standards conventionally adequate for the
social group to which the worker belongs. Real wages may prove insufficient
to maintain such standards, and in that case an increase in unpaid labour is
expected to bridge the gap. The flexibility of unpaid work depends on many
factors: total work, social conventions, habits, power relationships within
the family and in society, feminist movements and so on.
Let us now turn to some of the policy implications of the extension of the
standard of living and its expansion into well-being. Expansion refers to the
process of formation of individual capabilities necessary for functioning such
as the enjoyment of health, knowledge, mobility, and social and interper-
sonal relationships. Here the problems of matching distributed resources
and the conventional norms of social reproduction become even more
complex. To cope with the inherent tensions between the waged labour
market and effective living conditions the individual must be able to make
continual adjustments in the organisation of his or her life. Nevertheless,
individual flexibility is not infinite and it cannot disguise the fact that the
adjustments are a structural collective problem, which need safety nets and a
normal support and negotiation process as to the distribution of resources
and responsibilities. It is a negotiation not only about income distribution
but also about individual rights and social norms. The quality of public ser-
vices and of the relationship between the individual and the state depends
on what is negotiated at the level of society. For example, the tendency to
undermine individual dignity, practised all too often in public and private
institutions, has little to do with the scarcity of resources and much more
with power relationships, which affect the distribution of income, the provi-
sion and quality of public services, individual rights and the very definition
of human dignity.
As noted above, well-being has a multidimensional content that includes
vital functioning conforming to social standards. Different levels of well-
being may be measured partly by setting maximum and minimum stand-
ards given in historical time and geopolitical space. This is the method used
in the construction of the human development indexes published by UNDP
since 1990, in the yearly Human Development Reports. In accordance with the
human development approach, social policy, including labour–market
policy, should take into account objectives, concepts and indicators that try
to recognise the different human dimensions. Moreover, well-being has to be
defined to include the unpaid work element and should itself be included in
a macro vision of the economic system that specifies the relationships
between the basic processes: production, distribution, exchange of com-
modities and social reproduction of the working population.
The territory of well-being does not belong exclusively to the family
and/or to the state. It requires an intermediate, meso level of analysis bring-
ing out social concerns at community and local level. At this level a range of
actors are involved. Besides the generally recognised ones, such as individual
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firms, business associations, state institutions, a large body of people are
active in civil society who form associations, start business, build networks
and so on. These activities are usually characterised by non-profit objectives,
and their direct aim is often to improve the quality of living conditions,
sometimes at the level of social exclusion and often at the level of recreation
or art. They usually concentrate on particular segments of the population
and on specific projects. Civil society activities and actors broaden the scope
of negotiation on living conditions and, although they usually share the
gender blindness of other agents, they do approach more directly the issue of
living conditions. In this regard they could contribute by opening up some
space for a more equal sharing of reproductive responsibilities, at least
outside the family. In fact, while on the one hand a full recognition of
women’s experience and agency in daily life is crucial for complete awareness
of the dimensions and inherent tensions of the process of social reproduction,
on the other hand, it is only through sharing responsibility at social level for
the quality of life that unpaid reproductive labour can be reduced and redis-
tributed more equally.
For a clear picture of the impact of policies on men’s and women’s well-
being, including the impact on unpaid work, it is necessary to construct
analytical and institutional tools capable of handling the broadening of
perspective. First of all a system of statistical sources has to be built up,
capable of showing the non-monetary contribution of reproductive labour,
such as the system used in Total Work, published by Statistics Canada in
1996. Moreover, it is important to formulate public budgets, as advised in
the Beijing Platform,12 giving a comprehensive picture of income and
expenditure that shows: (1) how much is distributed directly to men and
women; (2) the different impact of policies on men and women, including
unpaid work; (3) the impact on social living conditions.13 From this
perspective it is also important to specify criteria of accountability, which
make individual and institutional responsibilities clear and assess results. To
do so, feasible indicators taking into account the adequacy of incomes, total
work and social vulnerability, are needed.
At present an increasing number of public institutions, at national and
local government level, are experimenting with budgets from a gender
perspective. A vast literature is forming around these experiments, led espe-
cially by Diane Elson and Debbie Budlender.14 The impact of expenditure
on benefits, pensions, public services and of taxes, tariffs and payment for
services is very different for men and women, and this difference should be
acknowledged and made clear in data and policy assessment, as is now
required by the European Commission at general level. For instance, an
increase of tariffs or of payment for health services may have a strong impact
on women’s unpaid work in the household, while a reduction of taxes may
have a stronger impact on men’s disposable income.
To achieve public budgets capable of including a women’s perspective,
much needs to be done at many levels. First of all, as noted above, we need
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statistics that show gender differences in income, well-being and unpaid
work. In this respect, there is a lot of new ground to cover as we are still
lacking adequate data even on gender-based wage differentials; but, most of
all, there is a lot of ground to explore at academic level. The new perspect-
ive, in fact, requires a realistic presentation of facts, the challenging of old
theories, a clarification of concepts and testing of conjectural causal relation-
ships. The challenge at theoretical and empirical level needs to spread into
the teaching of new tools and the critical assessment of the old ones. Stu-
dents have to be trained in universities and schools to be administrators and
to wotk in civil society organisations. It is a necessary institutional step to
provide the skills needed to assess the gender and social impact of policies
and social projects.
Much has already been done in this direction and a new awareness of the
need to take account of gender in budgets and policy has been pushed
forward at various institutional levels, such as the UN and the European
Commission. At academic level, new associations are being formed, such as
IAFFE (International Association for Feminist Economics), which publishes
the academic journal Feminist Economics. It is important to note that the
advancement of knowledge about women’s perspective on the economic
system is taking place in a fruitful co-operative partnership among different
institutions (international organisations, non-governmental organisations,
women’s centres, universities) and with a fruitful practice of interdisciplinar-
ity and pragmatism.
Notes
1 The data on the unpaid work of social reproduction, divided into care and domestic
work, are made available in time-use surveys carried out by National Statistical
offices. For data related to various countries, see Goldschmidt-Clermont and
Pagnossin-Aligisakis (1996), and UNDP (1995). The Italian data are analysed in
Chapter 2, this volume. It has to be noted that, in Italy, a recent law on ‘parental
leave’ calls for a regular time-use survey every five years.
2 Subsistence means not only a bundle of commodities that satisfy basic needs, but
the state of a process of social reproduction corresponding to standards of health,
education and socialisation adequate to the social conventions given in time and
space (Picchio 1999).
3 For other attempts to approach macroeconomics from a gender perspective, see
Cagatay et al. (1995), and Elson and Cagatay (2000).
4 New forms of national accounting are being currently tried out (Urdaneta de Ferrán
2000), and Statistics Canada produces a Total Work Account.
5 In the graph monetary exchanges are indicated by solid lines and real exchanges by
dashed lines.
6 By classical economists we refer mainly to the surplus-approach theorists such as
Smith, Ricardo and Marx. On the definition of long-period positions, see Garegnani
(1976).
7 It has to be noted that the relationship between the social reproduction of the
working population and the state production of goods and services was by no means
free of deep tensions in former Socialist countries either.
8 Petty based value on the ‘loaf of bread’ of adult males, Ricardo defined capital as
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‘that part of the wealth of a country which is employed in production, and consists
of food, clothing, tools, raw materials, machinery’ (Ricardo 1951: 95). In general, all
the surplus theorists define the subsistence of the working population as capital.
Marx centred his critique of political economy on the very tension between the value
of labour and the labour value of produced commodities.
9 The multiple dimensions of the human subject were at the foundations of classical
Greek philosophy and are still expressed in poetic and literary language. On these
aspects the work of Martha Nussbaum is illuminating: see Nussbaum 1990. Aware-
ness of the complexity of humanity was still colouring Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
10 See Addabbo in Chapter 2, this volume. It has to be noted that in this book no
particular attention is given to the growing importance of paid domestic labour. For
an interesting study of paid domestic work in Italy, see Alemanni et al. (1994).
11 For an attempt to give a broader picture of the dynamics of the processes taking
place in the European labour market, including also social reproduction, see Clarke
et al. 2000. For a more equal opportunity perspective between men and women, see,
for the European countries, Rubery et al. 1999.
12 Fourth UN Conference on Women (1975).
13 For an update of current experiences of public budgets from a gender perspective
and their analysis, see the UNIFEM website: <http://www.unifem.undp.org>. For a
general introduction to the subject, see UNIFEM 2000: Chapter 5; Budlender and
Sharp 1998.
14 For the South African experience, see Budlender 1996, 1997, 1998; for a first assess-
ment of the Australian experience, see Sharp and Broomhill 2002.
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2 Unpaid work by gender in
Italy
Tindara Addabbo
Statistical sources and survey of the literature
This chapter focuses on unpaid work (housework, care of other family
members, shopping and household administration) by gender in different
household types. A first source of data that may be used in order to quantify
unpaid work are time-budget data. These provide direct information on
unrecorded work activities and may also be used for comparative cross-
country analyses.1 The information has been recorded in Italy in the ISTAT
Time Budget Survey (hereafter TBS) which records time budgets by means
of interviews and daily diaries during different days of the week on a daily
basis for each individual in the family more than 3 years old. The survey was
conducted in 1989 on a sample of 19,728 families.2 However, the survey
does not follow the same household across different days of the week (week-
days excluding Saturdays and Sundays).
TBS distinguishes among the following activities:
• personal care: personal hygiene, eating, sleeping;
• productive activities: education and training, paid and unpaid (house-
work, childcare, shopping) work;
• leisure (by type of activity);
• time devoted to going from one activity to another.
A revision of time-budget surveys is currently in progress in order to comply
with the criteria fixed by the EUROSTAT, ETUS (European Time Use
Study) project.3 A pilot survey under this project was conducted in 1998. In
1996 the research centre Eurisko carried out a time-budget survey on a
sample of 3,000 individuals.4 In Law 53/2000 one states that the Italian
Statistical Service (ISTAT) will carry out time-budget surveys every five
years.
In analysing the allocation of unpaid work by gender in industrialised
countries, a major imbalance can be noted in Italy: in fact women’s unpaid
work is much greater than men’s unpaid work, and women’s total working
time is higher than men’s (UNDP 1995).
The latest data available on the average number of weekly unpaid
working hours (Bank of Italy 2000) confirm the disequilibrium by gender in
the distribution of total working time. On average, women (aged over 14)
worked eleven hours per week more than men in the year 2000 (see Table
2.1). The difference persists even when the analysis is confined to employed
people: women who are employed work on average 9.2 hours more than men
(women’s total working time is on average 64.8 hours, whereas employed
men work on average 55.6 hours a week). The distribution of total working
time confirms the lower number of hours devoted by women to paid work,
for – taking all women aged over 14 – it emerges that they devote on
average 76 per cent of their working time to unpaid work whereas men
devote only 35 per cent of their total working time to this activity. As far as
employed people are concerned, though also for employed women, paid
work activities predominate in the distribution of total working time:
employed women devote on average 45 per cent of their total working time
to unpaid work as against only 22 per cent for men.
Analyses of the time allocation by gender for Italy based on 1989 ISTAT
data have been provided by Palomba and Sabbadini (1994), Palomba (1997)
and Capellari (2001). These analyses, together with Perali’s (1999) analysis
on EURISKO data, show a greater burden of unpaid work for women and a
greater sensitivity of unpaid work supply to the presence of children for
women than for men. The presence of a child in the family increases unpaid
work.5 A peculiarity of the Italian family is that children tend to live with
the family into adulthood,6 and this increases the unpaid work burden of
their mothers (Palomba and Sabbadini 1994). The number of children rather
than their age increases women’s unpaid work (according to local surveys
carried out in the North Central region of Italy) and decreases women’s paid
work. However, the presence of children does not induce women to leave the
labour market but causes them to compress the time they devote to personal
needs (Palomba 1997; Trifiletti 1997).
The marginal participation of men in unpaid work inside the family and
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Table 2.1 Average weekly hours of work by gender and employment
Weekly average number Men Women
of working hours
employed total employed total
Unpaid 12.5 13.2 29.3 37.3
Paid 43.1 24.9 35.5 11.6
Total 55.6 38.1 64.8 48.9
Percentage of total working time
Unpaid working hours 22 35 45 76
Paid working hours 78 65 55 24
Source: Author’s calculations based on Bank of Italy 2002: 60, Table C10.
the sharp increase (almost three hours a day) of unpaid work of women when
they get married (an increase not observed for men) together mean that
women’s unpaid work decreases if the marriage breaks up (Vinay 1996;
Palomba 1997).7
Unpaid work allocation by gender inside the couple changes depending
on the area where the family lives and their level of education. Palomba
(1997) finds a greater sharing of childcare by fathers living in the North-
west of Italy, and Palomba and Sabbadini (1994) find that better educated
fathers tend to share housework more than less educated fathers.
It should be noted that men and women differ not only in the total
amount of unpaid work provided but also in the type of unpaid work they
do:
Male sharing is concentrated on the one hand in cooking and on the
other in gardening and small repairs which may be more tiring but also
lie between leisure and housework. Making beds, ironing and washing
clothes are the exclusive responsibility of women.
(our translation from Palomba 1997: 171)
Apart from time budgeting, one can also find synthetic information on
unpaid work in the ISTAT survey on the daily life characteristics of the
household.8 Since 1993 this survey has contained synthetic information on
the mean hours of unpaid and paid activities and information on the socio-
economic situation of the family (education, employment of each member),
type of surroundings where the family lives, health and use of services. These
data together with the Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth
have been used for a first evaluation of extended income in households where
both partners are in work (Addabbo 1998) and have also been used by 
Chiappero-Martinetti in Chapter 5, this volume.
The allocation of time by gender in Italian households
The ISTAT Time Budget Survey (TBS) collects information on a sample of
19,278 households. Data were collected in June 1988 and May 1989 by
asking the households to keep diaries on time use (disaggregated into 150
different activities) by each household member aged over 3. Palomba and
Sabbadini (1994) carefully describe the allocation of time by people in dif-
ferent age groups and in different phases of their family life cycle. This
chapter is devoted to an analysis of the time allocation between different
types of families (with or without children; one earner or double earners;
single, employed or not employed) and among men and women where the
head of the family is aged between 18 and 64. We have selected people in
this age group to detect the gender differences in the allocation of time
between paid and unpaid activities. One problem of TBS is that it does not
collect information on the same family over different days of the week but
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instead information on time use of different families on different days of the
week.9
Descriptive statistics on the sample over the different days of the week are
provided in Table 2A.1 (see Appendix). The data relate to 1,271 couples on
weekdays, 1,278 on Saturdays and 1,279 on Sundays; as far as single people are
concerned, we observe 88 single women and 63 single men during a
weekday, 98 women and 64 men on Saturdays, 76 women and 83 men on
Sundays. Women who live with a partner are on average younger than men
(women 41 years, men 45) whereas among single-person households, the
women’s age is on average higher than the men’s (women 51, men 42).
In Chapter 3 we report the results of the estimation of unpaid work equa-
tions, whereas here we report some descriptive statistics on the actual
average working hours on different days of the week for men and women
belonging to different family types (single, and couples with or without
children) and according to spouses’ employment status. Unpaid work is dis-
aggregated into three types of activities:
1 housework
2 caring for other family members
3 shopping and house administration work (constrained time).
We find that, apart from weekdays for households without children where
women are not employed, women always devote more time to total work
than do men. The allocation of time by gender is shown in households with
(Table 2.2) or without (Table 2.3) children.
During weekdays women’s unpaid work ranges from a minimum of 4.42
hours per day in double-earner households without children (Table 2.3) to a
maximum of 8.69 hours per day in one-earner households with children
(Table 2.2).10 It should be noted that for employed women with children
total working time is on average eleven hours per weekday.
The most relevant part of unpaid work consists of housework. The large
gender imbalance in the allocation of time between paid and unpaid activ-
ities is shown clearly in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 and Figures 2.1 to 2.6.
In Table 2.4 we have analysed the allocation of time in double-earner
households with children. On weekdays 57 per cent of the total working
time of women is devoted to paid work and 43 per cent to unpaid work
(women in this household type devote on average 4.87 hours per day to
unpaid work). For a woman who lives in a double-earner family and has chil-
dren, her total working hours are 71 per cent of a normal weekday, whereas
men’s total working time (in the same household type) amounts to 57 per
cent of a normal weekday (assuming that people sleep eight hours per day –
but the evidence suggests that women often sleep less than eight hours per
night in order to accomplish their heavy workload). On the other hand, men
devote 11 per cent of their total working time to unpaid work and have
more time than their partners to devote to non-work activities. Unpaid work
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Table 2.2 Allocation of time by gender and household type – households with children
Weekdays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 6.7 2.5 3.7 1.8 6.5 3.0
Men 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.9 2.1 2.5
Care Women 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.7
Men 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.8
Other unpaid work Women 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
Men 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9
Total unpaid work Women 8.7 2.7 4.9 2.1 7.5 3.4
Men 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.2 2.8 2.8
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 6.4 2.3 0.0 0.0
Men 7.2 3.3 8.2 2.3 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 8.7 2.8 11.3 1.7 7.5 3.4
Men 8.0 3.1 9.2 2.1 2.8 2.8
Saturdays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 6.3 2.4 4.7 2.5 6.3 2.6
Men 1.0 1.7 1.1 1.6 2.2 2.6
Care Women 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.8
Men 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7
Other unpaid work Women 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6
Men 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7
Total unpaid work Women 8.2 2.7 6.1 3.0 7.4 2.6
Men 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.8
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 2.9 3.5 0.0 0.0
Men 4.2 3.8 4.6 4.1 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 8.2 2.7 9.0 3.1 7.4 2.6
Men 5.8 3.5 6.6 3.6 2.9 2.8
Sundays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 5.1 2.4 4.4 2.5 5.6 2.7
Men 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.2 2.0
Care Women 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.6
Men 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.4
Other unpaid work Women 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
Men 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
Total unpaid work Women 5.9 2.6 5.2 2.6 5.9 2.7
Men 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.4 2.0
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.4 0.0 0.0
Men 1.1 2.6 1.2 2.9 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 5.9 2.6 6.0 2.9 5.8 2.7
Men 2.4 2.9 2.6 3.1 1.4 2.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
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Table 2.3 Allocation of time by gender and household type – households without
children
Weekdays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 5.8 2.4 3.8 2.4 6.1 1.9
Men 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.9 2.0 2.1
Care Women 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6
Men 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7
Other unpaid work Women 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.7
Men 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.8
Total unpaid work Women 7.0 2.8 4.4 2.7 7.2 1.9
Men 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.3 2.8 2.5
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 5.2 3.4 0.0 0.0
Men 7.0 3.1 7.0 3.2 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 7.0 2.8 9.7 2.9 7.2 1.9
Men 7.8 3.0 7.9 3.1 2.8 2.5
Saturdays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 5.6 2.1 4.4 2.5 5.7 2.4
Men 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.1
Care Women 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8
Men 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7
Other unpaid work Women 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.7
Men 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.6 0.9
Total unpaid work Women 6.7 2.3 5.4 2.8 6.9 2.4
Men 1.6 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.1
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.2 0.0 0.0
Men 5.1 3.8 4.4 3.9 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 6.9 2.3 7.9 2.8 6.9 2.4
Men 6.7 3.5 6.5 2.3 2.8 2.1
Sundays One earner Double earners Non-earners
Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance
Housework Women 4.7 2.2 3.5 2.4 5.5 2.2
Men 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.3 1.8
Care Women 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
Men 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
Other unpaid work Women 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6
Men 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Total unpaid work Women 4.9 2.3 3.6 2.5 5.8 2.2
Men 1.3 2.1 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.8
Paid work Women 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
Men 1.0 2.2 0.8 2.5 0.0 0.0
Total work Women 4.9 2.3 4.2 2.8 5.8 2.2
Men 2.3 2.7 1.9 2.7 1.5 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
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Figure 2.1 Allocation of time by gender on weekdays for different household types and
with children.














































































Figure 2.2 Allocation of time by gender on weekdays for different household types and
without children.



















































































Figure 2.3 Allocation of time by gender for different household types and with children
on Saturdays.

















































































Figure 2.4 Allocation of time by gender for different household types and without
children on Saturdays.



















































































Figure 2.5 Allocation of time by gender for different household types and with children
on Sundays.
















































































Figure 2.6 Allocation of time by gender for different household types and without
children on Sundays.
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Table 2.4a Allocation of unpaid work by gender – double earners with children
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 3.7 76 4.7 76 4.4 86
Men 0.5 49 1.1 56 0.9 63
Care Women 0.7 14 0.8 12 0.7 13
Men 0.3 29 0.4 20 0.4 28
Other unpaid work Women 0.5 10 0.7 11 0.1 1
Men 0.2 22 0.5 24 0.1 9
Total unpaid work Women 4.9 100 6.1 100 5.2 100
Men 1.0 100 2.0 100 1.4 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
Table 2.4b Allocation of paid work by gender – double earners with children
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 04.9 43 6.1 68 5.2 87
Men 01.0 11 2.0 31 1.4 54
Paid work Women 06.4 57 2.9 32 0.8 14
Men 08.2 89 4.6 69 1.2 46
Total work Women 11.3 100 9.0 100 6.0 100
Men 09.2 100 6.6 100 2.6 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
Table 2.4c Allocation of time by gender – double earners with children
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 11.3 71 09.0 57 06.0 37
Men 09.2 57 06.6 41 02.6 17
Total time Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
for men increases during the weekend but is always much less than that of
their partners.
The ISTAT Time Budget Survey also contains information on education
and other personal characteristics of each family member that we shall use in
the unpaid work estimation carried out in Chapter 3. Here we show how the
allocation of time changes according to women’s educational level (see
Figure 2.7) for women aged between 18 and 35 years with children. Women
with different educational levels may have a different distribution of unpaid
work activities (childcare versus housework). More educated women can
reduce their housework (by redistributing housework inside the family or by
buying market substitutes) and increase childcare.
We note that less educated women perform more unpaid work and less
paid work than more educated women. More educated women in this age
group undertake less housework but more childcare. Graduate women tend
to do more childcare work than less educated women even when our analysis
is restricted to employed women with children.
Another variable which can affect the allocation of time is age cohort.
However, in order to assess its effect on the distribution of time use one
would need a repeated series of cross-sections or panel data.11
Since 1989 there have been substantial changes in shop opening hours
which may have changed the spread of work across the week. In addition, for















Figure 2.7 Allocation of time by level of education and for women aged between 18 to
35 with children on weekdays.





and 2.6). Lack of longitudinal data prevents us from testing how changes in
the household composition would alter the allocation of working time. We
can only observe that on average employed single women do 2.17 hours of
unpaid work per weekday whereas employed wives in double-earner house-
holds without children do 4.42 hours of unpaid work per day (therefore on
average women who are employed but live in couples devote more (2.25)
hours to unpaid work than do single employed women). This difference in
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Table 2.5 Paid and unpaid work on different days of the week by gender – employed
single people
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Housework Mean 1.7 0.8 2.7 1.9 2.3 1.3
Variance 1.2 1.1 2.0 2.6 2.2 1.5
Care Mean 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0
Variance 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2
Other unpaid work Mean 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.1
Variance 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.2
Total unpaid work Mean 2.2 1.0 3.4 2.6 2.6 1.5
Variance 1.3 1.2 2.6 3.2 2.5 1.6
Paid work Mean 7.5 7.2 3.4 3.2 1.3 2.1
Variance 2.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.8
Total work Mean 9.7 8.2 6.8 5.8 3.9 3.5
Variance 1.9 2.6 3.2 3.9 3.8 3.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
Table 2.6 Paid and unpaid work on different days of the week by gender – non-
employed single people
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Housework Mean 5.0 2.0 4.5 2.1 4.0 3.5
Variance 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 4.4
Care Mean 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1
Variance 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.3
Other unpaid work Mean 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.3
Variance 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.5
Total unpaid work Mean 6.0 2.4 5.6 2.8 4.4 3.8
Variance 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 4.3
Paid work Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Variance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total work Mean 6.0 2.3 5.6 2.8 4.4 3.8
Variance 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 4.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
the number of unpaid working hours per day is greater than the difference
between the unpaid work of employed women who live in double-earner
households with children (whose unpaid work is 4.87 hours on average
during weekdays) and employed women living in double-earner households
without children (whose unpaid work is 4.42 hours on average). Therefore
unpaid work for women seems to increase more when they pass from living
alone to living in a couple than when they pass from living in a couple but
without a child to living in a couple and having a child – evidence that
having a partner increases women’s unpaid work.12
The distribution of time by gender between paid and unpaid work also
varies according to the area where the family lives (see Table 2A.3 in the
Appendix). Among one-earner households with children, on weekdays we
cannot find a large difference in the distribution of time according to the
region where the family lives (the number of observations by cell is too low
to allow for a comparison for one-earner households without children); on
average in double-earner households women who live in the North do more
paid work whereas women who live in the South do more unpaid work.
More recent time-budget data might allow one to see how the allocation of
unpaid work has changed, especially for younger and more educated cohorts.
On the whole, by comparing our results with EURISKO data analysed by
Perali (1999), with ISTAT 1998 survey data (Barbagli et al. 2001) and with
Bank of Italy (2000) data (Bank of Italy 2002), the persistence of a significant
difference may be seen in the allocation of time by gender in Italy.
Suggestions for further research and data collection
The statistical analysis of the allocation of working time by gender has been
performed by using the most recent ISTAT TBS data which, however, date
from 1989 (only from 2002 will ISTAT conduct a new survey on time-
budget data harmonised with surveys in other European countries). Art. 16
in Law 53 (8 March 2000) states that time-budget surveys (including
gender and age disaggregation) should be performed every five years by the
Italian Statistical Office. We hope that this will lead to the monitoring of
allocation of time by gender, and we would recommend that longitudinal
analysis on the allocation of time also be carried out in order to check, for
instance, how changes in the sociodemographic structure of the family could
lead to changes in the allocation of time by gender.
Time-budget surveys allow analyses of time use which are to be preferred to
surveys that only give information on average working hours for a week, since
the former type of analysis provides more precise information about the time
devoted to different activities and also allows one to take into account activities
carried out simultaneously or in the presence of different components.
By being brought into line with other European countries, the ISTAT
survey will also enable a comparison of the allocation of time among differ-
ent European countries and will allow us to see changes that may have
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occurred over time in the allocation of time within Italian households and
among different household types.
Here we highlight a few problems faced by the ISTAT 1989 time-budget
survey and make suggestions on the collection of unpaid work data. The
1989 time–budget survey did not enable collection of data on the allocation
of time for the same household on different days of the week. We would
suggest that the same household should be followed on different days of the
week to test how unpaid work is allocated differently by the same family on
days when more time is usually devoted to paid work and during the
weekend; this would also avoid using estimation of unpaid work equations
in order to obtain the average weekly hours of unpaid work.
The ISTAT 1989 time-budget survey did not enable the member(s) of
the family cared for to be identified. The literature on unpaid work in Italy
has stressed the importance of the presence of adult children in the house-
hold or the necessity to care for an elderly relative in increasing women’s
unpaid working time. It may be useful to have data disaggregated by the
person cared for.
The difficult reconciliation between working and family time is shown
clearly by different analyses of female labour supply carried out in Italy. This
difficult reconciliation is evident in Colombino’s (1982) analysis based on
Turin data, and by Borzaga’s (1994) and Giannelli’s (1997) analyses based
on surveys carried out in Trento and Tuscany respectively. Among the
employed women interviewed in Trento, 30 per cent would prefer to work a
different number of hours than they currently do (Borzaga 1994). Among
underemployed women the youngest, the unmarried women and those
without children are over-represented, whereas among overemployed women
there are more women aged between 25 and 39 years, married and with at
least one child. By using a survey of women living in Tuscany, Giannelli
(1997) also shows a positive correlation between overemployment and the
presence in the household of children aged under 6.
This evidence on disequilibrium and problems of reconciling different
uses of time suggests that surveys should investigate not only the actual but
also the desired (paid and unpaid) working time. This would allow us to
apply disequilibrium models to the family allocation of time.
The possibility of repeating the survey over time might allow one to see
in which phases of the family cycle imbalances in the allocation of time
occur, how long individuals bear disequilibrium, and who is most exposed
inside the family to the risk of mismatches between the preferred and actual
time devoted to different activities and the effect of these disequilibrium
phases on the future working profile.
It is also important to measure the contribution of members who do not
live in the household to unpaid activities (for instance, it is important to
measure the time devoted by grandparents to caring for their grandchildren
and the work done by baby-sitters or other family helpers).13 These data
would enable one to see in which phases of the family life cycle and in which
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household types (by considering also the employment status of spouses)
market substitutes or the time of relatives are used more frequently.
Even if time-budget data obtained by diary compilation are preferable to
synthetic information on mean hours of work during a week, it might be
useful to introduce the latter type of information on unpaid work into the
national surveys currently carried out on household budgets and wealth: this
could lead to an easier evaluation of total working time, and time-budget
surveys may be used to cross-check the information on average hours of
work. This suggestion has been taken into account at national level by the
survey on household income and wealth carried out by the Bank of Italy in
2000 and by the local survey on the socio-economic conditions of house-
holds living in the Modena district carried out by CAPP (Centro di Analisi
delle Politiche Pubbliche) in 2002.14
Conclusions
Disequilibrium in the distribution of time use in Italy by gender is shown
by the analysis carried out in this chapter using the ISTAT time-budget
survey. The evidence on the heavier load of unpaid work borne by women in
Italy is consistent with the results of the literature surveyed.
We have shown how unpaid work changes according to household types
(identified by taking into account the employment condition of the spouses, the
presence of children, and whether the individuals live as a couple). Women who
live in a couple perform a greater amount of unpaid work than do single
women (even when couples without children are taken into account), and there
are significant differences in the allocation of unpaid work among women with
different levels of education. The analysis of time-budget data shows that (apart
from households without children where women are not employed and on
weekdays) women always devote more time to total work than do men.
Apart from a descriptive analysis of the distribution of unpaid work by
gender and by type of household, this research aims to analyse the pattern of
unpaid work performed by men and women who live in a couple or alone as
individual and household characteristics change. The impact of variables
connected with the sociodemographic structure of the family and individual
characteristics are subjected to econometric analysis in Chapter 3.
We suggest changes in the design of a new time-budget survey in Italy
and the inclusion of synthetic information on the desired and actual alloca-
tion of time in the surveys on households run currently in Italy.
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics on ISTAT time–budget data
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Table 2A.1 Descriptive analysis Indagine Multiscopo ISTAT 1989
Weekdays Weekdays Saturdays Saturdays Sundays Sundays
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Women’s age 41.10 18.04 40.77 8.31 40.97 8.36
Women’s years of schooling 8.39 6.47 8.47 2.98 8.49 3.03
North West 0.17 0.61 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.29
North East 0.29 0.73 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.34
Centre 0.16 0.59 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.30
South 0.37 0.80 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37
Women not in labour force 0.63 0.78 0.61 0.37 0.60 0.38
Employed women 0.37 0.78 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.38
Housewives 0.52 0.80 0.50 0.37 0.50 0.38
Women employees 0.28 0.72 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.35
Self-employed women 0.09 0.45 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.24
Women part-timers 0.11 0.49 0.09 0.22 0.02 0.10
Women employed in 0.03 0.27 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.14
agriculture
Women employed in 0.28 0.72 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.35
Services
Women employed in 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.20
manufacturing
Number of components 3.53 1.61 3.55 0.76 3.52 0.80
Number of children 0–2 0.15 0.62 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.29
years
Number of children 3–5 0.15 0.62 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.29
years
Number of children 15–17 0.19 0.74 0.19 0.32 0.22 0.36
years
Number of children 18–24 0.25 0.90 0.25 0.40 0.24 0.40
years
Men’s age 44.59 17.93 44.37 8.28 44.66 8.44
Men’s years of schooling 8.91 6.63 8.86 3.03 8.95 3.25
Men part-timers 0.09 0.46 0.20 0.30 0.08 0.21
Men not in labour force 0.19 0.63 0.17 0.28 0.16 0.28
Employed men 0.81 0.63 0.83 0.28 0.84 0.28
Men employees 0.56 0.80 0.58 0.37 0.58 0.38
Self-employed men 0.23 0.68 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.33
Men employed in agriculture 0.07 0.40 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.17
Men employed in 0.25 0.70 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.33
manufacturing
Men employed in Services 0.48 0.81 0.49 0.37 0.54 0.38
Women’s housework 5.66 4.41 5.46 1.90 4.78 1.84
Women’s constrained time 0.74 1.26 0.88 0.70 0.12 0.31
Women’s care work 0.80 2.11 0.70 0.90 0.51 0.74
Women’s total unpaid work 7.19 5.14 7.04 2.21 5.41 1.99
Women’s paid work 2.05 5.27 1.17 1.90 0.35 1.26
Men’s housework 0.70 2.31 1.10 1.29 0.88 1.11
Men’s constrained time 0.30 1.11 0.51 0.64 0.12 0.26
Men’s care work 0.21 0.98 0.28 0.51 0.28 0.65
Men’s total unpaid work 1.21 2.96 1.89 1.59 1.28 1.30
Men’s paid work 6.23 6.33 3.66 2.93 0.97 1.90
Men doing unpaid work 0.62 0.78 0.75 0.32 0.67 0.36
Observations 1,271 1,278 1,279
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT 1989 Time Budget Survey.
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Table 2A.2 Allocation of time between different uses by gender and household type
One earner with children Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 6.7 77 6.3 76 5.1 86
Men 0.5 55 1.0 58 0.9 67
Care Women 1.1 13 1.0 12 0.7 12
Men 0.2 21 0.2 15 0.3 24
Other unpaid work Women 0.9 10 1.0 12 0.1 2
Men 0.2 24 0.4 27 0.1 9
Total unpaid work Women 8.7 100 8.2 100 5.9 100
Men 0.9 100 1.7 100 1.3 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 8.7 100 8.2 100 5.9 100
Men 0.9 10 1.7 29 1.3 55
Paid work Women 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Men 7.2 90 4.2 71 1.1 45
Total work Women 8.7 100 8.2 100 5.9 100
Men 8.0 100 5.8 100 2.4 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 08.7 54 08.2 51 05.9 37
Men 08.0 50 05.8 36 02.4 15
Total hours per day Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
One earner without children Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 5.8 82 5.6 81 4.7 95
Men 0.5 65 1.0 64 1.2 88
Care Women 0.2 3 0.2 2 0.1 2
Men 0.1 10 0.1 7 0.1 7
Other unpaid work Women 1.0 14 1.2 17 0.2 4
Men 0.2 25 0.5 28 0.1 5
Total unpaid work Women 7.0 100 6.7 100 4.9 100
Men 0.8 100 1.6 100 1.3 100
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Table 2A.2 (cont’d)
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 7.0 100 6.9 100 4.9 100
Men 0.8 11 1.6 24 1.3 57
Paid work Women 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Men 7.0 89 5.1 76 1.0 43
Total work Women 7.0 100 6.9 100 2.3 100
Men 7.8 100 6.7 100 2.7 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 07.0 44 06.9 43 04.9 31
Men 07.8 49 06.7 42 01.3 15
Total hours per day Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Double earner with children Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 3.8 86 4.4 81 3.5 97
Men 0.6 69 1.2 57 1.0 93
Care Women 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.1 2
Men 0.1 8 0.0 0 0.0 2
Other unpaid work Women 0.6 13 1.0 18 0.0 1
Men 0.2 23 0.9 43 0.1 5
Total unpaid work Women 4.4 100 5.4 100 3.6 100
Men 0.9 100 2.1 100 1.1 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 4.4 46 5.4 68 3.6 87
Men 0.9 11 2.1 33 1.1 59
Paid work Women 5.2 54 2.5 32 0.5 13
Men 7.0 89 4.4 67 0.8 41
Total work Women 9.7 100 7.9 100 4.2 100
Men 7.9 100 6.5 100 1.9 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 09.7 60 07.9 49 04.2 26
Men 07.9 49 06.5 41 01.9 12
Total hours per day Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
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Table 2A.2 (cont’d)
Non-earners with children Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 6.5 86 6.3 86 5.6 95
Men 2.1 73 2.2 77 1.2 86
Care Women 0.3 4 0.4 5 0.3 4
Men 0.2 7 0.2 7 0.1 6
Other unpaid work Women 0.8 10 0.7 9 0.0 1
Men 0.6 20 0.5 16 0.1 8
Total unpaid work Women 7.5 100 7.4 100 5.9 100
Men 2.8 100 2.9 100 1.4 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 7.5 100 0.7 100 0.0 100
Men 2.8 100 0.5 100 0.1 100
Paid work Women 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Men 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total work Women 7.5 100 0.7 100 0.0 100
Men 2.8 100 0.5 100 0.1 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 07.5 47 00.7 46 00.0 37
Men 02.8 18 00.5 18 00.1 9
Total hours per day Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Non-earners without children Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Housework Women 6.1 85 5.7 83 5.5 94
Men 2.0 70 2.1 73 1.3 87
Care Women 0.2 3 0.4 5 0.1 2
Men 0.2 9 0.2 7 0.1 7
Other unpaid work Women 0.9 12 0.8 12 0.3 5
Men 0.6 21 0.6 20 0.1 6
Total unpaid work Women 7.2 100 6.9 100 5.8 100
Men 2.8 100 2.8 100 1.5 100
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Table 2A.2 (cont’d)
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total unpaid work Women 7.2 100 6.9 100 5.8 100
Men 2.8 100 2.8 100 1.5 100
Paid work Women 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Men 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total work Women 7.2 100 6.9 100 5.8 100
Men 2.8 100 2.8 100 1.5 100
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
Hours % Hours % Hours %
Total work Women 07.2 45 06.9 43 05.8 37
Men 02.8 18 02.8 18 01.5 9
Total hours per day Women 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100
Men 16.0 100 16.0 100 16.0 100






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 See Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis (1996) for a comparative
analysis of this type of data.
2 Capellari (2001) and Palomba and Sabbadini (1994) provide a fuller description of
this time-budget survey and of the distribution of unpaid work.
3 See Zuliani 1994.
4 See Perali (1999) for data analysis.
5 Palomba (1997) estimates one hour of unpaid work for any other child.
6 See Giannelli and Monfardini, in Chapter 7, this volume.
7 The greater burden of housework which marriage brings about for women and the
reduction in terms of housework for men when they get married has been found also
by Duncan and Morgan (1978) by using US data.
8 The survey by ISTAT on household consumption do not contain information on
unpaid work by different members of the household. The Bank of Italy survey on
households’ income and wealth contains information on unpaid work only in the
2000 survey.
9 The average total number of hours devoted to unpaid work over the week has been
estimated by using information on time budget by different days of the week in
Chapter 3, this volume.
10 Decimals are fractions of hours, not minutes.
11 It should be remembered that by using only one cross-section, the cohort effect
becomes mixed with ageing effects.
12 If longitudinal data were available it would be possible to tackle the problem in
greater depth, accounting also for unobserved heterogeneity among different groups
of the population.
13 Surveys that account for the work of baby-sitters or family helpers show a reduction
in woman’s unpaid working time (Perali 1999).
14 See Bank of Italy (2002) for SHIW 2000 and <http:www.dse.unibo.it/capp> for the
survey of the socio-economic conditions of households living in the district of
Modena.
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3 Extended income estimation
and income inequality by
gender
Tindara Addabbo and Antonella Caiumi
Introduction
The evaluation of productive activities that take place within the household
without involving a monetary transaction has received increasing attention
in recent years in relation both to measurement issues and the theoretical
implications of its inclusion in the macroeconomic framework.
Measured in hours of work in fourteen industrialised countries, the mag-
nitude of unrecorded economic activity is as large as the recorded activity
(Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis 1996). In other words,
neglecting the non-monetary sector means leaving out of account about half
of human labour. Because of this enormous gap, social national accounting
data (SNA) provide distorted figures on the resources available to households
or countries to achieve their standard of living.
If non-market work is included in SNA activities, as required by the
commitments made at international level in the ‘Beijing Platform’ (1995),
the monetary value of production in the home must be compatible with
measurements of SNA activities. Since there is no market, no market price
for goods and services produced or transformed within the household is
determined and no salaries paid, any estimation of the monetary value of
home production has to be computed indirectly. However, there is no inter-
national agreement about the valuation method, and the outcome can vary
considerably depending on the method used.
The problem of the visibility of domestic work has important implica-
tions besides simply broadening the definition of income, in particular for
how wages are determined.1 It is evident that in the absence of household
production, money income ought to be increased in order to guarantee the
achievement of the same level of welfare provided by the consumption of
market and non-market goods.2 It follows that the inclusion of household
production in the analysis of the distribution of economic resources could
have important implications in terms of redistributive economic policy,
especially in light of the major changes recorded in the structure of the
family in recent decades. For instance, one may argue that extended income
should be taken into account in means testing access to public services or
assessing eligibility for income support, or extended income could be used
in order to analyse the gender impact of public policies (for an application of
this type to the impact of minimum insertion income, see Chapter 9, this
volume).
Since the distribution of household production among groups in the
population is likely to vary considerably compared to the distribution of
income in relation to gender, household type and composition, age, labour
conditions, education and local context, it is important to provide a broader
valuation of the economic welfare, accounting for extended income.
This chapter focuses on time use and aims to evaluate extended standard of
living and inequality by different household types. The evaluation of stan-
dard of living requires moving from the household unit to the individual.
Per capita income provides an inaccurate measurement of well-being among
households of different composition. The accepted specification of income in
the analysis of well-being is equivalent income (household income divided
by the household equivalent scales), a measure that can be interpreted as a
real value to the individual of consumption services to which each household
member has access, taking into account household economies of scale and
different needs. When the definition of income includes non-monetary com-
ponents, the adjustment of household extended income (to control for differ-
ent household composition) with the same equivalence scales usually applied
to monetary income cannot be accurate (Radner 1997). The possibility that
appropriate equivalence scales differ by income definition has not yet been
explored (Bonke 1992; Jenkins and O’Leary 1996). In this study, we use
equivalence scales estimates that are consistent with the definition of
income. In particular, we obtain nonparametric estimates of Engel scales
based on both monetary consumption and extended consumption in order to
verify how differences in needs among household members and economies of
scale that take place within the household vary in relation to the definition
of consumption.3 The equivalence scales estimates used here are presented in
Chapter 4.
Detailed information on household income, consumption and time use
are generally not available from a single database. Only recently, with the
2000 Bank of Italy survey, has a significant achievement been made in
filling this gap, by collecting information on unpaid work carried out within
households on a weekly basis together with data on household income and
wealth. At the time this research was carried out, the only way to perform a
distributive analysis of household extended income consisted in combining
information drawn from different data sources. As is well known, this
requires dealing with the problem of missing data, which involves inputing
missing data to records belonging to a statistical source on the basis of
information drawn from other complementary sources related to other
records. In this chapter, we describe a merging of statistics from the 1995
Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) with the
1989 ISTAT time-budget survey (TBS). By combining information on
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hours of unpaid work with wages and monetary income data, we estimate
the extended income by household. On the other hand, in order to turn to a
distributive analysis, as suggested above, it is necessary to compare different
households under equivalence conditions. The equivalence scales estimates
are traditionally based on consumption information. As is well known,
information on household consumption drawn from SHIW is underesti-
mated. Therefore, in order to estimate the equivalence scale on market con-
sumption goods and on extended consumption, described in Chapter 4, we
use the ISTAT survey of household consumption. For this purpose we repli-
cate the merging procedure to impute hours of unpaid work to the records
of the ISTAT consumption survey in order to estimate the non-market con-
sumption component by households.
Unpaid work is imputed by taking into account the differences in unpaid
work behaviour by gender, day of the week and by type of unpaid work –
housework, care and constrained time. The microeconometric analysis on
unpaid work is described in Section 1. The merging procedure of the differ-
ent data sources is reported in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to comparing
different methods of time evaluation: the opportunity cost method and the
service price method. The impact of the inclusion of household production
on the distribution of resources is assessed in Section 4. Both money and
extended income distributions have been analysed for different household
types (one-earner, double-earner, with or without children) and according to
the educational level of the family head. Inequality measures in earnings by
gender are discussed in Section 5.
1 Unpaid work: a microeconometric analysis
Before 2002 one could not rely on the same source of data to have informa-
tion on both income and unpaid work in Italy. Only the last survey on
household income and wealth carried out by the Bank of Italy (SHIW 2000)
contains both sets of information for a subsample of the households
surveyed.4
In this chapter we have used ISTAT time-budget data (TBS) and merged
them with SHIW 1995 data. Time-budget data allow us to estimate the
mean number of hours worked during the week by men and women aged
from 18 to 65, who live in couples or alone. The technique applied here
could be used to reconstruct unpaid work and extended income distribution
over time.
In Chapter 2 we provided descriptive statistics on the different allocation
of time by gender, household type and region; this analysis has shown a
greater unpaid workload for women in every household type and the high
total number of hours worked by women. Here we use econometric models
to detect the effect of individual and household variables on different types
of unpaid work.
We have used Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation method to account
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for the selection bias which may occur when people do not supply any unpaid
hours of work. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hours of unpaid
work (housework, care and other) supplied on a weekday, on a Saturday or on
a Sunday. The explanatory variables that have been introduced refer to:
• individual characteristics: age, years of education, employment con-
dition, type of job (industry, position, hours of work)
• partner’s sociodemographic characteristics
• area where the family lives
• number and presence of children in different age groups.
The estimations in Tables 3B.1–6 in Appendix B to this chapter will then
be used to impute unpaid work to other sources of data (ISTAT expenditure
survey data and Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth).
Unpaid work in couples by gender 
Microeconometric analysis of time budget data allows us to see the different
ways in which individual and household characteristics may affect the alloca-
tion of time by gender. For instance, we investigate if, other things being
equal, a better education increases or decreases different unpaid working
time analysed (housework, care or other types of unpaid work), and how men
and women behave differently with regard to the allocation of time when
the size and composition of their household change.
Unlike men, elderly women are characterised by a heavier load of unpaid
work (with regard to all types of unpaid work), whereas housework decreases
as the level of education rises and less educated women devote less time to
care work than do more educated women (this is consistent with the statisti-
cal analysis provided in Chapter 2).
Both the probability of care work supply and the time devoted to this
activity are negatively related to children’s age. The presence of children
aged under 6 years significantly increases the time devoted to care work,
whereas the presence of children aged over 15 years decreases care work. The
larger share of unpaid work is performed by mothers, and we can see how,
during the week, care work increases with the size of the household and with
the presence in the household of children in the age groups where public
childcare services are less widespread and more costly in Italy.5
The analysis carried out in Chapter 2 shows how the majority of unpaid
work is made up of housework; here we can see that on weekdays the
number of adult children increases their mothers’ housework significantly.
This, together with the higher and increasing probability that adult chil-
dren stay longer in the household in Italy (see Chapter 7), induces us to
expect an increase in the housework load for women living in Italy. The
other type of unpaid work (constrained time) is related more to individual
variables than to the demographic structure of the family.
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If we consider the sector in which women are employed, we can see how
employment in the primary sector (compared with employment in manufac-
turing) increases unpaid work for reasons that may be related to the organi-
sation of work inside the farming household. We can also see that men and
women who work part-time devote more time to unpaid work.
If we consider the impact of the husband’s individual characteristics on
his wife’s work, we can see that a more educated husband reduces his wife’s
care work on weekdays. The husband’s care work is very low on average, but
the hours devoted by husbands to care work tend to increase during the
week when there are young children (though the presence of children aged
between 6 and 14 lowers the number of hours devoted by their fathers to
childcare). In addition, the nature of the wife’s employment affects the
husband’s care work, for we can see how men who are married to women
managers or in managerial positions tend to provide more care work. The
husband’s housework and constrained time tend to increase during weekdays
if women are self-employed. Elderly men tend to provide less care work on
weekdays and more housework or constrained time, whereas if they are
white-collar or unemployed they tend to provide more care work on week-
days.
Not being in the labour force significantly increases the amount of unpaid
work both for men and for women, whereas being self-employed reduces
unpaid work. Having a partner in a managerial position reduces women’s
unpaid work and increases men’s unpaid work. Having a partner who works
part-time increases women’s unpaid work and reduces men’s unpaid work.
This may imply complementarity in the use of time by women, since men
who work part-time do more unpaid work.
Single household unpaid work
Unpaid work increases significantly with age for single women on every day
of the week, and for men only on Sundays. Both for men and for women, not
being in the labour force has the effect of increasing unpaid work signific-
antly. A higher educational level reduces the unpaid work of single women,
but this is so only during the weekend for men. Single women who work
part-time supply more unpaid work on weekdays. Unpaid work for single
self-employed women or women managers increases on weekdays (see Tables
3B.7 to 3B.9 in Appendix B).
Estimating average weekly unpaid working hours
The estimation of unpaid work for men and women interviewed on different
days of the week allows us to calculate the average weekly hours of unpaid
work. The technique used here consists in multiplying by five (weekdays)
the estimate of unpaid work obtained by using the variables and the coeffi-
cients reported in this chapter, and by adding to this estimated average
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number of unpaid working hours for weekdays the estimated unpaid
working hours for weekend days.
On average, women devote 78.5 per cent of their working time to unpaid
work, whereas men devote on average 18.6 per cent of their total working
time to unpaid work and 81.4 per cent to paid work (see Table 3.1a).
SHIW 2000 data based on a sample of individuals aged over 14 provides
us with information on the actual number of weekly hours of unpaid work
in 2000 (see Table 3.1b). The sample is different from ours (we are using
TBS data in 1989 and we selected people aged 18 to 65 living in couples or
alone, not including data on the other members of the family) so the
information sets are not directly comparable. However, even if the samples
are composed differently, one can note the similar distribution of time
between paid and unpaid work activities found in 1989 with regard to
women (women aged over 14 years interviewed in SHIW 2000 devoted 76
per cent of their total working time to unpaid work, while women inter-
viewed by TBS 1989 devoted 78.5 per cent of their total working time to
unpaid work activities). By comparing data on the allocation of time
between paid and unpaid activities with reference to a similar sample of
households (one-earner households) and by using two different sources of
data (ISTAT 1994 multipurpose daily life survey data – Indagine multiscopo
sugli aspetti della vita quotidiana and ISTAT 1989 TBS data), Olivier (see
Appendix E) shows that the distribution of time by gender did not signific-
antly change over time. However, the two sources of data differ since the
ISTAT 1994 survey collects only the average weekly number of unpaid and
paid working hours and is less precise than time-budget data. Comparison
between the same data sources (ISTAT multipurpose surveys 1994 and
1998) allows Olivier (Appendix E) to show a narrowing of the gender gap in
unpaid working hours over the period analysed especially for households
without children. One should note that in 1998 women’s total working
time in double-earner households (64.5 hours in households with children
and 58.3 hours in households without children) is still much higher than
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Table 3.1a Estimated weekly working hours by gender
Women Men
hours % hours %
Housework 36.11 074.6 05.56 061.6
Care work 05.25 010.8 01.53 017.0
Constrained time 07.06 014.6 01.94 021.4
Unpaid work 48.42 100 09.03 100
Unpaid work 48.42 078.5 09.03 018.6
Paid work 13.29 021.5 39.45 081.4
Total hours of work 61.71 100 48.48 100
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISTAT Time Budget Survey data.
men’s (52.1 hours in households with children and 50.5 hours in households
without children) (see Table 3E.3 in Appendix E).
Our estimation of average weekly hours of work can be transferred to a
graph similar to UNDP (1995) to show more clearly how women’s total
work is higher than men’s and how in Italy the disequilibrium in the type of
work (paid versus unpaid work) by gender is greater than in other industri-
alised countries (see Appendix E). The share of women’s unpaid work in
their total working time is 66 per cent on average in industrialised countries
according to UNDP (1995), whereas according to our estimation the share
of women’s unpaid work in their total working time is 78.5 per cent in Italy
(see Figure 3E.2 in Appendix E).
2 Statistical matching
The estimates shown in Section 1 are applied in this section to impute the
unpaid hours of work to individual records belonging to other surveys which
did not gather this information, in particular the Bank of Italy survey of
household income and wealth (SHIW) and the ISTAT survey of household
consumption, by applying a statistical matching method.
The Bank of Italy survey is carried out every two years on a representative
sample of about 8,000 households. Since 1987 the survey has collected
information on working hours and income by each member of the household
and on the wealth of the household.6 This information if combined with
time use data makes possible an evaluation of the extended income by
household, as we show in Section 3. The survey also contains information on
household consumption, which is known to be underestimated. In order to
estimate the equivalence scale on extended consumption, we need to merge
the information on time use data drawn from TBS in order to predict hours
in unpaid work in the ISTAT consumption survey. On the other hand,
unlike the SHIW, the ISTAT consumption survey does not allow one to
compute wages, which are needed to evaluate the unpaid work using the
opportunity cost method (Section 3). We therefore estimate the earnings
function on SHIW, which is then used to impute wages on the ISTAT con-
sumption survey. This latter survey is carried out regularly every year. Both
the SHIW and ISTAT consumption data, which we use in this chapter, were
collected in 1995.
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Table 3.1b Unpaid versus paid work by gender – SHIW 2000
Weekly average number of Women (%) Men (%)
unpaid working hours 76 35
paid work 24 65
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bank of Italy 2002: 60, Table C10.
Other studies based on the use of complementary sources of statistical
information are by Angrist and Krueger (1992), Arellano and Meghir
(1992), and Battistin et al. (2000). A discussion of the statistical matching
procedures is provided by Rettore (1992). Some basic requirements must be
met for the statistical matching to be feasible: the complementary datasets
should share a common set of conditioning variables and should be drawn
from the same population.
All three surveys used in this chapter contain information on sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of the households – such as household composition,
age and level of education of each household member – which are used as
explanatory variables in the analysis of unpaid work. As far as the second
requirement is concerned, we check if the records drawn from different data
sources – corresponding to the selected household types, those living alone
and households with and without children – belong to the same population
by testing their mean values. This provides a measure of the distance
between different samples. See Appendix A, Table 3A.1 for a test on the dis-
tance between the mean of the variables used in the statistical matching,
drawn from the samples based on SHIW and TBS.7 The test is rejected in
many cases: the difference is often small with regard to the absolute values of
means but is amplified by the standard deviation due to the small sample
size. In some cases the difference can be imputed to actual differences in the
variables analysed over time, given that TBS data refer to 1989 and SHIW
refer to 1995; for instance, women’s average years of education have
increased between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.
The statistical matching procedure applied in this chapter may be
described as follows: to impute the variable of interest, y, into the survey
where it is unobserved, we take the conditional mean of the regression
obtained from the survey where y is observed, E(y/X1)  X1, and we sub-
stitute the exogenous variables drawn from the former survey, X0. Following
the approach proposed by Kennedy (1983), we add the standard error of the
regression,  in order to reproduce as far as possible the observed hetero-
geneity not captured by the conditional mean of the regression. The variable
of interest is then computed as y X0  . In a first step, a comparison
between the estimated hours of work – devoted to childcare, domestic activ-
ities and constrained time – and the observed data are obtained for the
selected TBS subsample in order to test the method applied. As Table 3C.1
(Appendix C) shows, the simulated distribution is close to the observed one
on the basis of the first and second moments. We then apply the merging
procedure on the SHIW and ISTAT consumption surveys. In both cases, the
distribution parameters of the estimated unpaid hours of work – the first
and second moments – are similar to the ones observed for the TBS 1989
survey (Table 3C.2 in Appendix C provides results for the SHIW data).
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3 Evaluating unpaid work
We now turn to the issue of time evaluation in order to assess its impact on
household welfare and inequality. Two different methods have been pro-
posed in the literature to evaluate unpaid work:
• The opportunity cost method: the individual chooses how to allocate her
time, taking into account the marginal net wage she would receive in
paid work.
• The service price method: unpaid work is evaluated at its market price. One
can use a single market price applied to a general housekeeper (replace-
ment cost) or one can distinguish different types of unpaid work and
evaluate each according to the corresponding price of market specialists
(service cost).8
The first evaluation method has been criticised on the grounds that an indi-
vidual’s marginal net wage in paid work may differ from an individual’s
marginal productivity in unpaid work (Gronau 1986). Moreover, given the
greater specialisation in paid work, average productivity in paid work
should be higher than average productivity in unpaid work (Bruyn-Hundt
1996). Another problem connected with this method of evaluation is how to
evaluate unpaid work for unemployed people or people who are outside the
labour force whose market wage is unknown.
The second way to evaluate unpaid work can also be criticised. The
service cost method of evaluation could overestimate unpaid work given the
higher productivity of market-trained workers; on the other hand, it might
be difficult to disaggregate unpaid work into all its different components.
The replacement cost, on the other hand, may underestimate the quality of
the services provided at home, and some types of unpaid work may not find
a similar substitute in the market.9
In this chapter we use both methods of time evaluation and assess the
sensitiveness of welfare inequality to different methods of time evaluation.
Following the replacement cost method we evaluate unpaid work at the mean
bargained wage for a general housekeeper in 1995. We do not distinguish
among the costs of the different types of unpaid work provided.
Turning to the opportunity cost method of evaluating unpaid work, owing
to our sample composition we have to solve the problem of defining a wage
for those people who are outside the labour force or unemployed. The
opportunity cost is given by:
• the actual wage that the employed individual earns (SHIW provides
this information while the ISTAT consumption survey does not provide
detailed information on current labour income);
• or the reservation wage estimated by using Heckman’s selection model
(Appendix D). The right-hand side variables we have included are
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justified in terms of human capital theory and we have also introduced
regional dummies to take into account the effect of the labour market
situation on wages.
The wage equations reported in Appendix D are the result of a wider set of
regressions we have run. The return of education (years of schooling) is 8 per
cent for women and 7 per cent for men, age having no significant effect on
women’s wage. Past work experience increases the women’s wage by 6 per
cent and the men’s wage by 8 per cent. Wages are clearly lower for women
living in the South-west (16 per cent less with respect to those living in the
North), in the South-east (10 per cent less) and those living in Central Italy
(11 per cent). Wages decrease by 15 per cent if men live in the South and by
4 per cent if they live in Central Italy. Heckman’s selection term has the
positive and significant effect on wages, meaning that those who are more
likely to work are also more likely to earn higher wages.
4 Extended income distribution
In this section we present the results of the extension of income to include
unpaid work evaluated by following the methods described in Section 3. A
household’s extended income (yex) is defined as the sum of money income
plus the evaluation of unpaid working time for each member of the house-
hold:
yex  y  	w(UNP2) 	h(UNP1)
y  household net money income,
UNP1  men’s unpaid working time,
UNP2  women’s unpaid working time,
	w  evaluation of wife’s unpaid work,
	h  evaluation of husband’s unpaid work.
This extended income definition has been used among others by Bonke
(1992), Bryant and Zyck (1985) and by Jenkins and O’Leary (1996). Table 3.2
presents the descriptive statistics on the money and extended income distribu-
tions at the level of the household, per capita and adult equivalent by using
the opportunity cost (o.c.) and the service price (s.p.)10 methods. Equivalent
income corresponds to the adjusted income obtained by using the appropriate
estimates of equivalence scales for each definition of income (money and
extended). The cost of children index applied to money (extended) income is
0.40 (0.96) for a baby under 2 years old, 0.48 (0.94) for a child between 3 and
5 years old, 0.48 (0.48) for a child between the ages of 6 and 17, and 0.74
(0.74) for a young dependent between the ages of 18 and 24.
The average monthly extended income of married couples is around
6,000,000 lire (i3,100) when evaluated by using the opportunity cost prin-
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ciple and 5,470,000 lire when evaluated by using the service price method,
whereas average money income is 4,000,000 lire (Table 3.2).
To evaluate the standard of living at the individual level we have com-
pared the distribution of equivalent and per capita money and extended
income (extended income has been evaluated by using both the opportunity
cost and the service price methods) (Figure 3.1). The increase observed in
the median of the extended income is by over 40 per cent, with non-
significant differences between various definitions of income, suggesting
that significant differences between household economies are not apparent
when different consumption definitions are used. However, when we use
equivalent income, the extended standard of living increases significantly for
households (ranging from 42 per cent to 55 per cent depending on the
method used to evaluate unpaid work). Extended income distribution is
more concentrated around the mean when unpaid work is evaluated at
service price rather than at opportunity cost. Next we analyse how inequal-
ity changes with the inclusion of household production in the definition of
income for the whole sample and for significant groups of households.
By using different indicators of income inequality (Gini, Theil and Log of
variance), we find that extended income is characterised by a lower inequal-
ity than money income and that extended income valued at opportunity cost
(o.c.) is characterised by greater inequality than extended income valued at
service price (s.p.) (Table 3.3).11 This result holds for different types of
families: one-earner, double-earner, childless or with children, and for differ-
ent levels of education of the head of the family. The reduction in income
inequality is greater in one-earner households than in double-earner house-
holds. Income distribution for childless households and for households with
children is similar, owing probably to a similar distribution, within these
groups of families, of one-earner and double-earner households. In general,
Extended income estimation and inequality 69
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics on monthly money and extended income
Median Mean Std dev.
Household money income 3485.917 4027.921 2373.027
Extended household income (o.c.) 5301.472 6070.504 2913.722
Extended household income (s.p.) 4915.19 5470.094 2194.293
Per capita money income 1040.861 1273.618 0900.1993
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 1617.759 1898.097 1103.97
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 1471.834 1713.083 0904.9367
Equivalent money income 1491.214 1719.914 1043.114
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 2310.201 2617.939 1276.056
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 2121.673 2359.977 0982.1832
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1995 SHIW matched with 1989 TBS data (thousand
lire).
Notes
Sample: number of observations 2,013 (couples only).
o.c. = opportunity cost method; s.p.  service price method.
inequality in the distribution of resources is reduced when we use equivalent
income instead of per capita income as a measure of welfare.
The decrease in income inequality that we obtain by widening the income
definition to include unpaid work is found for different household types and
with different inequality indicators. This equalisation result is consistent
with Jenkins and O’Leary’s (1996) analysis of UK data and in contrast with
the mixed evidence provided by other studies such as those by Bonke (1992)
and by Bryant and Zyck (1985).12 Jenkins and O’Leary’s (1996) analysis is
based on personal equivalent income (rather than on household income, like
most of the previous literature on this topic). We find that equalisation in
extended income distribution does not depend on the unit of analysis, since it
holds for household income, per capita and equivalent income.
Note that the inequality measurements for the whole sample are higher
than intra-group inequality in the case of households distinguished by eco-
nomic status (for instance, the Theil index for extended income evaluated at
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Figure 3.1 Extended standard of living.
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Table 3.3 Income inequality by household type
Whole sample
Gini Theil Log Var
Household money income 0.30 0.15 0.33
Extended household income (o.c.) 0.24 0.10 0.18
Extended household income (s.p.) 0.20 0.07 0.12
Per capita money income 0.27 0.12 0.23
Equivalent money income 0.31 0.16 0.35
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 0.29 0.14 0.26
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 0.25 0.10 0.19
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 0.26 0.11 0.20
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 0.20 0.07 0.12
Double-earners One-earner
Gini Theil Log Var Gini Theil Log Var
Household money income 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.28 0.14 0.29
Extended household income (o.c.) 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.12
Extended household income (s.p.) 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.08
Per capita money income 0.27 0.13 0.24 0.33 0.20 0.37
Equivalent money income 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.30
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.20
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.13
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.10 0.15
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.09
Obs 1,008 1,005
No children With children
Gini Theil Log Var Gini Theil Log Var
Household money income 0.31 0.16 0.36 0.30 0.15 0.32
Extended household income (o.c.) 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.10 0.18
Extended household income (s.p.) 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.07 0.11
Per capita money income 0.31 0.16 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.38
Equivalent money income 0.31 0.16 0.36 0.30 0.15 0.34
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.22
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.25 0.10 0.19
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.09 0.15
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.12
Obs 370 1,643
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1995 SHIW matched with 1989 TBS data.
opportunity cost is 7.5 per cent for double earners and 8.1 per cent for one-
earner families, whereas for the whole sample it is 10 per cent). This sug-
gests the presence of inter-group inequality. What is interesting to note is
that inter-group inequality remains even after allowing for household pro-
duction. This result is emphasised in Figure 3F.1 (in Appendix F) where
subgroup decile decomposition for one-earner and double-earner households
is reported.
In sum, income inequality decreases and the standard of living increases
when one considers unpaid work as part of the household’s standard of
living. However, it is important to bear in mind that the production of
unpaid work is mainly a result of women’s work, as was shown in Chapter 2.
It follows that it is women’s unpaid work that sustains a higher standard of
living. The object of Section 5 is to evaluate gender inequality in earnings
both in traditional and non-traditional households.
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Table 3.3 (cont’d) Income inequality by household type
Years of education Years of education 
under 8 8–13
Gini Theil Log Var Gini Theil Log Var
Household money income 0.26 0.11 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.24
Extended household income (o.c.) 0.20 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.14
Extended household income (s.p.) 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.10
Per capita money income 0.42 0.30 0.73 0.32 0.17 0.39
Equivalent money income 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.27 0.12 0.25
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.13 0.22
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.22 0.08 0.15
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.19
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.11
Obs 973 795
Years of education 13–18
Gini Theil Log Var
Household money income 0.24 0.10 0.19
Extended household income (o.c.) 0.21 0.07 0.14
Extended household income (s.p.) 0.20 0.07 0.13
Per capita money income 0.32 0.17 0.34
Equivalent money income 0.24 0.10 0.19
Per capita extended income (o.c.) 0.23 0.09 0.17
Equivalent extended income (o.c.) 0.20 0.07 0.13
Per capita extended income (s.p.) 0.24 0.09 0.17
Equivalent extended income (s.p.) 0.20 0.07 0.12
Obs 238
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1995 SHIW matched with 1989 TBS data.
5 Gender inequality in earnings
This section focuses on gender inequality in earnings. While the entire
approach to inequality has recently been based on identifying what people get
out of the means they can use rather than on the means they earn, the tradi-
tional approach of relying on earnings as a welfare indicator is useful in high-
lighting an important asymmetry between women and men still existing in
our society. Women often work as hard as, or harder than, men, while their
earnings are much lower. As shown in Figure 3.2, more than 50 per cent of
the total time devoted to work by a married couple, including the unpaid
kind, is done by women, whose contribution to household extended income is
less than 50 per cent. This holds both for traditional households where the
women’s share of working time is 52 per cent, while their contribution to
household extended income is 36 per cent, and for non-traditional households
where women share the 58 per cent of total working time to which about 48
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of total working time and of extended income by gender.

















per cent of household extended income corresponds. This is due to the pres-
ence of a consistent wage differential by gender in the labour market.13
The assessment of gender inequality in achievement can be evaluated by
comparing the amount of inequality in the distribution of household income
and the amount of inequality in the distribution of individual income. The
larger the gender gap, the larger the inequality as measured by any inequal-
ity indices. The difference between the inequality measures in the two dis-
tributions provides an indirect measure of the extent of the intra-household
inequality.
As far as the earnings aspect is concerned, Table 3.4 shows that income
inequality is greater among individuals than among households. As
expected, the distance between individual and household income inequality
decreases when we extend income to include unpaid work, especially in one-
earner households, suggesting that allowing for unpaid work reduces the
gender gap. As noted in Section 4, inequality is lower when unpaid work is
evaluated at the service price rather than using the opportunity cost method,
even if the evaluation method used does not affect the distance in terms of
inequality between households and individuals.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed the pattern of unpaid work supply as
households and individual characteristics change, and we have used the esti-
mated equations to impute unpaid work in SHIW and ISTAT surveys. This
analysis shows that household composition and individual characteristics
affect unpaid work by gender differently. As expected, women’s unpaid
work increases significantly with the presence of children consistently with
the type of childcare services available in Italy. We have also found that not
only young dependants but also older ones increase significantly women’s
unpaid work.
We focus on the assessment of extended standard of living and inequality by
gender in one-family households. Extended income distribution has been
analysed for couples with or without children by using equivalence scales
consistent with the definition of income used.14 The non-monetary income
component is almost 40 per cent of money income. Extended income distri-
bution is more concentrated around the mean when unpaid work is evalu-
ated by using the replacement cost rather than the opportunity cost method.
As expected, extended income valued at opportunity cost is characterised by
greater inequality than extended income valued at service price, while both
are more equally distributed than money income. This result holds also at a
disaggregated level, by disaggregating the sample according to the number
of earners in the family and the presence of children. The reduction in
inequality passing from money to extended income is greater for one-earner
than for double-earner households.
More than 50 per cent of a couple’s total working time (computed by also









































































































































































































































































































































































including unpaid work) is performed by women, but their share of extended
income is less than 50 per cent. This disparity is observed both in one-earner
households (where women’s share of total working time is 52 per cent,
whereas their share of extended income is 36 per cent) and in double-earner
households (where women’s share of total working time is 58 per cent,
whereas their share of extended income is 48 per cent). Therefore one can
note, together with a disequilibrium in the distribution of total working
time, a disequilibrium in household income distribution in its extended def-
inition. This uneven distribution of working time and income by gender
should be taken into account in the assessment of welfare policies.
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Appendix 3A Descriptive statistics and t-test on the
SHIW and TBS (weekdays) samples and t-test
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Variables mean std dev. mean std dev. t-test
Women’s age 42.48 9.95 41.1 18.04 –3.75
Women’s years of education 8.88 4.12 8.39 6.47 –3.61
North-west 0.28 0.44 0.17 0.61 –8.34
North-east 0.2 0.39 0.29 0.73 6.08
Centre 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.59 –1.61
South 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.8 1.82
Women not in labour force 0.58 0.49 0.63 0.78 3.07
Employed women 0.42 0.49 0.37 0.78 –3.07
Housewives 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.8 3.00
Women employees 0.32 0.46 0.28 0.72 –2.65
Women self-employed 0.1 0.3 0.09 0.45 –1.05
Women employed in agriculture 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.27 1.84
Women employed part-time 0.11 0.3 0.11 0.49 0.00
Women employed in service 0.3 0.45 0.28 0.72 –1.33
Women employed in manufacturing 0.09 0.3 0.06 0.37 –3.63
No. of members 3.56 0.98 3.53 1.61 –0.90
No. of children aged 0–2 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.62 5.73
No. of children aged 3–5 0.15 0.38 0.15 0.62 0.00
No. of children aged 6–17 0.63 0.82 0.19 0.74 –23.58
No. of children aged 18–24 0.43 0.69 0.25 0.9 –9.10
Men’s age 46.04 10.04 44.59 17.93 –3.96
Men’s years of education 9.33 4 8.91 6.63 –3.06
Men employed part-time 0.04 0.2 0.09 0.46 5.52
Men not in the labour force 0.23 0.41 0.19 0.63 –3.01
Men employed 0.77 0.41 0.81 0.63 3.01
Men employees 0.56 0.49 0.56 0.8 0.00
Men self-employed 0.21 0.4 0.23 0.68 1.43
Men employed in agriculture 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.4 3.76
Men employed in manufacturing 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.7 –4.06
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Table 3B.3 Married women’s constrained time of work equations: different days of the
week (Heckman selection model – dependent variable: log of daily hours of
constrained work)
First step Weekdays Saturdays
Variables coeff t-ratio coeff t-ratio
Constant 0.744 2.857 1.127 5.167
South 0.209 2.44 0.214 2.399
Women’s years of education 0.030 2.796
Women employed part-time 0.173 1.18 0.141 0.812
Women self-employed 0.530 3.769
Women employed in agriculture 0.171 0.513
Women employed in service 0.359 3.91 0.242 1.993
Men’s age 0.005 1.068 0.010 2.207
Dummy children 0–2 years 0.404 2.906 0.197 1.862
Dummy children 3–5 years 0.310 2.461
Dummy children 6–14 years 0.034 0.446
Dummy children 15–17 years 0.178 1.903
Second step
Constant 0.403 2.19 0.247 0.126
South 0.331 4.824 0.097 1.313
Women’s age 0.009 2.332 0.009 2.306
Women’s years of education 0.016 2.026
Women employed part-time 0.166 1.538 0.280 1.739
Women employed in agriculture 0.224 1.822
Men not in labour force 0.219 2.96
Men employed in service 0.099 1.722
Dummy children 0–2 years 0.130 1.139
Dummy children 3–5 years 0.105 0.972
Dummy children 18–24 years 0.151 2.101 0.215 1.851
Dummy adult children 0.139 1.748 0.208 1.415
Women employees with low education 0.138 1.793 0.302 3.051
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Table 3B.7 Unpaid work of single men and women – weekdays
(a) Single women – weekdays
(OLS – dependent variable: log of daily hours of unpaid work)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 0.93 0.31 2.99
Age 0.03 0.01 4.86 50.87 11.88
Not employed 0.91 0.23 3.98 0.46 0.5
South 0.67 0.14 4.68 0.28 0.45
Employed in agriculture 0.74 0.58 1.29 0.01 0.11
Employed in services 0.41 0.21 1.94 0.4 0.49
Self-employed 1.05 0.21 5 0.16 0.37
Part-time employed 0.99 0.25 3.94 0.1 0.3
Manager 0.91 0.26 3.51 0.08 0.28
(b) Single men – weekdays (Heckman selection model)
(First step of Heckman model: Unpaid work probability)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 0.55 0.84 0.65
Age 0.02 0.01 1.25 41.64 13.82
Years of education 0.07 0.05 1.47 9.6 4.04
Centre 0.68 0.49 1.39 0.13 0.34
(Second step: Dependent variable log of men’s unpaid working hours)
Constant 2.1 1.13 1.85
Age 0.02 0.02 1.26 42.15 13.88
Not employed 1.15 0.46 2.51 0.23 0.43
Self-employed 0.95 0.46 2.05 0.19 0.39
Part-time employed 0.89 0.49 1.83 0.14 0.35
Heckman’s lambda 1.9 1.67 1.14 0.39 0.13
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Table 3B.8 Unpaid work of single men and women – Saturdays
(a) Single women – Saturdays
(OLS – dependent variable: log of daily hours of unpaid work)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 0.24 0.42 0.58
Age 0.02 0.01 3.25 52.43 9.14
Years of study 0.03 0.01 1.98 8.15 5
Not employed 0.21 0.15 1.42 0.56 0.5
Self-employed 1.12 0.57 1.97 0.01 0.11
(b) Single men – Saturdays (Heckman selection model)
(First step of Heckman model: Unpaid work probability)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 1.33 1.58 0.84
Age 0.04 0.03 1.55 43.51 11.79
Years of study 0.14 0.07 1.92 9.32 4.05
North-west 1.13 0.65 1.74 0.19 0.4
South 1.91 0.56 3.4 0.21 0.41
(Second step: Dependent variable log of men’s unpaid working hours)
Constant 3.22 0.49 6.56
Years of study 0.13 0.05 2.85 8.47 3.85
Not employed 1.34 0.45 2.97 0.26 0.44
Employed in services 0.6 0.37 1.64 0.6 0.5
Self-employed 1.21 0.33 3.62 0.26 0.44
White-collar 0.98 0.4 2.43 0.2 0.4
Heckman’s lambda 0.37 0.46 0.8 0.2 0.31
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Table 3B.9 Unpaid work of single men and women – Sundays
(a) Single women – Sundays
(OLS - dependent variable: log of daily hours of unpaid work)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 0.81 0.43 1.88
Age 0.02 0.01 2.69 52.27 11.65
Years of study 0.1 0.02 4.75 8.4 4.2
Centre 0.34 0.17 1.99 0.25 0.44
South 0.53 0.19 2.78 0.13 0.34
Self-employed 0.42 0.24 1.7 0.1 0.3
White-collar 0.53 0.22 2.38 0.27 0.45
Manager 0.52 0.45 1.16 0.03 0.17
(b) Single men – Sundays – Heckman selection model
(First step of Heckman model: Unpaid work probability)
Variables Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Variable Std. dev.
mean
Constant 0.81 0.88 0.92
Age 0.02 0.02 1.33 38.03 12.27
Years of study –0.09 0.04 2.31 10.82 4.53
(Second step: Dependent variable log of men’s unpaid work hours)
Constant 0.9 0.86 1.04
Age 0.03 0.02 1.86 40.25 13.38
Not employed 0.43 0.37 1.16 0.2 0.4
Employed in services 0.49 0.29 1.71 0.52 0.5
Self-employed 0.65 0.31 2.1 0.26 0.44
White-collar 0.56 0.31 1.82 0.27 0.45
Heckman’s lambda 0.31 0.82 0.37 0.42 0.25
Appendix 3C Results of the statistical matching:
comparison between actual and imputed values in
ISTAT TBS 1989 and SHIW 1995 survey
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Table 3C.1 Comparison between observed and imputed values of unpaid work for the
sample of couples with and without children belonging to the 1989 TBS
(a) Women: weekdays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1532 5.56 2.72 0 14.67
Imputed 1532 5.32 2.8 0 13.85
Care work Observed 1532 0.8 1.27 0 9.5
Imputed 1532 0.81 1.08 0 6.44
Constrained Observed 1532 0.7 0.79 0 6
Imputed 1532 1.23 0.74 0 3.63
Unpaid work Observed 1532 7.07 3.16 0 16
Imputed 1532 7.36 3.18 0 16
(b) Men: weekdays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1532 0.73 1.44 0 11.59
Imputed 1532 0.67 1.04 0 6.47
Care work Observed 1532 0.23 0.66 0 6.5
Imputed 1532 0.20 0.52 0 3.42
Constrained Observed 1532 0.27 0.66 0 6.08
Imputed 1532 0.31 0.64 0 3.62
Unpaid work Observed 1532 1.23 1.82 0 11.67
Imputed 1532 1.19 1.43 0 7.56
(c) Women: Saturdays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1395 5.59 2.57 0 17.86
Imputed 1395 5.14 1.46 1.01 9.97
Care work Observed 1395 0.72 1.24 0 13.5
Imputed 1395 0.76 0.99 0 5.38
Constrained Observed 1395 0.84 0.90 0 5.5
Imputed 1395 1.49 0.84 0 3.83
Unpaid work Observed 1395 7.15 2.93 0 17.86
Imputed 1395 7.4 1.93 1.25 14.52
Table 3C.1 (cont’d)
(d) Men: Saturdays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1395 1.19 1.84 0 12.58
Imputed 1395 1.38 1.69 0 7.37
Care work Observed 1395 0.27 0.68 0 5.58
Imputed 1395 0.26 0.58 0 6
Constrained Observed 1395 0.49 0.85 0 4.92
Imputed 1395 0.38 0.71 0 4.62
Unpaid work Observed 1395 1.95 2.20 0 13.08
Imputed 1395 2.03 2.05 0 10.36
(e) Women: Sundays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1371 4.78 2.47 0 17.08
Imputed 1371 4.37 1.36 0.25 9.01
Care work Observed 1371 0.54 0.98 0 7
Imputed 1371 0.63 0.91 0 4.39
Unpaid work Observed 1371 5.42 2.65 0 17.58
Imputed 1371 5.00 1.53 0.25 10.39
(f) Men: Sundays
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Housework Observed 1371 0.96 1.55 0 12.33
Imputed 1371 0.79 0.91 0 4.24
Care work Observed 1371 0.28 0.82 0 8.08
Imputed 1371 0.26 0.62 0 3.45
Unpaid work Observed 1371 1.35 1.75 0 14.25
Imputed 1371 1.05 1.11 0 5.46
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Care work 8.44 5.50
Constrained 6.30 4.83
Unpaid work 49.54 25.27
Men
Housework 7.76 8.16
Care work 4.10 4.19
Constrained 3.15 3.87
Unpaid work 15.01 16.21
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Appendix 3D Estimation of the potential wage
equations for men and women
Table 3D.1 First step: employment probability
Women Men
Variable Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Coeff. Std. error t-ratio
Constant 5.177 0.538 9.621 4.800 0.632 7.599
Household income 0.001 0.002 0.625 0.014 0.002 8.248
Age 0.238 0.028 8.638 0.308 0.030 10.364
Age square 0.003 0.000 9.095 0.004 0.000 11.927
Years of education 0.134 0.007 18.407 0.082 0.008 10.302
Number of children
aged under 3 0.343 0.088 3.905 0.107 0.111 0.958
Number of children
aged 3–5 0.231 0.064 3.602 0.019 0.080 0.234
Number of children
aged 6–17 0.183 0.036 5.136 0.141 0.038 3.681
Number of children
aged 18–24 0.157 0.044 3.550 0.088 0.045 1.951
Regional
unemployment rate 0.049 0.006 8.735 0.040 0.006 6.601
Chronic disease 0.270 0.087 3.103 0.119 0.084 1.423
Partners not employed 0.156 0.106 1.465 0.159 0.170 0.934
Table 3D.2. Second step: wage equations
Women Men
Variable Coeff. Std. error t-ratio Coeff. Std. error t-ratio
Constant 0.504 0.470 1.072 0.237 0.302 0.783
Years of education 0.084 0.009 9.411 0.072 0.003 24.272
Age 0.030 0.019 1.556 0.089 0.014 6.249
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.001 0.000 6.042
Past work experience 0.064 0.019 3.373 0.078 0.011 6.824
South-east 0.103 0.057 1.812 0.152 0.026 5.792
South-west 0.164 0.057 2.855 0.155 0.029 5.287
Centre 0.109 0.038 2.880 0.043 0.023 1.848
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3E Unpaid work by gender over time and
across countries
Francesca Olivier
In this Appendix a comparison among different surveys which record
information on unpaid work in Italy over different years will be carried out
together with a comparison among data from other countries.
I shall compare TBS time budget data with the information on unpaid
hours of work taken from the ISTAT 1994 multipurpose survey on daily life
(Indagine multiscopo sugli aspetti di vita quotidiana). The latter data are less
precise than the TBS data for the following reasons:
• ISTAT 1994 data do not allow us to distinguish between housework,
care and shopping and house administration, but collect total average
unpaid work time carried out by each family member.
• This total time does not refer to a specific day, nor does it come from a
diary, but is a weekly mean; hence it is not possible to account for
simultaneous activities and average weekly data are more exposed to the
risk of recall errors.
For the comparison I have used a subsample: only one-earner couples.
Despite the different statistical sources and the different years, the data
shown in this Appendix confirm what has been found by using the 1989
ISTAT time budget survey: in 1989 women devoted 79 per cent of their
total working time to unpaid work (according to time budget data) and 75
per cent according to survey data.
However, the differences in the distribution of time arising in this com-
parison may be due to the different sources of data analysed. To see how
total work distribution has changed over time in Italy I have therefore
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Table 3E.1 Allocation of time by gender in one-earner households: ISTAT TBS 1989
versus ISTAT 1994 Survey
1989 (%) 1994 (%)
Women
Unpaid work 79 75
Paid work 21 25
Total working time 100 100
Men
Unpaid work 18 20
Paid work 82 80
Total working time 100 100
Sources: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT TBS 1989 and ISTAT 1994 data.
compared the same sources of data (ISTAT multipurpose surveys 1994 and
1998) distinguishing by different household types. As Tables 3E.2 and 3E.3
show, the average time spent on unpaid work by women without children
decreased between 1994 and 1998 both in one-earner (where only the
husband was employed) and double-earner households. On the other hand,
women’s unpaid work in households with children decreased only in one-
earner households. There was a narrowing of the gap in total working time
by gender between 1994 and 1998.
By looking at the distribution of time by type of household (with or
without children) and by women’s age (Tables 3E.4 and 3E.5) one can see
that women aged under 50 have reduced significantly unpaid work activities
in households without children (Table 3E.4), whereas the decrease in
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Table 3E.2 Allocation of time (hours) in one-earner households: comparison between
1994 and 1998 ISTAT household surveys
With children Without children
1994 1998 1994 1998
Women
Unpaid work 50.5 48.9 44.0 38.9
Paid work 0 0 0 0
Total working time 50.7 48.9 44.0 38.9
Men
Unpaid work 4.9 5.3 4.4 4.5
Paid work 43.6 43.9 42.5 43.8
Total working time 48.5 49.2 46.9 48.3
Table 3E.3 Allocation of time (hours) in double-earner households: comparison between
1994 and 1998 ISTAT household surveys
With children Without children
1994 1998 1994 1998
Women
Unpaid work 30.4 30.2 24.5 20.9
Paid work 34.5 34.3 37.3 37.5
Total working time 64.9 64.5 61.8 58.3
Men
Unpaid work 6.5 7.9 5.5 6.0
Paid work 43.6 44.2 45.1 44.5
Total working time 50.1 52.1 50.6 50.5
women’s unpaid work for households with children occurs only when
women are older.
By analysing women’s level of education (Tables 3E.6 and 3E.7) one can
see that women’s unpaid work in households without children (Table 3E.6)
decreased, especially for women with medium or high levels of education,
whereas the reduction in unpaid working time was much lower for women
in households with children, while unpaid work of graduate women even
increased. Note the net increase in women’s total working time in house-
holds with children and (for graduate women) in households without 
children.
I then carried out a comparison between UNDP (1995) data on the allo-
cation of time in industrialised countries and data on the allocation of time
estimated by using ISTAT TBS data for Italy. This comparison (made by
using a graph similar to the one proposed by UNDP 1995) shows a greater
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Table 3E.4 Allocation of time (hours) by women’s age in households without children:
comparison between 1994 and 1998 ISTAT household surveys
18–35 years 35–50 years 50–65 years
1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998
Unpaid work 31.1 24.4 32.8 26.8 36.5 34.1
Paid work 28.9 32.9 29.5 31.4 25.1 27.4
Table 3E.5 Allocation of time (hours) by women’s age in households with children:
comparison between 1994 and 1998 ISTAT household surveys
18–35 years 35–50 years 50–65 years
1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998
Unpaid work 41.7 41.3 40.6 39.2 40.8 38.9
Paid work 21.4 23.7 24.0 25.8 21.0 23.8
Table 3E.6 Allocation of time (hours) by women’s education levels in households
without children: comparison between 1994 and 1998 ISTAT household
surveys
Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary Degree
1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998
Unpaid work 38.5 36.5 35.3 30.6 29.3 24.0 22.8 21.7
Paid work 23.8 26.0 27.7 30.5 30.1 32.1 27.3 33.2
Total working time 62.3 62.5 63.0 61.1 59.4 56.1 50.1 54.9
disequilibrium by gender in the allocation of time in Italy (Figure 3E.2)
than in all the industrialised countries analysed in UNDP 1995 (Figure
3E.1).
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Table 3E.7 Allocation of time (hours) by women’s education levels in households with
children: comparison between 1994 and 1998 ISTAT household surveys
Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary Degree
1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998
Unpaid work 44.7 43.8 42.7 42.2 38.3 37.1 30.0 31.6
Paid work 18.6 20.1 21.0 22.8 26.2 27.8 27.7 28.1



















Figure 3E.1 Allocation of time by gender – industrialised countries.
Source: UNDP (1995).
Figure 3E.2 Allocation of time by gender – Italy.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SHIW 1995 data matched with ISTAT TBS.
Notes
SNA, recorded in the system of national accounts.
Non-SNA, unrecorded in the system of national accounts.
-----------------·.--.--------.... 
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Appendix 3F Decile distribution of money and extended
income by gender and different household types
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Figure 3F.1 Decile composition by employment condition of money income (a) and
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Notes
1 Analyses on the implications of the inclusion of unpaid work in the economic analy-
sis are provided in Chapters 1, 8 and 9 of this book.
2 ‘Domestic work is hidden because it sustains other types of work, formal and infor-
mal, waged and unwaged. The difficulties of measurement are partly related to the
problem of placing this work and the whole process of the reproduction of people
within the analytical framework of basic economic processes, and within the scheme
of the social relationships that link different kinds of work, social subjects and eco-
nomic processes’ (Picchio 1996: 90).
3 Household activities contribute to household consumption by combining market
goods and household time into commodities. By the term ‘extended consumption’
we mean the consumption of market and non-market goods.
4 See Bank of Italy (2002) for a first analysis of the 2000 survey. The survey includes
synthetic information on household members’ weekly hours of unpaid work
together with information on household income and wealth.
5 Analyses of the presence of childcare services for children in different age groups are
provided by Moss (1990), ISTAT (1997), Saraceno (1997) and OECD (2001). In
addition, women’s paid work is affected significantly by the presence and number of
children in different age groups depending on the system of childcare services
(Addabbo 1999).
6 See Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and Cannari and Gavosto (1994) for more details
on SHIW.
7 If the two samples are drawn from the same population one can show that the two
instrumental variables estimator suggested by Angrist and Krueger (1992) (and
applied, among others, by Lusardi 1996) provides consistent estimates for the
moments of the population even if computed on two different samples.
8 Chadeau (1985), Perali (1999) and Murphy (1982).
9 Bruyn-Hundt (1996).
10 We use as service price method the replacement cost.
11 This result has also been obtained by Jenkins and O’Leary (1996).
12 Bonke (1992) finds that the result on equalisation depends on the type of inequality
index and the type of household analysed, whereas Bryant and Zyck (1985), by using
US data, found that income inequality decreased by extending income to include
unpaid work between 1979 and 1980 and increased between 1975 and 1976.
13 The wage differential by gender in Italy was 22 per cent in 1995 and has increased
over the past decade (ITER 2001; Rossi 1998).
14 See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the equivalence scales used here.
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4 Unpaid work and household
living standards





The aim of this chapter is to provide some measures of how equivalence
scales change when household production is included in a broader definition
of consumption. In Chapter 3 we stressed the importance of extending the
definition of income to measure economic well-being. Traditionally, in
welfare analysis the money income of a household is treated as a proxy for its
level of welfare on the grounds that income is the means to achieve welfare.
Defined in this way, income represents the value of consumption that can be
undertaken. However, it may be observed that household activities con-
tribute to household consumption by combining market goods and labour
time of household members, as input to a household production process,
into household commodities as output. The evaluation of the ‘value added’ to
household consumption through domestic activities and the extent to which
broadening the definition of income may affect the distribution of welfare
was the object of Chapter 3. For this purpose, we pointed out that the fact
that households differ in terms of their size, composition and other demo-
graphic characteristics implies that if we wish to compare the welfare level
of two households it is not sufficient simply to compare their income levels.
For example, families with children need more income than families without
children to achieve the same living standard. The question is: How much
more income?
A household equivalence scale is a measure of the adjustment required to
compare income and expenditure of different household types, by taking
account of demographic variables. For instance, suppose that a household of
two adults and two children has an equivalence scale of 1.5 where the refer-
ence household type is the childless couple. If a family of the former type has
B3,000 of total monthly expenditure, it follows that the same level of utility
may be achieved by a childless couple with B2,000 income per month. This
chapter aims to analyse whether equivalence scales vary with the definition
of income. As shown in Chapter 2, time spent on household activities
depends largely on household composition. It is likely that household 
equivalence scales associated with the non-monetary component of con-
sumption are different from those usually estimated on market consumption
goods. To our knowledge, the possibility that appropriate equivalence scales
differ with the definition of income has not yet been explored.
Since our purpose is to perform interpersonal welfare comparisons from
cross-sectional data and not, for instance, to measure the cost of raising chil-
dren over the parents’ life cycle, the approach adopted in order to estimate
equivalence scales is based on needs. We apply Engel’s approach to compute,
parametrically and non-parametrically, the compensating variation required
in order to restore household welfare to its level prior to the change in
family composition. In particular, this study provides the cost associated
with the presence of children by different age groups and the cost of a single
adult as a percentage of the cost of a childless couple. The inclusion of
household commodities in the bundle of necessities increases significantly
the cost of pre-school children.
Equivalence scales make it possible to convert household income into
equivalent quantities, based on the assumption of equal treatment of family
members. In terms of interpersonal welfare comparison, focusing only on
inter-household distribution and disregarding questions related to intra-
household inequality implies that measures of poverty and inequality may
be grossly underestimated.
The question of how resources are allocated within the household is
crucial in behavioural analysis related to the household decision-making
process. It is also relevant in the context of the design of household policies;
for example, to devise eligibility rules for benefit schemes targeted at a spe-
cific household member or to rank households in terms of the equality of the
intra-household distribution process. Besides, the distributive effects of
alternative tax/benefit schemes should take into account their impact on
individual behaviour and welfare.
One method of estimating the extent of inequality within the household
is based on labour supply data. Chiappori (1992) argues that by observing
how leisure is shared between the individual partners, it is possible to infer
(up to a certain constant) how resources are shared between spouses and how
the household’s ‘sharing rule’ alters in response to changes in income or
prices. Since time spent outside the labour market is not just pure leisure –
because it is often spent in household production and domestic work it is
usually unequally distributed by gender – accounting for household produc-
tion allows one to avoid misleading results concerning the intra-household
resource allocation (Apps and Rees 1996).
The analysis of the behaviour of household members and their interac-
tions through the sharing rule is central in the measurement of equivalence
scales since utility is ultimately experienced by individuals.
After reviewing the literature on intra-household allocation of resources
and the inclusion of household production, we summarise some results on
the estimation of the sharing rule for Italian households and the implication
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related to the presence of children within a collective representation of the
household, based on the data described in Chapter 3.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the conventional
method of estimating equivalence scales. Section 2 provides estimation
results obtained using data on extended consumption. Section 3 is devoted
to discussing issues related to the intra-household decision-making process
and domestic production. Section 4 deals with the challenges implied by
moving from inter-household comparison to interpersonal comparisons.
1 Equivalence scales: definitions
Equivalence scales attempt to measure the proportionate increase (or decrease)
in income necessary to maintain a certain level of welfare given some changes
in household composition. By analogy with the theory of cost of living indices,
equivalence scales are expressed as a ratio between the cost of reaching a given
standard of living for different types of households. Let us define the cost or
expenditure function C(u, p, d )  x as the minimum cost x necessary to reach
the utility level u at prices p for a household with characteristics d.
If d 1 denotes a family of two adults and a child, and d 0 a reference family
usually composed of a childless couple, the additional cost of choosing d 1
over d 0 may be expressed as a consumer surplus measure, by
D( p, d 1, d 0; u)  C( p, d 1; u)  C( p, d 0; u). (4.1)
For a given utility level of the reference household u and current prices, (4.1)
corresponds to the monetary compensation required to restore the utility
level of the household before the change.
An equivalence scale compares two households with different demo-
graphic composition, in the same way that a cost of living index number
compares two price levels, and can be written as






















Following the previous example, the ratio (4.2) corresponds to an index of
child cost. Analogously, if d1 differs from d0 for only one element, the equiva-
lence scale corresponds to an index of cost associated with a specific demo-
graphic attribute, say, the cost of an elderly or disabled person, or the cost of
living in a specific region. The difference between (4.2) and unity determines
the compensating variation as a percentage of total household expenditure.
An equivalence scale (ES) may be considered exact if it is independent of
the utility level or the income level chosen as the base of comparison among
different households. This property of the ES is called base independence (BI),
and implies a restriction on the form of the cost function. It has been shown
(Lewbel 1989; Blackorby and Donaldson 1993) that a base-independent
Unpaid work and living standards 105
equivalence scale requires the cost function to be separable in the demo-
graphic function which includes only prices p and demographic character-
istics d as arguments, m( p, d ), and in the cost function independent from d,
G(u, p, d 0 ). If C(u, p, d )  G(u, p, d 0 )m( p, d ), it follows that m( p, d ) corres-
ponds to a base-independent equivalence scale, which is independent from u,
ES( p,d )  m( p, d ).
In this context, if preferences are represented in terms of the dual indirect
utility function, V( p, y, d ), the level of welfare of a family with total expen-
diture x and prices p is given by V( p, y, d )  V( p, x/m( p, d ), d 0 ), where
x/m( p, d ) represents the equivalent expenditure. It follows that if two house-
holds facing the same prices are endowed with the same amount of equival-
ent expenditure, they are equally well-off.
In order to calculate equivalence scales, the cost function C(u, p, d) has to
be recovered from expenditure surveys. However, household characteristics d
is exogenous in demand equations; thus it is not possible to identify from
consumption data alone all the parameters required for modelling explicitly
how households choose their characteristics. In other words, demand data
reveal only conditional preference ordering regardless of whether households
choose consumption and demographic characteristics simultaneously, subse-
quently or independently (Blundell 1998). This is the root of the fundamen-
tal identification problem of equivalence scales (Pollak and Wales 1979).
Nevertheless, consumption data can be used to recover the conditional cost
of attaining each indifference curve in consumption space, i.e. conditional
preferences, and therefore provide some information on relative costs (Blun-
dell and Lewbel 1991).
Another shortcoming associated with this approach of equivalence scales
measurement is that the cost function C(u, p, d) is specified at the household
level, while the utility derived from consumption is experienced by indi-
vidual members. This implies that welfare comparisons are only allowed
across households rather than individuals (see Section 4).
The literature on equivalence scales has also been criticised because it has
been observed that the cost of children, measured as a utility loss, is only
distantly related to the total cost that parents sustain to raise their children,
which should include the actual outlays and losses of earnings (Cigno
1996). In particular, Cigno suggests that the expenditure function of the
household should be replaced by the cost of children function, where the
minimand is the opportunity cost of having children (given by the amount
of expenditure plus income forgone for raising children) while the utility
held constant is that of children, or, more concretely, the quality of life
offered to them.
In our view, this approach can provide useful insights for the analysis of
fertility choices and design of family policies. In the context of welfare
analysis, we observe that, measured in this way, the cost of children is
subject to wide variability in relation to preferences expressed by parents in
terms of the quantity – that is, the number – and quality – in the sense of
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quality of life – of children, to the household production technology and,
obviously, to time and budget constraints. This implies that the estimate of
the cost of children would not be exact, or, that is, the same, not independ-
ent, of the level of income or utility chosen as reference. It follows that if the
estimation of the cost of children is motivated by the aim of making
interpersonal welfare comparisons, as in this study, a more appropriate
method would rely on needs; that is to say, the method should be empiri-
cally consistent with the property of equivalence scale exactness.
In this study, we adopt the compensating variation method to compute
equivalence scales, but unlike the traditional approach which is based only
on market consumption goods, we widen the class of goods on which inter-
personal comparisons are usually based.
2 Estimation and results
In this section, we present our estimation results of equivalence scales on
extended consumption by applying the Engel method, which is based on the
assumption that the welfare of adults is inversely related to the proportion of
the household budget spent on food. This leads to the hypothesis that adults
in two households with different numbers of children enjoy the same level of
welfare if these households have the same food share. The Engel equivalence
scale, then, may be defined as the ratio of household expenditure that
implies an identical budget share for food in these demographically different
households.
The Engel method is also known in the literature as the iso-prop method.
This term is more general since it allows one to choose as an indirect indica-
tor of welfare any number of necessities, such as food, clothing, education or
household commodities, which we consider in this study. The Engel curve
may be linear or non-linear depending on the nature of the product. In
particular, for a necessity such as food, the relationship between the associ-
ated expenditure share and the logarithm of income is linear.
One method to estimate Engel curves without imposing parametric
restriction on the shape of the function to be estimated is based on kernel
regression methods. This approach offers the advantage that it does not
require us to assume any particular function in order to estimate the
unknown conditional expectation function. The conditional expectation
function of the Engel relationship is given by:
mm
h (x)  E[Wmi | Xi  x, di  d
h ] (4.3)
where Wmi is the consumption budget share of good m, Xi denotes income
(total expenditure) and di is a vector of variables representing household
characteristics, and we allow di to assume a number of discrete values identi-
fying H household groups, h  1, . . ., H.
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The Engel curve in (4.3) is estimated using kernel techniques (see e.g.
Hardle 1990) by
m̂ hm (x) (4.4)
where I(A) is the indicator function of the event A and K(.) is a kernel func-
tion (we chose the Gaussian density).
Alternatively, the Engel curve can be estimated parametrically by choos-
ing a specific function. In comparing non-parametric results, we estimate
the budget share function proposed by Working (1943) and Leser (1963)
that takes the form:
wi i i ln y  ln (d ) (4.5)
where it is assumed that the function of demographic characteristics ln (d) is
separable analogously to the cost function from which it is derived, ln C(u, p,
d )  ln(G(u, p, d0 )m( p, d )). In particular, ln m(d )  ln ( p, d ) is the first
derivative with respect to prices of the demographic function ln ( p, d ).1
Data on extended consumption have been drawn by matching the survey
of Italian household consumption (1995) carried out by ISTAT with data on
time use (ISTAT Multiscopo (TBS) described in Chapter 3).
We consider the following types of household: single adults, childless
couples, and couples with one child and couples with two children. These
latter two categories are also distinguished by the children’s age group (under
2, between 3 and 5, between 6 and 17, between 18 and 24 years old). All
subsamples are selected in order to exclude adults over 65 years old since
expenditure patterns are likely to differ for the elderly. In terms of expendi-
ture categories we consider only non-durable consumption, in particular food
consumed at home, clothing, transport, recreation and personal care. Table
4.1 shows summary statistics about the data for some household types.
Within the categories of these market goods, only food may be classified
as a necessity according to the shape of related expenditure shares (Figure
4.1). As far as household commodities are concerned, only domestic activ-
ities and personal care provided by the woman seem to correspond to the
requirement that the share computed in terms of extended consumption is
downward-sloping (Figure 4.2). Extended consumption is obtained as the
sum of the expenditure for goods purchased in the market, in this case only
non-durable goods, and the imputed value of household production.
Including household commodities in the selected bundle of necessities
changes significantly the index of cost of children. At the median, the cost of
a child under 6 years old rises to 48 per cent of the figure for a childless
couple, which means it almost equals the cost of an equivalent adult. For an
older child, the compensating variation converges to conventional measures











of a young child is higher than the cost of a dependent adult in terms of
extended consumption. This result also holds according to parametric esti-
mates even if the distance between the two age groups is smaller, probably
because the functional form needed to fit the Engel curve is less flexible than
non-parametric regression (Table 4.2).
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Figure 4.2 Non-parametric Engel curves on extended consumption for different
household types.
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Note also that at a lower welfare level (corresponding to the fourth quin-
tile of the budget share distribution) the costs associated with a child under
2 years old falls to 14 per cent of the reference household, according to the
equivalence scales based on food, whereas it rises to 50 per cent when the
basket of necessities includes parents’ time devoted to household production.
On the other hand, this index remains stable at 20 per cent at a higher
welfare level for a household with a small child as at the median level, while
it falls to 46 per cent in the case of extended consumption, implying that
some substitutions between purchasing market goods and household pro-
duction occur in relation to earning capacities, especially when the child is
very young.
As far as economies of scale are concerned, it seems that the cost of two
children in the same age group increases the costs of the reference household
less than proportionally. In particular, economies of scale seem higher
within extended consumption also according to parametric estimates (Table
4.2), with the exception of the cost of a single adult compared to the cost of
a couple. Family formation is associated with a higher level of needs than
living alone when household production is considered.
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Table 4.1 Non-parametric Engel scale
Quantile No. No. Children Engel equivalence scale
adults children age group
Food Food and household 
production
40 per cent 1 0 – 0.60 0.48
2 1 2– 1.14 1.50
2 1 3–5 1.20 1.49
2 1 6–17 1.23 1.25
2 2 6–17 1.40 1.44
2 1 18–24 1.35 1.38
2 2 18–24 1.60 1.55
Median 1 0 – 0.60 0.47
2 1 2– 1.20 1.48
2 1 3–5 1.24 1.47
2 1 6–17 1.24 1.24
2 2 6–17 1.35 1.32
2 1 18–24 1.37 1.37
2 2 18–24 1.51 1.52
60 per cent 1 0 – 0.61 0.47
2 1 2– 1.20 1.46
2 1 3–5 1.28 1.46
2 1 6–17 1.30 1.25
2 2 6–17 1.45 1.41
2 1 18–24 1.39 1.37
2 2 18–24 1.50 1.51
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT Consumption Survey (1995) matched with
ISTAT TBS Indagine Multiscopo (1989).
It should be noted that even the same value of the equivalence scale asso-
ciated with a given household implies a very different amount of compensa-
tion needed to restore the same standard of living of the reference household
depending on consumption definitions, as the median of the household
expenditure distribution is about B1,550, whereas the extended consump-
tion median is approximately B2,580.
3 Intra-household allocation of resources, household
production . . .
The recent literature on the models of household-level analysis is increas-
ingly critical of those describing household decisions in a unitary fashion,
from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. To be consistent with
methodological individualism, the basic unit of microeconomic analysis
should be the individual rather than the household. Within the unitary
model, individual preferences of household members are aggregated so that
it is not possible to recover the parameters characterising the internal
decision-making process that determines observed outcomes. Put more
simply, a preference ordering defined at the household level presupposes a
common preference among family members or that consensus is reached by
the dominance of a benevolent dictator. Family behaviour is described as the
outcome of the maximisation of a single utility function subject to a pooled
income constraint, implying that family demand for goods, leisure and com-
modities (such as children) are independent of which individuals in the
family receive income or control resources. The reservations advanced by
Samuelson (1956) on the empirical validity of the unitary approach have
been endorsed in numerous studies (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and
Horney 1981; Chiappori 1988; Horney and McElroy 1988; Notburga 1992;
Del Boca 1997; Perali 1999).
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Table 4.2 Parametric Engel scale
No. adults No. children Children age group Engel equivalence scale
Food Food and household 
production
1 0 – 0.59 0.53
2 1 2– 1.13 1.30
2 1 3–5 1.16 1.21
2 2 6– 1.30 1.45
2 1 6–17 1.19 1.22
2 2 6–17 1.40 1.40
2 1 18–24 1.28 1.28
2 2 18–24 1.55 1.50
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT Consumption Survey (1995) matched with
ISTAT TBS Indagine Multiscopo (1989).
As a consequence, collective models of household behaviour have been
developed. These studies describe the household decision-making process as
the outcome of a strategic game. Bargaining theory represents the household
as a group of individuals, each of whom is characterised by specific prefer-
ences, and provides tools to recognise explicitly the existence of several
decision-making units. Within this setting, the rules underlying the intra-
household allocation of individual consumption, time use and welfare can be
investigated, as well as issues such as household formation and divorce. This
approach relies on a specific class of collective models, namely the co-
operative ones, based on the Nash bargaining scheme.
The condition of Pareto-efficient resource allocation is central in the liter-
ature on household behaviour, both in the common preferences and bargain-
ing models. That is to say, households will never adopt Pareto-dominated
decisions. Chiappori (1988, 1992) proposes a more general collective
representation of household behaviour than the bargaining ones. Starting
from the sole Pareto-efficiency assumption without requiring the choice of a
specific bargaining model, the collective model nests the co-operative
models and the unitary approach as specific cases, making it possible to
derive testable restrictions upon behaviour. Chiappori shows under which
conditions it is possible to recover a sharing rule (up to a certain constant)
and a pair of individual preferences in the limited case where only one
private or assignable product is observed.
In most household surveys, consumption and expenditure data are col-
lected at household rather than individual level, so individual consumption
is not observed directly. Moreover, few goods are consumed by only one
member of the household. Therefore, most empirical analyses of intra-house-
hold allocation models have focused on leisure demand (Chiappori 1992;
Browning et al. 1994; Fortin and Lacroix 1997). It has then been shown that
the use of exogenous information affecting only the distribution process, but
not preferences in the standard collective model, is helpful in improving the
identification of the sharing rule (Chiappori et al. 2002). Focusing on labour
supply, Blundell et al. (1998) and Donni (2002) analyse decisions (not to)
participate in the labour market and the impact of income tax.
While it has been recognised since the work of Becker (1965) that a
significant proportion of time not allocated to paid labour supply is spent in
producing goods and services within the household, up to now few papers
have focused on the implications of including household production on the
estimates of intra-household resource allocation. Apps and Rees (1996,
1997) emphasise the importance of incorporating household production in
collective models of household behaviour in order to better describe the
intra-household resource allocation process and obtain more precise esti-
mates of individuals’ responses to policies. They point out that the absence
of domestic production leads to misleading results for welfare analysis, espe-
cially in households where the allocation of time to domestic activities
results from high specialisation of labour between domestic and market pro-
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duction (see also Chapter 3 for a distributional analysis of extended income).
On the other hand, they argue that in the collective model with household
production, the partial derivatives of the share function can only be recov-
ered completely at the cost of imposing some specific restrictions.
Chiappori (1997) shows that when collective models are extended to
include household production of a tradable product, which implies that the
price of the domestic product is exogenously determined in an outside market,
then previous results hold, namely the sharing rule can be identified up to an
additive constant. In the alternative situation considered by Apps and Rees,
where households cannot buy or sell domestic products, endogeneity of the
household product price to household decisions is crucial. Functionally differ-
ent parametric structural models may be consistent with the same reduced
form, thus revealing a fundamental identification problem giving rise to
sharing rules identifiable only up to an additive function of wages.
We often experience situations where the same goods or services pro-
duced within the household may also be bought on outside markets. For
instance, eating out can substitute for meals prepared at home, household
members may choose to do the ironing themselves or hire someone else to
do it and so on. On the other hand, there are domestic goods that can be
produced only within the household. Examples of household commodities
include ‘children, prestige and envy, health and pleasure of the senses’
(Becker 1965). If the case of a tradable domestic product is likely to prevail.
One may test it empirically.
Arosson and colleagues (2001) provide estimates of individual demand for
leisure in a collective model with household production based on a model
specification derived for the case of a non-tradable domestic product without
explicitly modelling the related price. They also consider the case of a mar-
ketable household product and the unitary model as nested versions. The
evidence drawn from Swedish cross-sectional data in terms of models com-
parison is not univocal across different years. Even if this attempt empiri-
cally to validate the assumption incorporated into the household model is
useful, the specification adopted in this chapter does not take into account
explicitly the fact that production and consumption in the household model
cannot be separated when there are missing markets. It follows that house-
hold decisions cannot be modelled recursively as in the case of a marketable
domestic product, and the decentralised solution of the collective model
should be redefined accordingly.
While recently empirical studies have shown the advantages offered by
the collective approach in evaluating the economic effect of public policies,2
it is to be hoped that further research efforts are made to address the issues
involved in modelling household decisions including domestic production.
None the less, significant progress in the identification of the share function
is connected unavoidably with the availability of survey data on individual
consumption of market and non-market goods and time use, even in stylised
form (Perali 2002a).
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4 . . . and children
Further extensions of the collective approach should examine modelling
family decisions concerning children to analyse the linkage between labour
supply, fertility and consumption. Applying the tools of household produc-
tion, Picard and Ekert-Jaffe (2002) consider children as goods both pro-
duced and publicly consumed by household members, and they explore the
consequences implied by the non-separability of the production and con-
sumption sides of the model on the Pareto-optimal solution of the collective
framework.
Another promising field concerns the reconciliation of the literature on
the collective analysis of household behaviour with the literature on equiva-
lence scales measurement, in line with Phipps’ exhortation (1997).
Traditionally, equivalence scales measure the income or expenditure adjust-
ment required to perform interpersonal welfare comparisons across house-
holds on the assumption that everyone in the household shares the same
level of welfare. ‘However, there are cases in which such an assumption
would clearly be inappropriate’ (Deaton and Muellbauer 1986). Several
studies have shown that unequal distribution of resources within the house-
hold – between men and women, between adults and children and so on –
can increase inequality (Haddad and Kanbur 1990; Lazear and Michael
1988; Borooah and McKee 1994; Davies and Joshi 1994; Woolley and Mar-
shall 1994). Inequality measurement among individuals requires converting
household well-being into individual well-being. This may involve two
measurement adjustments: an adjustment for economies of scale across
households of different size, and an adjustment for the distribution of
resources that occurs within the household (Johnson 1998). Indices of intra-
household inequality resulting from the household bargaining process may
be considered as household attributes directly affecting the measurement of
the scales and enhancing the informational basis on which inter-household
comparisons are made (Perali 2002b). This kind of information would also
be useful in designing an optimal in-kind benefit. Taking account of who
exactly in the household receives the benefits is essential, for instance, to
target income support for children. Clearly, the provision would be mean-
ingless if the increase in family disposable income were followed by a reduc-
tion in the child’s share of resources.
While intra-household inequality cannot be inferred directly on the basis
of the available household expenditure surveys, the collective approach
developed through the works of Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al.
(1994) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) offers a tool to estimate the
sharing rule within the household in quite general situations, namely
without requiring the notion of private goods, on the basis of observations of
aggregate household consumption behaviour and bargaining power of
household members, as well as to recover individual utility functions. The
underlying idea is that observing an exclusive product enables something to
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be inferred about the allocation of consumption among family members.
Analogously, observing how the aggregate consumption of goods depends
on the various income sources in the household is sufficient to identify the
share of the budget allocated to household members up to a certain constant.
One of the main advantages of this approach consists in the possibility of
evaluating how intra-household distribution of welfare varies in relation to
any variable that may affect the decision-making process and the bargaining
power of each household member, such as his or her wage or non-labour
income, regulation of minimum wages, legislation on divorce, the marriage
market and so on. For instance, a change in the minimum wage is likely to
modify the threat point of non-working spouses according to the bargaining
theory, which in turn would affect the amount of income shared with the
partner. Accordingly, any variable that is correlated positively with the bar-
gaining power of one spouse should have a positive effect on his or her own
share, while negative effects should result from any increase in the partner’s
threat point.
It is even more important to explore the possibility that the collective
approach provides an alternative to traditional equivalence scales methods
for interpersonal welfare comparisons. The individual utility function may
be recovered from the representation of the process of intra-household alloca-
tion of goods and services, thus making it possible to derive welfare func-
tions at the level of every individual in the family based on what each
individual actually receives. By splitting the household expenditure into
costs attributable, for instance, to adults and children separately would allow
one to compute a measure of the standard of living of the adults based on
the adults’ expenditure level and the compensation needed to restore the
pre-child utility level, as advocated by Deaton and Muellbauer (1986).
Bourguignon (1999) investigates extensions of earlier work (Bourguignon
et al. 1993; Browning et al. 1994) which make it possible to identify a two-
dimensional sharing rule, by distinguishing the resources allocated to chil-
dren from those shared between husband and wife. In contrast to
conventional methods, this approach avoids the need to rely on any compa-
rability assumption of family behaviour among households of different com-
position – say, demographic separability – so that the associated measures of
the cost of children can be derived under less restrictive assumptions. None
the less, it is worth mentioning several limitations. First, Bourguignon con-
siders children as a household public product, and therefore with no
decision-making power, while the intra-household allocation game is played
by only the two parents. This assumption seems reasonable until the child
grows older and can choose to leave his family. Thus the challenging issue
remains to extend the collective framework to admit several decision-
making units beyond the couple, so that households may be followed
through the life cycle. This will be helpful also in disentangling intergenera-
tional issues, allowing dynamic models of generational accounts to be
developed. Second, this approach allows one to analyse the allocation of
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resources among family members only in terms of differentials rather than in
absolute terms, since the sharing rule can be identified only up to a constant.
Identifying fully the sharing rule requires resorting to arbitrary allocation
for some reference couple. Third, this chapter disregards costs associated
with parents’ time spent in childcare and other domestic activities, and so is
subject to the shortcomings highlighted in Section 3.
A different attempt to reconcile the literature on decision-making units
within the family and the literature on the estimation of equivalence scales
is suggested by Caiumi and Perali (1999). Borrowing from the literature on
modifying functions used to incorporate demographic or other exogenous
effects into demand systems and from studies estimating household tech-
nologies (Bollino et al. 2000), they specify a gender-specific demand system
incorporating a sharing rule in structural form3 with the aim of learning
about the intra-household distribution process of goods and time, including
household production. The main purpose of this study is not to perform
interpersonal comparisons, but rather to illustrate how the presence of chil-
dren affects the allocation of time and other resources within the household,
and to examine the implications related to the estimation of the cost of chil-
dren on the basis of a collective model that considers full-time labour supply
as endogenous. In particular, this chapter provides measures of the extent to
which the full cost of a child is shared between the mother and father. An
analogous perspective is adopted in the analysis developed by Apps and Rees
(2001) to derive the intra-household distribution of resources and implied
child-rearing costs.
The paper by Caiumi and Perali (1999) draws statistical data from the
matched data-set on individual earnings and time use described in Chapter 3,
so it is worth summarising the main results of this chapter after a brief dis-
cussion of the model’s specification. Individual utility functions are defined
for leisure, a composite domestic product and a composite market product,
and are maximised with respect to an individual budget constraint. The allo-
cation process depends on individual market wages and non-labour income.
The model specification requires an a priori assumption about the sharing of
market and domestic goods between the partners since information on indi-
viduals is lacking. This implies that estimates of both preferences and the
sharing rule may be driven by priors. Specifically, assuming that a large share
of both goods is public and accessible to both members without restrictions,
individual budget shares are computed imposing that both composite market
and domestic goods are assigned fairly between the couple. It follows that the
inference on the sharing rule (up to a constant) relies on observations of
leisure demand and how the combination of market and domestic goods
varies in relation to different income sources of the household. Provided that
the assumption mentioned above is not too far from reality, the authors argue
that estimating a joint system of equations is more informative than a single
equation approach based on a private product, since it takes into account the
full set of constraints faced by the consumer.
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When we look at demand elasticities, in double-earner households the
husband’s behaviour is not affected by the presence of children, while the
wife reacts by becoming significantly unresponsive to wage changes. This
suggests that when a child is born, a woman in a non-traditional household
spends more time in the home, while the husband’s time allocation remains
almost unchanged. Furthermore, estimates of the share function suggest that
in double-earner families an increase in each member’s labour income is not
shared with the spouse, while an increase in non-labour income raises the
transfer to the other partner. The presence of children seems to motivate
transfers from the husband to the wife. By contrast, single-earner households
behave in a more altruistic manner. For both household types, at lower
income levels the actual and predicted values of the male share of total
income show a more egalitarian distribution as a result of a more equal dis-
tribution of power. The patterns of relative contributions to the full cost of a
child are only slightly affected by the different organisation in traditional
and non-traditional households. In both situations, the parental investment
in household production is supported mainly by the mother at the expense
of the consumption of leisure, especially when the child is very young.
Conclusions
In this chapter we show that equivalence scales change significantly, espe-
cially for young children when household commodities are taken into
account. Although the importance of incorporating household production
into models of household analysis has been recognised, there are still few
studies that address this issue.
Further progress should be made to redefine equivalence scales more cor-
rectly in terms of individual welfare instead of household welfare. Distribu-
tional analyses, such as the one described in Chapter 3, could then benefit
from a better inequality assessment by gender.
As suggested also by others (Apps and Rees 1997), we emphasise that
significant improvement in empirical application requires household con-
sumption data to be collected jointly with information on time use and on
individual consumption of market and domestic goods. Stylised time use
information is very effective and may be added to household surveys at very
low administrative cost.
Unpaid work and living standards 117
Appendix Descriptive statistics
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Table 4A.1 Descriptive statistics
Monetary consumption (average budget shares)
Household types
Single Couple, Couple, Couple, All
(3,014) 0 children 1 child 2 children families
Obs. (2,818) (3,174) (3,291) (19,947)
Food 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.33
Clothing 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Transportation 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25
Recreation 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23
Personal care 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
Extended consumption (average shares)
Household types
Single Couple, Couple, Couple, All
(3,014) 0 children 1 child 2 children families
Obs. (2,818) (3,174) (3,291) (19,947)
Food 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
Household production 0.27 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.42
Clothing 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Transportation 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
Recreation 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14
Personal care 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT Consumption Survey (1995) matched with
ISTAT Indagine Multiscopo (1989).
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Notes
1 For an application to Italian data, see Perali (1999).
2 In particular, empirical evidence of the distortions produced in the analysis of a tax
reform based on traditional household models instead of collective models is already
available for several European countries (Berninger et al. 2001; Chiuri and Longo-
bardi 2002).
3 Similar to sharing rules, demographic functions are not observable. However, when
demographically modifying functions interact with exogenous prices or income, it is
possible to identify the demographic parameters of interest provided that there is
sufficient information on the data. Analogously, in order to achieve identification
from a structural specification, the sharing rule interacts with individual incomes.
This approach, when practicable, is simpler than a reduced form approach such as
the one carried out by Chiappori et al. (2002).
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The increasing attention devoted to unpaid work is concentrated mainly on
the economic role it plays in the process of income production and wealth.
Some of the main issues debated during recent years in many international
conferences are: how, and if, unpaid work can be measured; how, and if, it
can be valued and included in the systems of national accounts (SNA); and
how the unpaid provision of care relates both to the market and to the state,
affecting women’s economic position. There are no unique and unquestion-
able solutions to these issues; different approaches have been suggested on
how domestic work may be measured and evaluated, and the results in terms
of its monetary value are strongly dependent on the chosen method.
However, there is a general consensus that if non-market work was included
in SNA a totally different picture would emerge.1
The monetary evaluation of unpaid work represents an essential step
towards a broader assessment of economic well-being and is also the main
aim of this book; but other useful perspectives may be undertaken to com-
plement this point of view. To bring out the centrality of care work in every
society requires enlarging the analysis and including those effects on per-
sonal well-being that cannot (or must not necessarily) be converted into
monetary terms. The possibility of receiving care, assistance and support for
practical as well as for psychological and emotional needs is one of the most
important ways to achieve personal well-being, yet most of these social
reproduction activities are not adequately supplied by the private or public
sectors. Moreover, these activities, which take up a large amount of time and
energy, are traditionally distributed unevenly between men and women with
inescapable consequences for the well-being of whoever provides and
whoever benefits from this care work.
The aim of this chapter is to complement the general goal of this book by
investigating, from a gender point of view, the relationship between unpaid
work and well-being, the latter conceived as a multidimensional and
complex concept described in Sen’s capability approach. First, I shall debate
some theoretical issues related to this relationship and focus on how house-
hold production, and therefore social reproduction activities, may be con-
ceived of within this framework. Second, I shall present the main results of
an empirical analysis that draws on ISTAT micro-data with the aim of
answering the following questions: (1) Is there a gender inequality in the
multidimensional well-being distribution? (2) Is there a gender inequality
in the use of time? and (3) Is there a relationship between these two poten-
tial sources of gender inequality?
Section 1 shows how the process of ‘well-being production’ that occurs
within the family and the relationship between unpaid work and well-being
can be depicted in general terms and, in particular, through the adoption of
Sen’s capability framework. Section 2 describes both the methodological
approach followed here and the data-set employed for the multidimensional
assessment of well-being, while Section 3 presents the main empirical
results obtained. The final two sections are devoted to describing how paid
and unpaid work are distributed between men and women in Italy (Section
4) and to trying to define what kind of relationship may be deduced between
individual well-being and unpaid work from this empirical analysis (Section
5). Some concluding remarks will follow.
1 Some theoretical issues about the relationship between
unpaid work and well-being
The mainstream approach to welfare economics defines the individual’s well-
being in terms of available income and/or the value of the consumption to
which he or she has access. The supremacy of the material dimension of
well-being as the only evaluation space in which to judge standard of living,
inequality and poverty has been seriously questioned in the past two
decades. Among the authors who contributed to this debate a prominent
role has been played by Amartya Sen (1987, 1992, 1997, 1999), who has
associated a well-argued criticism of the utilitarian theory and its interpre-
tive limits with an innovative, persuasive ‘way of thinking’ that leads to a
broader concept of well-being. To limit one’s attention to the total amount
of economic resources available can lead to a partial and unsatisfying picture
of an individual’s standard of living. Incomes and commodities reflect the
material dimension of well-being, and their influence on what people can or
cannot do is crucial: however, they represent means and not ultimate goals
for human life. Amartya Sen’s proposal is to shift the attention towards a
broader space that includes ‘the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to
choose a life one has reason to value’ (Sen 1999: 74).
Figure 5.1 summarises the process of well-being as conceived of in the
capability approach and outlines some of the main explanatory factors that,
at three different levels (individual, household and society in a broad sense),
can affect the process of converting resources into capabilities and achieved
functionings. A person’s standard of living should be assessed on the basis of
this broader scheme of well-being.
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The capability space reflects the individual’s real freedom to pursue her
ends, to do (or be) things that she has reason to value. These valuable things
may vary from basic aspects of human life (such as being adequately nour-
ished, enjoying a good state of health, avoiding disease, having adequate
housing and having access to all levels of education) to other personal states
such as taking part in social life, fulfilling one’s own goals and aims, and
using to their full the talents and abilities which everyone has. The possibil-
ity for the individual to accomplish these functions depends on the availabil-
ity of economic resources, but also on the person’s own ability to convert
commodities and resources into functions and results, through what can be
defined as a ‘conversion mapping’. The extension of the capability set is, in
its turn, linked to a variety of personal characteristics, such as age, sex, state
of health, abilities and talents, but it is also positively and negatively influ-
enced by external circumstances, including the structure and characteristics
of the family, the socio-economic environment in which individuals and
families are located, the social and cultural norms, the availability of social
services, access to public supports and benefits and so on.
But how can unpaid work and social reproduction activities be included
within this scheme? What are the costs and benefits of unpaid work in terms
of well-being for whoever provides it and benefits from it, respectively?
Before discussing these issues I want briefly to describe, with diagrams,
the various phases that constitute the intra-household production and distri-
bution process, with the aim of comparing how domestic work is conceived
in the new home economics and how it can be included in the capability
framework.
Some general observations can be made with reference to Figure 5.2:
1 The standard approach to welfare analysis, which focuses on the income































Figure 5.1 From resources to individual well-being in the capability approach.
ship between the amount of available economic resources and individual
well-being,2 undervalues the aggregate welfare. The passage from the
initial stage (market goods and services) to the final stage of this process
(individual well-being) creates added value in society, so that social
well-being is greater than the value of the available goods purchased on
the market. It is the households, through social reproduction activities,
that generate most of this added value but this is not taken into
account.
2 As outlined by Ringen (1996), between the initial and final phase, there
are intermediate stages that involve intra-household production, co-
operation and distribution activities. The process of household produc-
tion transforms raw materials (purchased goods, available services) and
(unpaid) labour into household goods and services (i.e. caring, cooking,
cleaning, maintenance) that are consumed by household members.
Through co-operation the family takes advantage of the economies of
scales and generates ‘public family goods’, i.e. goods (such as house,
telephone, many durable goods) that do not have an exclusive and rival
consumption but that can be used jointly by all the components.
Finally, the distribution phase concerns the way in which goods and ser-
vices are allocated among household members in relation to each indi-
vidual’s needs or following some other distributive rule. While the
production process involves all types of household, the co-operation and
distribution phases play a role only in multi-person households.
3 The way in which production and co-operation operate is linked to
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Figure 5.2 Household production process, individual well-being and gender
inequalities.
questions of efficiency and depends on the size, composition and behavi-
our of the household. Families who are more efficient in combining
work, time and goods bought on the market produce more, and this
outcome is substantially dependent on the quantity as well as the
quality of the social reproduction activities. Larger families or those
better at collaborating may be more efficient in producing added value
and consequently the household welfare level will be higher; by con-
trast, unco-operative behaviour within a household can negatively affect
production and consumption efficiency.
4 If production and co-operation relate mainly to efficiency, then distribu-
tion concerns equity. How needs are satisfied and well-being is allocated
within the family is not easy to observe, and strong presumptive
assumptions are usually made. The most frequent assumption is that
intra-household distribution is, by definition, fair and all the com-
ponents are able to satisfy their own needs to the same extent or propor-
tion. This means accepting implicitly another hypothesis: either this
egalitarian result is due to the presence of a head of the family who, in
some way, represents a kind of ‘non-despotic dictator’ in that he or she
chooses and distributes according to his or her own preferences, which
one assumes respect individual needs; or it is the result of a real demo-
cratic process of choice that occurs within the family. However, it has
been argued by many authors that neither of the hypotheses may be
plausible, especially in those socio-economic contexts in which discrimi-
nation and inequality are the rule.3
5 But there is another space where distributive issues are important and
this concerns the way in which time use and domestic work are distrib-
uted within the family, and how gender inequalities in this space can
affect household efficiency and individual well-being. The questions are:
Does a higher (lower) inequality in the distribution of unpaid work
imply more (less) efficiency in terms of household production? What are
the consequences of a gender inequality in the use of time on individual
well-being? As we shall see below, the answers may be controversial and
depend on how well-being is conceived and how its production process
is postulated.
The research programme formulated by the new home economics in the
early 1960s, which started with Gary Becker’s seminal contribution, repre-
sents the first and most famous attempt to deal with household decisions in
many fields of human life; analysing productive, co-operative and distribu-
tive questions within the family, stressing the role of unpaid work.4 The
Becker approach has received wide and justified support, but several aspects
of this research programme have also been strongly criticised. Namely: (1)
the mainstream assumptions of rationality and maximising behaviour seem
to be even more ‘heroic’ when applied to household decisions; (2) the
decision-making process that occurs within the family is undefined or inade-
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quate to depict conflict and interdependence relationships; and, (3) more
important for our aims, the way in which care work and domestic activities
are taken into account can be criticised. First, in the Becker model the eco-
nomic value of unpaid work is expressed in terms of opportunity cost and
represents a sort of lost opportunity of participating in the labour market;
but in this way it is depicted as a residual and second-best choice. Second, if
the allocation of time depends on the real wage in the labour market, a low
real wage rate reduces the opportunity cost of unpaid work and its economic
value. Third, individuals who are relatively more ‘efficient’ in market activ-
ities – that is, they have a higher wage rate and or/more opportunities – will
devote less time to domestic activities; but in this way, the unequal distrib-
ution of unpaid work will add to the traditional gender inequality in the
labour market.
The holistic perspective suggested by Sen can offer fruitful possibilities
for understanding more about the role of social reproduction activities and
does not suffer from the limits that characterised the Beckerian approach. As
we have already seen, in Sen’s scheme the relationship between goods and
well-being is not direct and immediate either, but proceeds through inter-
mediate stages, and once again the role the family plays within this process
is crucial. However, compared to Becker’s household production model
there are some radical changes: (1) the meaning of well-being is much
broader in the capability approach and not just materialistic; (2) the rela-
tionship between means (e.g. goods and services supplied to the market or
produced by the household) and ends (i.e. well-being). In this case, too,
Sen’s scheme is much more complex and complete, and includes the capabil-
ity to convert the available resources into constitutive elements of well-
being.
With reference to Figure 5.2, if we neglect fundamental aspects such as
internal features and external circumstances and focus our attention only on
the links between the bold blocks depicted in Figure 5.1, it is easy to see
that social reproduction activities play an important role at three different
levels:
1 They affect significantly, and in some cases contribute directly to, the
determination of personal capabilities. This is quite obvious for many
dimensions of human life such as education and health; but, generally
speaking, the family environment is a fundamental source for the devel-
opment of individual capabilities and for the attainment of psychologi-
cal and physical well-being.5
2 They make it possible to realise most of the fundamental functionings of
human life previously referred to: to nourish, dress and educate oneself
but also to enjoy an independent life, to avoid disease and to participate
in social life – all functions that are based substantially on the contribu-
tion of unpaid work.
3 They compensate for conditions of disadvantage and restrictions on 
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capabilities for which there are no or only partial solutions. This refers
in particular to people who have some handicap or suffer from poor
health and who find the primary and sometimes unique answer to their
needs within the family.
From this point of view, restricting the evaluation of the economic weight of
unpaid work would perhaps risk leaving in the shadows what it really means
at an individual, household and social level. This is particularly evident for
the weaker members of the family – children, the elderly, the sick – for
whom the absence of these activities would mean not achieving most of the
fundamental functions, but it is equally true for the adult, ‘stronger’ compo-
nent: in many societies, and certainly in Italy, the greater career opportun-
ities for men, and therefore the different possibilities to achieve professional
and personal goals, are often a consequence of an unequal distribution of
domestic roles and activities within the family.
These issues, and in particular the gender inequalities in the distribution of
the use of time and well-being, are the main topic of the following sections.
2 The empirical analysis: aims, data-set and methodology
The empirical analysis carried out in this part of the chapter is drawn from
micro-data taken from a large national survey on daily household life con-
ducted in 1994 by the Italian Statistical Office (hereafter ISTAT).6 This
survey records a large amount of information (more than 350 relevant vari-
ables) on a sample of over 61,000 individuals corresponding to 21,000
households. It collects information about housing, education, employment,
health, social life, opinions on many aspects of daily life as well as the
weekly amount of unpaid and paid activities carried out by each member of
the household.
The features of this data-set have enabled the interpretive richness of
Sen’s approach to be preserved to a large extent, in spite of unavoidable com-
promises between theoretical prescriptions and constraints faced in terms of
available data. Thus, for example, I focused my attention on the achieved
functionings space instead of on the capability set, for although this latter
may seem more suitable for a well-being analysis, it is also more difficult to
assess. The choice of the functionings is based on similar grounds. Five
dimensions of well-being are included in this empirical analysis: housing
conditions, health, education and knowledge, social interaction and psycho-
logical state. This choice is in line with current literature regarding the
aspects of human life that should not be left out of a well-being analysis and,
as such, can be considered sufficiently exhaustive.7 Corresponding to these
five well-being dimensions there is a broad spectrum of elementary indic-
ators, principally qualitative, sometimes dichotomous but more often dis-
tributed on an ordinal scale (see Appendix 5A for a more detailed list of the
indicators used).
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Let us look briefly at what these indicators comprise. Housing conditions
(the only material dimension of well-being considered here) is the synthesis
of two elementary indicators: the first is a crowding index calculated by
dividing the number of rooms available to the family by an equivalence coef-
ficient that takes into account the economies of scale.8 The second refers to
several essential aspects of living standards such as the availability of a tele-
phone, water and adequate heating.
Health is covered by a single indicator which refers to chronic diseases;
the diseases are ranked on the basis of seriousness and the restrictions they
impose on a person’s ability to lead a completely independent life.9 For the
‘education and knowledge’ functioning three variables are included relating
to the level of education reached and the frequency with which books are
read per year and newspapers per week.
Social interactions are measured by clusters of indicators which refer to
the frequency of meeting friends and participation in social and political life.
For the latter category a distinction was made between ‘passive’ and ‘active’
participation. The former, represented by a group of eight variables, is
linked to the frequency with which someone participates in political, cul-
tural and associative manifestations and events. The latter assumes instead a
more direct form of participation, for example, through active membership,
registration or the carrying out of activities within associative bodies,
parties, unions and voluntary organisations.10 There is also a social participa-
tion indicator relating to the level of interest in political matters shown by
those interviewed.
The latter refers to the psychological state and is described through a
large number of indicators that express levels of satisfaction in several per-
sonal spheres: from economic conditions to personal and social relationships,
from state of health to working conditions and leisure time. Some of these
overlap with other dimensions (for example, those relating to health and
social relationships) and in this sense they might appear redundant.
However, it seemed interesting to place the objective and subjective spheres
side by side since the concept of ‘well-being’ in the sense of being happy,
having respect for oneself and satisfying one’s desires plays an important
role.11
The ISTAT survey does not contain information about income or indi-
vidual and family wealth, although it does consider several variables linked
to consumer habits (i.e. eating and drinking habits as well as leisure time
activities). However, for the purposes of this analysis, the exclusion of any
monetary dimension cannot be considered a limit, since income, wealth and
available resources play only an indirect role in the assessment of well-being.
An inadequate level of income can certainly help to explain why, among
other factors, a given functioning (for example, housing or education) is not
fully achieved, but there are no particular reasons why they must be directly
included in the evaluation space. The information regarding consumer
habits could have been interesting for our purpose, but the impossibility of
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distinguishing the role of constraints and preferences in the observed con-
sumption led us to omit these variables.12
The methodological tool used here is based on fuzzy set theory, which
seems particularly suitable for capturing and describing the complexity asso-
ciated with the capability approach.13 In brief, fuzzy set theory replaces the
characteristic function of a crisp set that assigns a value of either 1 or 0 to
each element in the universal set (with a clear distinction between full mem-
bership or non-membership) with a generalised characteristic function
(called membership function) that varies uniformly between 0 and 1: larger
values denote higher degrees of membership. Membership functions can
vary from the simplest linear functions to other, more complex functions;
they can either be chosen in an arbitrary way or based on empirical evidence
to avoid a priori choices and to connect the analytical description to the
observed reality. In this chapter I have tried to use the latter solution when-
ever possible (see Appendices 5B and 5C for more details on the fuzzy
methodology and the way in which it has been applied).
3 Gender inequality in multidimensional well-being
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the average values of the membership degrees for
the whole sample with reference to the fifteen elementary indicators and the
five functionings considered, respectively. The interpretation of these indices
is very simple: low values of membership degrees are a clear sign of disad-
vantage or of difficulty in achieving a satisfying standard of living while
values close to 1 define the almost full realisation of these goals.
With reference to Table 5.1, two general remarks may be made: (1) for
the total of the sample units14 high average values are registered with refer-
ence to some indicators of material life, such as the availability of essential
living services 12 (the average membership degree is around 0,900) and the
health indicator 21 (a little less than 0,800) as well as for some aspects of
the psychological dimensions such as level of satisfaction linked to health
status (this seems fairly obvious), and personal and social relationships; (2)
on the other hand, the membership degrees relating to knowledge in a broad
sense (in particular as regards reading) as well as to forms of participation in
social life are much lower.
The distinction by population groups allows the differences to be high-
lighted. The values are systematically below the average for women, with
the one significant exception of the indicator 32 which concerns reading
books. Very low levels are also recorded for the older subjects, not only with
regard to health, as one would expect, but also to education and knowledge,
participation and social relations. A relative disadvantage is shown for the
regions of the South and the Islands as regards the housing and essential
living standards indicators, as well as for education and knowledge.
However, this disadvantage is not present for the indicators referring to
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Table 5.2 Average membership degrees for each functioning by personal and social
characteristics (no. of cases 61,053)
Housing Health Education Social Psychological
knowledge interactions state
Sex
Male 0.486 0.817 0.369 0.360 0.601
Female 0.506 0.782 0.347 0.251 0.580
Total 0.496 0.799 0.358 0.304 0.590
Age
18–35 0.472 0.925 0.448 0.327 0.612
36–65 0.518 0.732 0.348 0.320 0.573
66 and over 0.672 0.452 0.199 0.198 0.566
Total 0.524 0.759 0.359 0.304 0.586
Geographical area
North-west 0.509 0.787 0.411 0.310 0.611
North-east 0.580 0.811 0.406 0.336 0.623
Centre 0.540 0.775 0.364 0.312 0.589
South 0.421 0.814 0.284 0.275 0.559
Islands 0.431 0.803 0.321 0.284 0.561
Total 0.496 0.799 0.358 0.304 0.590
Marital status
Single 0.447 0.926 0.455 0.331 0.622
Married 0.498 0.740 0.337 0.304 0.580
Divorced 0.659 0.754 0.459 0.324 0.561
Widow/widower 0.726 0.473 0.189 0.183 0.549
Total 0.496 0.799 0.358 0.304 0.590
Work status
Employee 0.509 0.852 0.428 0.364 0.595
Unemployed 0.402 0.901 0.404 0.289 0.577
Housewife 0.488 0.717 0.260 0.193 0.560
Student 0.439 0.958 0.585 0.363 0.647
Pensioner 0.639 0.516 0.241 0.254 0.587
Other 0.549 0.524 0.220 0.209 0.523
Total 0.517 0.769 0.358 0.304 0.590
Occupational groups
Manager 0.591 0.855 0.669 0.469 0.610
Office worker 0.527 0.867 0.554 0.412 0.610
Blue-collar worker 0.458 0.861 0.294 0.322 0.591
Other employee 0.459 0.835 0.360 0.302 0.595
Self-employed 0.538 0.828 0.387 0.344 0.579
Total 0.509 0.852 0.428 0.364 0.595
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
come from the distinctions based on civil and work status as well as for
occupational groups. Of particular note is the clear disadvantage of house-
wives with regard to most of the well-being dimensions: the social inter-
action is extremely low, the same is true for education and knowledge and
also, even though with smaller differentials, for subjective perception.
The same conclusions may be drawn from Table 5.2, where the average
membership degrees for the five dimensions of well-being are summarised.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the gender inequalities in the well-being more
clearly. They refer to the same indicators and the same subgroups of popu-
lation as Tables 5.1 and 5.2, but make a distinction between males and
females. The results appear quite interesting. The disadvantage relating to
women remains and, with reference to functionings such as social interac-
tions and psychological conditions, does not seem to depend on age. Even
young women seem to participate in social life less than do young men. As
far as the subjective evaluation is concerned, women are relatively less satis-
fied than men, in particular with regard to personal relations, work, leisure
time and health. Concerning this latter aspect, the position of women is
systematically lower compared to men even if, for obvious reasons, the dif-
ferential widens with increase in age. The only favourable dimension for
young women is that connected with education and knowledge, while for
those belonging to middle and older age groups, comparatively higher
values are recorded only for housing.
If one looks at the geographical area of residence, the unfavourable differ-
entials for women remain and are generally accentuated, with housing again
being the only exception. Even the relative educational advantage noted
above is now apparent only for women who live in Northern Italy while it is
falling in other Italian regions.
The discrimination remains even when we look at individual groups dis-
tinguished by civil status. Unmarried and divorced women are in a more
favourable position compared to men with regard to education, and widows
with regard to housing, but in general women’s conditions are always much
worse if one looks at both the dimensions of well-being and the elementary
indicators that determine them.
4 Gender inequality in the use of time
In this section I describe briefly the time allocated to paid and unpaid work
by the socio-economic groups previously analysed, with the aim of under-
standing whether the differences in well-being which have emerged can be
better interpreted in light of the existing disparities in the use of time.15
In Table 5.5 the time distribution between paid and unpaid work for
males and females is presented for a subsample of heads of family and
spouses. On average, about 80 per cent of men spend less than ten hours a
week on domestic activities compared with only 11 per cent of women. By
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Table 5.4 Average membership degrees for each functioning by personal and social
characteristics and by sex (no. of cases 61,053)
Housing Health* Education Social Psychological
knowledge interactions state
Age
18–35 M 0.480 0.930 0.427 0.365 0.620
F 0.464 0.921 0.468 0.292 0.605
36–65 M 0.506 0.746 0.367 0.391 0.582
F 0.529 0.719 0.329 0.251 0.564
66 and over M 0.635 0.493 0.242 0.269 0.583
F 0.695 0.432 0.174 0.153 0.551
Total M 0.514 0.777 0.370 0.365 0.593
F 0.536 0.737 0.347 0.248 0.576
Geographical area
North-west M 0.500 0.806 0.415 0.359 0.621
F 0.517 0.769 0.407 0.265 0.602
North-east M 0.571 0.828 0.405 0.387 0.631
F 0.589 0.796 0.408 0.290 0.615
Centre M 0.529 0.795 0.384 0.369 0.604
F 0.550 0.756 0.345 0.258 0.575
South M 0.411 0.831 0.308 0.342 0.570
F 0.431 0.799 0.262 0.213 0.549
Islands M 0.418 0.821 0.331 0.343 0.573
F 0.443 0.785 0.312 0.228 0.550
Total M 0.486 0.817 0.369 0.360 0.600
F 0.506 0.782 0.347 0.251 0.580
Marital status
Single M 0.449 0.933 0.432 0.349 0.628
F 0.445 0.919 0.480 0.312 0.614
Married M 0.498 0.732 0.346 0.370 0.587
F 0.498 0.748 0.328 0.237 0.573
Divorced M 0.708 0.772 0.455 0.372 0.579
F 0.622 0.740 0.462 0.288 0.548
Widow/widower M 0.719 0.521 0.224 0.262 0.577
F 0.727 0.464 0.183 0.169 0.544
Total M 0.486 0.817 0.369 0.360 0.600
F 0.506 0.782 0.347 0.251 0.580
Source: Own elaboration on ISTAT sample survey 1994.
Notes
Differences in average value due to the different size of the subgroups.
*Only one elementary indicator.
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Table 5.5 Distribution of time (hours of paid and unpaid work) by sex (head of family
and spouses)
Total sample Employed people
Male Female Male Female
Unpaid work
0 32.8 2.9 37.2 2.6
1–10 46.3 8.1 48.0 10.8
11–20 14.2 14.5 11.5 25.0
21–30 3.8 18.9 1.9 27.7
31–40 1.4 18.5 0.8 18.9
41–50 0.7 15.4 0.4 9.4
51–60 0.2 9.3 0.1 3.1
61 0.2 12.4 0.1 2.5
Total 100 100 100 100
(no. of cases) 15,970 18,472 10,812 5,710
Paid work
0 18.9 47.1 0.4 0.6
1–10 2.1 2.6 1.2 1.9
11–20 2.4 6.3 1.6 10.8
21–30 2.5 8.4 2.6 16.2
31–40 40.8 26.2 52.0 52.8
41–50 20.8 6.9 26.3 13.3
51–60 8.1 1.6 10.3 3.0
61 4.4 0.9 5.6 1.4
Total 100 100 100 100
(no. of cases) 14,031 12,198 10,851 5,927
Total time
0 6.3 1.6 0.1 0.0
1–10 8.4 3.5 0.9 0.3
11–20 5.2 5.1 1.1 0.6
21–30 3.4 7.9 1.8 1.6
31–40 17.9 12.1 21.9 5.9
41–50 31.1 17.2 39.2 14.9
51–60 16.6 18.8 21.0 25.1
61–70 6.6 16.4 8.4 23.2
71–80 2.5 9.2 3.2 15.6
80 2.0 8.2 2.4 12.8
Total 100 100 100 100
(no. of cases) 13,462 11,762 10,357 5,611
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
hours a week to domestic work. Figures do not really change if instead of
looking at the whole sample we look only at those individuals who are in
paid employment, the only significant difference being that the male load is
reduced even further.
These gender differences could be explained by the fact that, in general,
women dedicate less time to work outside the home. In part this is what
effectively takes place, even if, when we look at the typical full-time job
(thirty-one to forty hours per week), the percentage of women and men is
the same whereas more men spend longer hours in paid employment (forty-
one to fifty hours). However, the differences between men and women are
fairly apparent if we look at the overall time dedicated to both domestic and
paid work. Seventy women out of a hundred work for a minimum of forty
and a maximum of eighty or more hours per week: this share is higher than
90 per cent if we consider only the women employed outside the home. The
corresponding values for the male population are lower and equal to 58 and
74 per cent, respectively.
More detailed information is given in the following tables, which show
the average time spent on domestic work (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) and total
work (Tables 5.8 and 5.9) by men and women. Generally speaking, Italian
men contribute no more than seven hours per week to domestic work: a very
small contribution when compared with the thirty-seven hours spent by
women. Once again this disproportion cannot be explained entirely by the
presence of housewives: this is shown by the fact that differences remain
even if we look at the group of employed people (Table 5.7), where five
hours per week of male unpaid work correspond to twenty-seven hours of
female unpaid work. Moreover, if we consider the total time dedicated to
both paid and unpaid work, the average values are forty-one hours for men
and fifty-two hours for women (Table 5.8) but these figures rise respectively
to forty-nine and sixty-three for the subsample of employed people (Table
5.9). If we look at this subgroup of the population and focus our attention
on unpaid work distribution by personal and household characteristics
(Table 5.7), we will see that the low contribution of men to domestic activ-
ities (5.7 hours on average) does not seem to change.16 Men spend less time
on domestic activities when their age increases, when they marry, when they
have a low level of education and when they come from a large family. The
situation for women is obviously the opposite and the variability is greater:
getting married means increasing the time spent on domestic work by
almost eleven hours a week, and with a larger family the burden of unpaid
work becomes increasingly heavy. If we look at the overall time (paid and
unpaid), there is not a single case in which male work is greater than female
work, clear evidence that the increasing participation of women in the
labour market has simply meant that the domestic workload has been added
to the non-domestic workload and time devoted to personal needs has been
compressed.
The last topic that I want to examine briefly is whether or not this great
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Table 5.6 Unpaid work by sex and by personal and household characteristics – whole
sample (no. of cases 35,235)






18–35 6.8 18.0 37.3 21.6
36–65 6.8 65.7 39.5 59.2
66 and over 9.7 16.3 28.4 19.2
Work status
Employee 5.7 67.4 27.6 31.6
Unemployed 11.7 2.7 43.2 2.0
Pensioner 10.6 27.7 33.7 20.2
Housewife – – 45.6 43.4
Other 9.2 2.2 26.7 2.7
Marital status
Single 10.1 6.1 22.1 5.3
Married 6.8 88.0 39.9 77.2
Divorced 9.5 3.0 27.8 3.5
Widow/widower 14.0 2.8 28.2 14.0
Education
University degree 5.9 7.6 27.0 7.6
Upper secondary school 7.2 25.8 34.4 25.8
Lower secondary school 6.8 29.3 39.6 29.3
Primary school 7.9 31.3 39.3 31.3
No education 8.5 6.0 32.9 6.0
Geographical area
North-west 7.7 22.5 35.0 22.8
North-east 8.0 21.6 38.1 21.4
Centre 6.9 18.8 35.5 18.9
South 6.5 26.5 37.2 26.3
Islands 7.5 10.6 40.5 10.5
Type of family
Single 11.3 8.0 23.3 13.5
Couple 7.9 21.6 33.7 19.3
Couple with children 6.4 62.5 42.0 53.9
Lone parent 14.3 1.3 33.3 6.5
Other 7.2 6.5 36.6 6.8
No. of components
1 11.3 8.0 23.3 13.5
2 8.3 23.5 33.0 24.4
3 6.9 27.4 38.7 25.7
4 6.3 29.5 42.3 25.9
5 5.8 8.7 45.0 7.9
6 or more 6.5 2.9 47.8 2.6
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
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Table 5.7 Unpaid work by sex and by personal and household characteristics – employed
people (no. of cases 16,947)






18–35 6.4 24.9 26.6 33.5
36–65 5.4 73.9 28.1 65.9
66 and over 5.0 1.2 20.9 0.6
Marital status
Single 8.0 6.3 18.0 7.7
Married 5.4 89.8 28.9 81.9
Divorced 8.5 3.3 22.9 6.5
Widow/widower 10.8 0.6 26.7 3.9
Education
University degree 5.3 9.6 24.3 12.6
Upper secondary school 6.5 32.4 27.6 41.0
Lower secondary school 5.8 34.8 28.2 28.2
Primary school 4.6 21.8 28.7 16.9
No education 4.0 1.4 29.1 1.3
Geographical area
North-west 5.7 21.8 25.8 25.0
North-east 6.2 20.9 27.6 22.8
Centre 5.6 18.7 27.7 21.3
South 5.2 27.9 28.9 23.8
Islands 5.9 10.7 28.4 7.1
Type of family
Single 8.7 6.8 17.8 8.7
Couple 5.2 12.8 22.3 14.6
Couple with children 5.5 74.0 30.2 63.7
Lone parent 10.1 0.8 26.1 7.1
Other 4.8 5.6 26.9 5.9
No. of components
1 8.7 6.8 17.7 8.8
2 5.4 14.0 22.7 19.3
3 5.6 29.0 28.2 31.1
4 5.5 36.5 31.4 31.1
5 4.9 10.5 31.2 7.7
6 or more 5.1 3.2 33.0 2.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
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Table 5.8 Total time (paid and unpaid work) by sex and by personal and household
characteristics – whole sample (no. of cases 26,304)






18–35 49.3 20.3 57.7 25.0
36–65 43.5 68.1 55.7 60.2
66 and over 13.7 11.6 29.5 14.8
Work status
Employee 49.3 77.4 62.9 48.7
Unemployed 19.9 1.9 46.7 1.7
Pensioner 12.2 19.0 34.2 15.1
Housewife – – 46.8 32.1
Other 19.3 1.7 29.1 2.4
Marital status
Single 43.5 6.2 44.3 6.1
Married 41.3 88.7 55.4 78.3
Divorced 45.8 3.1 53.3 4.3
Widow/widower 23.2 2.0 34.6 11.3
Education
University degree 43.5 8.3 52.3 7.3
Upper secondary school 45.8 27.9 57.6 28.0
Lower secondary school 45.2 30.7 56.7 25.8
Primary school 35.2 28.2 48.3 30.9
No education 21.1 4.9 35.3 8.0
Geographical area
North-west 41.7 21.7 51.6 22.3
North-east 40.9 22.1 52.8 24.2
Centre 41.1 18.5 53.8 18.7
South 40.3 27.4 51.0 26.2
Islands 43.1 10.3 53.3 8.6
Type of family
Single 40.9 7.6 35.9 12.1
Couple 30.8 18.8 46.3 18.3
Couple with children 44.6 66.2 58.3 56.2
Lone parent 37.9 1.1 50.9 6.6
Other 38.0 6.3 50.2 6.8
No. of components
1 40.9 7.6 35.9 12.1
2 31.3 20.5 46.0 23.4
3 42.3 27.9 55.8 26.9
4 45.3 31.7 59.0 27.2
5 44.9 9.3 58.7 7.9
6 or more 43.5 3.0 60.3 2.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
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Table 5.9 Total time (paid and unpaid work) by sex and by personal and household
characteristics – employed people (no. of cases 16,839)






18–35 50.4 24.9 62.1 33.5
36–65 49.0 73.9 63.4 66.0
66 and over 47.2 1.1 53.9 0.5
Marital status
Single 50.4 6.2 55.9 7.8
Married 49.1 89.8 63.9 81.7
Divorced 51.5 3.4 59.0 6.6
Widow/widower 53.6 0.6 62.8 3.9
Education
University degree 46.7 9.6 54.8 12.6
Upper secondary school 49.3 32.5 62.9 41.1
Lower secondary school 49.6 34.7 65.2 28.1
Primary school 50.2 21.8 65.7 16.8
No education 49.2 1.4 60.0 1.3
Geographical area
North-west 50.1 21.7 61.9 25.0
North-east 50.0 21.0 63.6 22.9
Centre 49.3 18.7 63.8 21.3
South 47.4 28.0 62.8 23.6
Islands 49.7 10.7 62.1 7.1
Type of family
Single 50.8 6.9 55.3 8.8
Couple 48.7 12.7 59.4 14.6
Couple with children 49.2 74.1 64.8 63.6
Lone parent 54.1 0.8 62.2 7.1
Other 49.6 5.6 63.8 5.8
No. of components
1 50.8 6.9 55.3 8.8
2 48.9 14.0 59.7 19.3
3 49.5 29.0 63.5 31.0
4 49.0 36.5 65.5 31.2
5 49.4 10.5 65.4 7.6
6 or more 50.1 3.2 67.6 2.1
Source: Author’s caluclations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
amount of female household work can be attributed in part to the presence
of young children and, in these circumstances, men’s contribution to
domestic responsibilities. Families with only one child (more than 4,000
cases in my sample) were selected and the distribution of domestic work
between mother and father was analysed, both in relation to the child’s age
and to whether the mother was employed in work outside the home or was
instead a housewife. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.10 and
are quite interesting.
For the parents of children who are under 3 years old, the time spent on
domestic work is fairly onerous for the mother (more than forty hours), but
not substantially higher than the average (39.4 hours), while it is slightly
higher than usual in the case of the father (7.4 hours compared to 6.7).
Unpaid work decreases when the mother participates in the labour market
(30.6 hours of unpaid work per week instead of 40.5), but this lower amount
is compensated for by turning to domestic help or social structures and not
by the intervention of the father, whose load increases but only marginally
(under an hour per week). Finally, housewives with young children spend
almost fifty hours a week in domestic activities; their husbands no more
than six hours.
As children grow up, their mothers’ burden decreases initially by several
hours but then increases again until it exceeds forty hours per week in
homes where there are adult sons and daughters. For mothers who are also
employed outside the home, domestic activity seems to be unavoidable and
the time commitment changes only marginally with the increase in age of
the children. Housewives dedicate on average forty-seven hours per week to
school-age children and can count on under five hours of help per week from
the father. The hypothesis that women’s unpaid work is devoted not only to
young children but also, and above all, to the other adult members of the
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Table 5.10 Fathers’ and mothers’ unpaid work by children’s age (couple with a child; no.
of cases 4,294)
Total sample Mother employee Mother housewife
Child’s age Father’s Mother’s Father’s Mother’s Father’s Mother’s
unpaid unpaid unpaid unpaid unpaid unpaid
work work work work work work
 3 years 7.4 40.5 8.3 30.6 6.5 49.7
3–5 years 6.5 36.0 8.4 27.8 3.8 44.1
6–10 years 6.3 36.2 7.5 28.1 4.3 47.0
11–13 years 5.1 35.8 5.0 27.6 4.9 47.6
14–18 years 5.5 37.1 6.2 27.7 4.6 47.7
18–25 years 6.1 40.9 5.3 27.9 5.8 47.4
 25 years 8.3 41.6 7.3 26.1 7.5 45.5
Total 6.7 39.4 6.9 28.5 5.9 47.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on ISTAT sample survey, 1994.
family has been already argued (see Chapter 1) and seems to find further
confirmation here.
5 Is there a relationship between well-being and unpaid
work?
In order to check whether or not there is a relationship between individual
well-being and unpaid work, only families made up of couples without chil-
dren (3,709 cases), or with one (4,294 cases) or two children (4,586 cases),
were selected. In all of these cases, the aim was to investigate whether or not
unpaid work carried out by women was correlated with the well-being of
spouses and children.17 At a higher level of detail, attention focused on the
fifteen basic indicators of well-being and the five dimensions they make up,
as well as an aggregate well-being indicator represented by the simple
average of the membership degrees referring to the five functionings. Using
contingency tables and the corresponding association measures (chi-square
test), the relationship between unpaid work and well-being was tested.
Then, starting from linear regressions, more complex relations such as quad-
ratic, logistic or sigmoidal functions were looked for to describe this rela-
tionship. In brief, the results obtained in this first preliminary and
explorative analysis are as follows. The relationship between the well-being
of spouses and children and the domestic work carried out by women
appears fairly weak when we look at the overall indicator, but is strength-
ened if we look at several of the five dimensions and the fifteen basic indic-
ators considered. In particular, statistically significant chi-square values are
obtained with reference to the functionings relating to health, education and
knowledge, and psychological state.
The estimated linear regressions gave significant results only for the indi-
cator referring to health, with regard to both its objective value (the pres-
ence of chronic diseases) and the subjective perception of one’s own state of
health. However, for other dimensions of well-being the relationships seem
to be more complex: for instance, the link between unpaid work and social
relations is well approximated with a sigmoidal function, and a quadratic
function seems to describe in an appropriate way the link between unpaid
work and psychological state.
These results, as well as those discussed above, seem to suggest that a rich
and complex set of links between well-being and unpaid work may be drawn
and should be clarified. More detailed analyses are necessary to make these
links clearer, but I believe that by following this complementary line of
research, which focuses on the non-material dimension of well-being, we can
throw light on the unique role that unpaid work plays in human life.
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Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter was to complement more traditional
approaches to the economic evaluation of unpaid work with a broader con-
ceptual scheme that enlarges the boundaries of individual well-being beyond
a quantitative and monetary sphere. I have tried to show that the theoretical
contribution suggested by Amartya Sen can provide a fruitful framework for
this aim. Sen’s approach allows unpaid work to be analysed as a main input
in the household production process, something already made possible
thanks to other economic theories, but which is actually the only approach
that allows non-materialistic dimensions of well-being to be considered.
Most importantly, it affords us the possibility to examine how the well-
being process and intra-household distribution mechanisms can generate
positive effects in terms of capabilities and achieved functionings, but also
negative consequences in terms of gender inequalities in the distribution of
well-being and use of time.
To have a comfortable and suitable house, to enjoy good health, to
achieve a satisfactory level of education and to enlarge one’s knowledge, to
have rich and gratifying social and family relations, to be happy and satisfied
in many dimensions of one’s own life – from economic to relational, from
professional to the dimension that refers to health and leisure time – are ele-
ments that are included in the list of those aspects that make life worth
living (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum and Glover 1995). The analysis
of how these well-being indicators are distributed among individuals has
permitted us to outline positions of advantage and disadvantage, uniformity
and inequality which are very different from those that arise from the more
traditional studies of the monetary well-being of the family. It has allowed
us, first of all, to highlight how women are still disadvantaged in many fun-
damental aspects of human life, the exception being knowledge and educa-
tion, but only in the case of young women. It has brought to light the fact
that, in certain respects, non-monetary well-being is distributed in a more
equal way than commonly occurs with income: in this sense the results
attained in some of the dimensions of well-being between the North and
South of Italy appear relatively less unequal, above all in the field of health
and for the functionings of a relational and psychological type. On the other
hand, when the single individual instead of the whole family is taken as the
reference unit, this allows the low level of well-being in which housewives
live to be highlighted. Looking at the family’s income obviously does not
permit an assessment of this type of deprivation and inequality.
Very large gender inequalities in time allocation between paid and
unpaid work emerge from our empirical analysis, and they do not seem to be
related to economic, social and cultural factors such as geographical area,
age, professional status or level of education. Nor can they be explained from
a ‘life-cycle’ household perspective: as already argued in other chapters in
this volume, the burden of women’s domestic work does not depend in any
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significant way on the age of the children because it continues to exist even
when they reach adulthood. In fact, the increase in women’s participation in
the labour market has simply translated into a greater total amount of work
that is nothing but the corollary of the huge gender inequality to be found
in the unpaid work space.
Finally, I tried to connect the two parts of our empirical analysis – the
distribution of non-monetary well-being and the distribution of the use of
time – with the aim of investigating whether a correlation exists. The
results obtained move in the direction of a relatively weak relationship if the
overall well-being is considered, a predictable result given the intrinsic com-
plexity of the phenomenon and the heterogeneity of its components.
However, a stronger relationship may be observed with regard to several
specific functionings and/or basic indicators, mainly in the field of health,
knowledge and the subjective perception of well-being. The attempts made
to individuate the nature of the correlation between these elements further
confirm the fact that the functional relationships, far from being expressible
by simple linear functions, are rather more complex.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 5B A few remarks about the fuzzy set theory
In formal terms, if X denotes a universal set, then the membership function
A, by which a fuzzy set A is usually defined, has the form
A: X → [0, 1] [1]
where [0,1] is the interval of real numbers from 0 to 1. Hence, A(x)  0 if
the element x ∈ X does not belong to A, A(x)  1 if x belongs completely
to A and 0  A(x)  1 if x belongs partially to A.
Let us assume that the subset A defines the position of each individual
according to the degree of achievement of a given functioning or refers to
one of the indicators considered for the functioning assessment. In this case,
membership values equal to 1 identify a condition of full achievement, a
value equal to zero denotes the opposite situation of total failure, whereas
intermediate values between 0 and 1 describe gradual positions within the
arrangement. Generally speaking, it is necessary: (1) to define an appropriate
arrangement of modalities (or values) on the basis of the different degrees of
hardship/well-being; (2) to identify the two extreme conditions such that 
A(x)  1 (full membership) and A (x)  0 (non-membership); (3) to
specify the membership functions for all the other intermediate positions.
The choice of the proper membership function depends on the applica-
tion context and the kind of indicator we want to describe. For instance, in
cases of variables with equi-distributed modalities along an ordinal scale, a
linear function may be appropriate; a trapezoidal or a sigmoid function
could be appropriate to describe quantitative and qualitative variables with
modalities that are not equi-distributed and so on. In our work we have
made wide use of membership functions derived directly from the distribu-
tion function of the k indicators considered. That is, we have computed
(xk) in the following way:
(xk)0(xk1) if k1if k>1 [2]
where F(x) is the sampling distribution function of the variable x arranged
in an increasing order according to k. For each indicator related to a given
functioning, membership grades equal to 0 and 1 are assigned respectively
to the lowest and the highest position in the ranking, and intermediate
values are reserved for all the other elements, relating to their position inside
the distribution function. With this kind of specification any a priori and
arbitrary choice is avoided and membership functions are the ‘mirror’ of the
sample distributions: in this sense it may be considered as a ‘totally relative’
approach that fully reflects reality (see Cheli and Lemmi 1995: 124).
As outlined above, in the evaluative process measurement and representa-
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of elementary indicators referring to a given functioning, and/or (2) the
whole set of functionings. The former allows us to obtain a synthetic evalu-
ation for each achieved functioning fi, whereas the latter is related to an
overall evaluation of well-being wi. From a general point of view, both
operations may be viewed as a suitable aggregation of each elementary fuzzy
set with membership degree mkfi pertaining respectively to the k indicators
and the f achievements examined, for each of the i reference units.
The basic operations in crisp sets theory, i.e. union and intersection, have
been generalised with reference to the fuzzy sets, so that for both of these
operations there exists a broad class of function operations, each of which is
characterised by a given set of property axioms. In our work we used very
simple aggregation operations such as:
standard intersection A∩B  min [A, B] [3]
standard union A∪B  max [A, B] [4]
Standard intersection and union operations focus, respectively, on the least
and the most favourable position, so the membership grades to the compos-
ite set will be the lower value of  to the elementary sets in the former case,
and the highest values in the latter. They implicitly excluded the possibility
that there may be any sort of compensation between indicators.
A different way to consider the aggregation operation on n fuzzy sets
(with n  2) is through a generalised mean:
h  (a1, a2, . . . an) [(a1
  a2
 . . .an
)/n] [5]
with  equal to 1 for the arithmetic mean,   –1 for the harmonic mean
and 0 for the geometric mean; a1, a2, . . ., an denote the membership
grades of each element belonging to sets A1, A2, . . ., An.
In an analogous way, a class of weighted averaging operations may be
derived:
h h(a1, a2, . . . an; w1, w2, . . . wn) [wi ai
] [6]
where the weighting structure, expressed by wi ≥ 0 and wi 1 specifies the
relative importance assigned to each aggregate set.
The selection of a suitable weighting structure is an old and questionable
issue. In a multidimensional approach, if each dimension of human well-
being is considered as equally relevant, a neutral choice could be to assign an
equal weight to all constitutive elements, as in [8] below: in this way we are
not called upon to express uneasy judgements or to define a ranking among
them. Alternatively, if we want to maintain an ‘objective’ approach to the
measurement, a frequency-based weighting can be adopted. With regard to this










as an inverse function of the frequency of the corresponding symptom of
deprivation:
wi  ln 
1n
 i ij [7]
and the choice of the logarithm is justified with the opportunity of not
giving too much importance to the modalities showing a very low frequency
(see Cheli and Lemmi 1995).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 It has been estimated that in most industrialised countries the unrecorded economic
activity is as large as the recorded activity in terms of hours of work, and the mone-
tary value of domestic work is also supposed to be absolutely significant. See e.g.
Addabbo and Caiumi 1998; Goldschmidt-Clermont 1994; Nyberg 2000. For an
extended standard of living evaluation relating to Italy, see the econometric analysis
carried out in Chapter 3, this volume.
2 With reference to Figure 5.1, this means limiting attention to the two extremes of
the process of well-being.
3 On this argument, see e.g. Sen 1984, 1990; Tinker 1990.
4 See Becker 1981; Cigno 1991; Willis 1987. For a recent survey on household eco-
nomic models, see also Grossbard-Shechtman 2001; Jefferson and King 2001;
Mattila-Wiro 1999.
5 Among the few empirical analyses on the standard of living that refer to Sen’s theoretical
approach is that carried out by Schokkeart and Van Ootegem (1990) on a sample of
unemployed people in Belgium, who were asked to answer questions about their eco-
nomic, physical, psychological and relational well-being. An interesting result that
emerges from this research is that all these aspects (which are deemed by the authors to
be essential functionings in a person’s life) are strongly affected by the family structure,
with the result that those who lived alone suffered major difficulties, not only for obvious
economic reasons but even more for physical, psychological and relational reasons.
6 For the empirical analysis discussed in the following sections, I will refer largely to a
previous paper (see Chiappero-Martinetti 2000, 2002) concerning a multidimen-
sional assessment of well-being; however, I enlarge this analysis here by investigat-
ing the gender inequalities in both well-being and time-use distribution as well as
the relationship existing between them.
7 With regard to this, see e.g. Desai 1990; Nussbaum and Sen 1993, as well as Sen’s
already cited works.
8 A simple equivalence scale has been applied, proposed by Carbonaro (1986), and
based only on the number of household components.
9 Information on chronic diseases collected by the survey has been organised into
three groups: non-disabling pathologies (i.e. hypertension, allergies, asthma and
bronchial problems), partially disabling illnesses that can nevertheless be treated
(i.e. diabetes, ulcers and other similar pathologies) and, finally, disabling illnesses
such as cancer, heart attacks, nervous disorders and so on.
10 This is what may be defined as social capital.
11 Concerning the correlation on each indicator and/or dimension, see Chiappero-Mar-
tinetti 2000.
12 The fact of knowing, for example, that an individual habitually consumes breakfast
or meat less than once a week does not tell us if these eating habits are the result of
free choice or of economic restrictions. This distinction is, however, central to Sen’s
approach in that it is what differentiates the area of capabilities from that of the
effective realisations.
13 In the following pages, I shall describe just a few essential elements of the method-
ology used by referring to the Appendix and to my previous papers already quoted
for more technical aspects.
14 The average values for the total sample coincide with the average values only in the
case of the group divided by sex. For the other groups, the differences in the total
average values arise because the dimension of the subgroups varies depending on the
cases.
15 This part complements the empirical evidence described in Chapter 2, where unpaid
work in Italy is analysed in great detail by Addabbo using another data source: the
1989 ISTAT time budget survey.
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16 The only exceptions being for the single parent with a child for whom the amount
of domestic work almost doubles: this type of family is, however, statistically irrele-
vant because it represents less than 1 per cent of the sample.
17 The cases where the head of the family was female (very few, in fact) were not con-
sidered. I have also excluded the effect of unpaid work carried out by the male head
of the family on the well-being of the other components (children and wife), given
the small amount of male domestic work revealed in the previous section.
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6 ‘Convenience consumption’




This chapter analyses unpaid labour from a different perspective from the
one often adopted in the literature on the subject and also from that of many
contributions presented in this volume: we shall try to understand its rele-
vance by looking at the demand side, and more precisely at consumption,
rather than at the supply side.
In the light of the history of household consumption in the USA, the
basic idea of our approach is that unpaid work represented and continues to
represent an important field of investigation and ‘manipulation’ for both
industrial and post-industrial economies always in search of markets for
their production and reproduction. It represents, indeed, the ‘household
market’ whose target group, initially composed of housewives only, has pro-
gressively changed to include women working outside the home and all the
men undertaking unpaid work.
Focusing attention on the post-industrial societies, for which time seems
to represent the scarcest resource, a simple scheme is proposed to explain the
success of a particular group of products – within the household market –
defined as ‘convenience consumption’, the function of which seems to be to
reduce unpaid labour time.1 By buying these products, indeed, consumers
purchase not only the goods but time as well, and unpaid labour time in
particular.
By looking carefully at the experience of the American economy,
however, the relationship between convenience consumption and unpaid
labour time (together with leisure time) produces much more complicated
results than the ones economists and experts on marketing and business
expected on the basis of their oversimplified models. Convenience consump-
tion patterns were not adopted primarily by women working outside the
home and, even more surprisingly, they did not reduce unpaid labour time.
The time spent on unpaid work has remained fairly steady from 1920 to
1990, while for some housework activities it has even increased, in spite of
convenience consumption. The scope of the chapter is to provide an explana-
tion for such apparent paradoxes and to understand what new phenomena
can be associated with the long-run stability of unpaid labour time.
A methodological note
In this chapter – as mentioned already – we refer mainly to the American
experience, not only because the literature on convenience consumption
started and developed there, but also because the figures for unpaid labour
time in the American economy allow for a long-term perspective. We also
hope that, given the high level of development attained by the USA, our
investigation could, with the usual caveats, shed some light on the future of
the household market and unpaid labour time in the Italian case too.
The difficulty of applying the above mentioned approach to the Italian
economy arises for the following two reasons:
1 The absence of research on both convenience consumption and its rela-
tionship with unpaid labour. The only exception – considered in Section
3 of this chapter – is represented by some empirical investigation of a
particular group of convenience consumption products defined as ‘usa e
getta’ (use and throw them away), a fast-growing sector of the Italian
economy.
2 The unavailability of time series on unpaid labour time; only in 1989
did the Italian Central Institute of Statistics start to provide figures on
‘Bilanci del Tempo’ (time balances) and for the time being they are
limited to a few years.2
1 The continuous search for markets: ‘the household
market’ and its difficult creation
An investigation of the functioning of industrial and post-industrial
economies clearly shows the enormous efforts they made to acquire domestic
and international markets for the production and reproduction of goods and
services. The intensity of such efforts had to increase over time, due to the
saturation phenomena that usually accompany rising incomes. To recall a
well-known debate on capitalism, we can say that such a system always had
to face the problems associated with possible ‘crises of realisation’, and these
problems become more severe the longer the capitalist system survives.3
After the saturation of so-called mass consumption, which was crucial to the
production and reproduction of the industrial system, it is usually argued
that what will guarantee the market for post-industrial economies is the
demand for services, in particular financial and personal services.
To look carefully at changes in consumption patterns, unpaid labour has
always constituted a field of observation and ‘manipulation’, in view of the
potential market for products that it could generate. The problem, indeed,
was that such a market (from now on defined as the household market) was
not always ready to buy products, but rather had to be constructed. Let us
recall some of the main steps in this construction process.
If we take the USA during the 1920s, i.e. during Taylorism, we already
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see enormous efforts made by producers, economists, experts in marketing
and advertising, to teach women how to become more efficient about house-
work (see Strasser 1982; Cowan 1989; Graham 1999). More precisely,
through a very detailed study of the necessary movements and time associ-
ated with different housework activities, they wanted to suggest to house-
wives how to eliminate the waste of time, and energy in particular. These
suggestions, apparently with the goal of improving the efficiency of house-
work, aimed ultimately to open up new markets for products, more specifi-
cally durable consumption goods such as refrigerators and washing
machines. The producers of such durable consumption goods, indeed, knew
very well that, in 1920, women – in particular, middle-class women – were
responsible for 80 to 90 per cent of total household consumption and con-
sequently they constituted a privileged target group. However, they had to
be convinced to buy these particular goods and services.
The efforts to open up the household market were accompanied, if not
preceded, by many publications aimed at preparing housewives to be more
efficient about their housework. In a short time, indeed, a great number of
books started to appear; e.g. Managing Home Efficiently, The New House
Keeping, Scientific Management at Home, Household Engineering, The Efficient
Kitchen, Efficiency in the Household. Needless to say, one should also add the
enormous number of articles on the efficiency of household production
which appeared in the Ladies Home Journal in the years between 1912 and
1919.4
All these considerations lead to a straightforward conclusion: the creation
of the household market imposed a change in the form of household produc-
tion. In this connection, one should recall that in the period usually defined
as pre-industrial or agrarian, housework was fundamentally a production
activity based on great physical effort without a definite timetable and with
very little use of the marketplace. In the early phase of industrialisation,5
and particularly in the 1920s, entrepreneurs were trying to replace this kind
of housework ‘model’ with one closer to the Taylorist firm, able to produce
output by minimising effort and heavily dependent on the marketplace for
its goods and services. Some scholars of the history of domestic work in the
USA have seen in these phenomena of ‘manipulation’ of consumption pat-
terns important efforts to achieve total industrialisation of domestic produc-
tion.6 In addition, Strasser establishes a relationship between the
phenomenon of opening up the market for domestic consumption and the
end of community life of the previous period – community life based on a
strong sense of solidarity. The new pattern of housework centred on the
single consumer (in this case the housewife), who maximises her satisfaction
by buying goods on the market, was expected to lead to her social isolation.7
At this point one may ask what will happen to domestic production and
consumption today in the so-called post-industrial economies.
Once again, by looking at the experience of the American economy, one
can see a strong relationship between changes in the productive structure
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and changes in the structure of domestic consumption, in the sense that as
the productive structure moves towards the tertiary sector, the household
market shows an increasing share of services bought in the marketplace as
well (e.g. take-away meals and shopping by mail).
Once again, these processes reflect enormous efforts on the part of entre-
preneurs, economists, experts in marketing and advertising to create an
appropriate market for their products. It seems, however, that there are three
main differences between industrial and post-industrial economies in the
creation of the household market. First, in post-industrial societies, there is
strong competition among sectors – mainly between industry and services –
to capture the household market. For example, with regard to the important
market of goods and services for food, while the restaurateurs set lower and
lower prices for restaurant and take-away meals, the food industry produces
more and more cheap fast food to be consumed at home. Second, the house-
hold consumption target group has expanded over time and nowadays
includes not only housewives, but also women working outside the home, as
well as a growing number of men who do unpaid work (in several industri-
alised countries the proportion of such men seems to have increased in both
absolute terms and hours spent). Third, while in industrial economies the
main emphasis of advertising is on the reduction of physical effort, in the
post-industrial economies it is mainly on time saving.8
This means that to understand some important changes which occurred
in domestic consumption and production patterns in the post-industrial
economies, one should analyse not only the product characteristics, but also
the product functions, especially in relation to time and in particular to
unpaid work time. There exists, indeed, a time dimension of consumption
that should be considered explicitly, as will be shown below. This perspect-
ive will allow us to discover one additional difference between industrial and
post-industrial economies and societies related to the different intensity of
unpaid labour time that the literature does not seem to have acknowledged.
2 Domestic consumption functions and unpaid labour
time
A vast area of the literature on post-industrial economies and societies
argues that time represents the scarcest resource and that it imposes the
greatest constraints on people (see Linder 1970; Robinson 1990). On this
assumption, it would be easy to understand what has happened to some con-
sumption items – in our case household consumption – by looking at their
function in relation to unpaid labour time.
Our idea is that one should start by considering the time an individual
has available in one day, in other words his or her total daily time, referring
to a typical weekday and not a weekend. In this connection it is worth
recalling that for a long time economic theory has broken down the working
day into the following two main components: working time (WT) and
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leisure time (LT). Increasingly, however, at empirical and at theoretical
levels the need has emerged to divide working time, too, into two main
components, i.e. paid labour time (PLT) and unpaid labour time (ULT),
where by unpaid labour time we mean that time spent primarily on house-
work and family care.9
On this basis, an average working day (WD) can be divided as follows:
WD  PLT  ULT  LT
Needless to say, in the case of housewives, the first component PLT is equal
to zero, while for those who are not engaged in housework activities the
second component ULT is equal to zero.
Taking post-industrial economies and assuming that it is not possible to
reduce paid labour time, if people want to increase their leisure time – a
growing desire that accompanies rising incomes10 – they have to shorten
unpaid labour time. The problem is then how to achieve such a result. A
possible strategy is to buy goods which, at least in their expectations (ex
ante), will have the effect of reducing unpaid labour time. The idea of a dis-
tinction between ex ante and ex post, from the point of view of the consumer,
is important, since, as we shall argue below, the expected results can differ
greatly from the actual ones.
Thus it will be possible to relax some of the time constraints by consum-
ing specific goods and services, whose purpose is to save unpaid labour time.
And it is on the basis of this simple approach that one can explain the
enormous success of some goods and services – within the household market
– the object of which is exactly that of ‘buying working time in general’,
and unpaid working time in particular. Some of these goods could actually
be very expensive since the relative price of saving time is very high.
In this connection it is worth emphasising that already at the end of the
1950s in the USA, some contributions to the literature began to appear on
the relationship between consumption and unpaid labour time (see Kelley
1958), and some of these issues reappeared at the end of the 1970s (see Voss
1967; Voss and Blackwell 1975, 1979; Berry 1979). These articles, even
though they refer explicitly to the work of economists such as Gary Becker
(Becker 1966) and Linder (Linder 1970), came mainly from experts in mar-
keting and business. Their purpose, however, was not to recognise the
importance of housework within post-industrial societies, but rather to
understand the emerging markets for future production.11
A particular category was identified and defined as ‘convenience con-
sumption’ to indicate those goods and services – within domestic consump-
tion – through which one can ‘buy unpaid labour time’.12
Convenience consumption usually includes the following items:
• some durable consumption goods (e.g. microwave ovens, dishwashers,
refrigerators, freezers, washers and driers, food processors);
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• some non-durable consumption goods (e.g. frozen, canned, pre-cooked
and instant foods, together with disposable products such as napkins,
plates and nappies);
• some services (e.g. restaurants, purchased house cleaning, purchased dry
cleaning and laundry and purchased childcare).
One should also add that, at the beginning, the literature on convenience
consumption considered only the first group of goods, that is time-saving
durable consumption goods, and emphasised the major role played by tech-
nical progress, incorporated into these goods, in reducing unpaid labour
time. Later, this definition was extended to include time-saving foods and
services mentioned above, so that the linkage with technical progress has
become less important.
More interesting, however, are the expected results on the relationship
between convenience consumption, unpaid labour time and leisure time. In
particular, relative to convenience consumption, the experts on marketing
and business expected the following two results:
• convenience consumption goods would be bought primarily by women
working outside the home, since they have much less time available for
housework and family care;
• the reduction of unpaid labour time due to the use of convenience con-
sumption goods would increase leisure time, if paid labour time remains
unchanged (or, as economists say, ceteris paribus).
The empirical investigations of labour time and convenience consumption
did not seem to confirm these expectations; on the contrary, most produced
very different, if not paradoxical results.
3 The paradoxes of ‘convenience consumption’
Empirical investigations on convenience consumption have produced results
that, as already mentioned, may be considered unexpected if not, in some
cases, paradoxical. Let us recall them.
1 The relationship between convenience consumption and women’s
working conditions appears much more complicated than economists
and experts in marketing and business expected. In the case of the
American economy, a vast number of econometric studies did not find a
significant relationship between convenience consumption and women
working outside the home: other variables such as income, wealth, life
cycles and changes in housing appeared more significant (see Strober
1977; Strober and Weinberg 1977, 1980; Weinberg and Winer 1983).
In the case of Italy, a preliminary investigation of a fast-growing cat-
egory of convenience consumption, i.e. ‘Usa e getta’ (use and throw
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them away), for the house13 during the 1990s shows that they are not
bought primarily by women working outside the home, but by house-
wives and in particular by women from Southern Italy. They mentioned
convenience and practicality as the main reasons for their behaviour,
adding that these are important elements of that ‘American way of life’
which allows them to save time and energy. It is worth adding,
however, that factors such as the number of children, of meals and of
courses for each meal, together with the lack of water and good climate,
can also play a crucial role in this result, and all these factors are greater
in the case of Southern Italy (see Vesco 1998). One should also add that
women working outside the home not only have less time, but perhaps
are also less vulnerable to convenience consumption advertising and
sales.
2 In spite of the expectations about convenience consumption,14 in the
USA unpaid labour time does not seem to have fallen, but rather
remained virtually unchanged between 1920 and 1990 (see Figure 6.1),
particularly in the case of housewives.15
A disaggregated picture of unpaid labour time can, however, show interest-
ing phenomena of time reallocation. Going back to the well-known study of
Vanek (1974) for the American economy over the period 1926 to 1968, the
following results emerged (see Figure 6.2): the time spent on preparing food
has been reduced, whereas that devoted to shopping (including the time
spent travelling from one shop to another) and managerial tasks, together
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with home care and family care, has expanded.16 In particular, the time
devoted to food preparation fell by about ten hours per week between 1920
and 1960, but it has been offset by an increase in the time spent shopping,
and on managerial tasks and family care. The time devoted to laundry sur-
prisingly increased (see Figure 6.3), in spite of convenience consumption
use.
The explanation for this last, apparently paradoxical, result is quite
simple: the standards of different housework activities (or tasks) can rise. An
interesting example of this is the time devoted to laundry, since over time
people have more clothes and want them to be cleaner. Thus one discovers
that, for some convenience goods, the expected function (stressed by econo-
mists and business people) of saving unpaid labour time did not coincide
with the reality since labour time did increase. Another case is that of family
care, the standard of which, in spite of convenience consumption, has risen
so much that a very large increase in time is required: to be a good mother
(and, why not, a good father) nowadays encompasses not only material, but
also psychological needs. Let us not forget, moreover, that even children’s
leisure requires greater expenditures of time and money on the parents’ part,
given all the different after-school activities in which children are involved.
Thus in this scenario technical progress incorporated into convenient con-
sumption did not play the role that many economists and business people
believed it would: to substitute leisure time for working time. This hap-
pened because, although, on the one hand, technical progress is able to save
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of time among various kinds of household work.
generating new activities and new standards. This means that one should also
include quality considerations of unpaid labour time since one may use the
latest equipment to increase the quality of one’s work without considering
whether this is related to a reduction in working hours.17
Another example of these apparent paradoxical results of technical
progress is represented by small home appliances, which seem to have
extended rather than reduced tasks and work time for housewives, especially
if one takes into account the time spent reading instructions, taking the
appliances out of the cupboard and cleaning them after use.18 Sometimes the
list of paradoxical results of technical progress incorporated into convenience
consumption includes even the refrigerator: the reason is that it has con-
tributed to an increase in the amount and variety of food stored in the home,
with a consequent increase in the number of trips to supermarkets which are
usually located at a distance from housing, and an increase in travelling time
for shopping.
In conclusion it seems that, as Cowan argues, the ‘modern labor-saving
device eliminates drudgery, not labour’.19
4 A crucial dimension of unpaid labour time: its
intensity
It seems that increased standards and new activities of unpaid labour,
together with greater pressures generated by a leisure time that is more and
more ‘time consuming’,20 can produce a relevant intensification of unpaid
labour time. In other words, one hour of unpaid labour in a post-industrial
society can differ greatly from ‘the same hour’ in an industrial or agrarian
society in terms of numbers, in some cases standards too, of housework
activities (or tasks) done per unit of time. One should not forget, indeed,
























Figure 6.3 Time devoted to laundry.
that in a post-industrial society some of these activities may be done
simultaneously thanks to technical progress which makes it possible to wash
clothes and linen in the washing machine, while the microwave oven warms
up foods, the dishwasher washes the dishes of the last meal, and so on. Thus
the concept of unpaid labour has to be put in a historical perspective, since
the two dimensions of total time devoted to it and the other, perhaps even
more crucial one, of its intensity, defined as the number of housework activ-
ities per hour, can substantially change over the years.
Unfortunately, the literature on unpaid labour has devoted little atten-
tion to the second dimension, and the lack of data on the intensity of house-
work activities allows only speculation. However, we are convinced that the
long-run stability of unpaid labour time in the USA between 1920 and
1990 is associated with an increase in the number of housework activities
per hour, with a consequent rise in stress for the unpaid workers.
7 Conclusions
The scope of this final section is to summarise the main results of the
chapter and to discuss them in the light of the whole research project.
Our investigation reveals the crucial role played by unpaid labour in cre-
ating additional demand in both industrial and post-industrial economies.
The history of domestic consumption in the USA during the 1920s shows
how the transformation of domestic production, and consequently of house-
hold consumption, was instrumental to the production and reproduction of
the economic system as a whole.
In current post-industrial societies, in which time seems to be the scarcest
resource, an understanding of the changes in consumption patterns necessit-
ates an examination of the functions of goods and services in relation to time
rather than of their characteristics. Taking the household market, we
explained the enormous success of a particular group of goods and services –
defined as convenience consumption – by relating them to the possibility of
reducing unpaid labour time.
Once again, however, as in other contributions to this project,21 it
emerges that an investigation of convenience consumption and its relation-
ship with unpaid labour requires a more comprehensive framework than the
one often adopted in the literature. Our investigation shows, indeed, that
oversimplified approaches based on quantitative variables alone (such as total
time or quantity of physical effort), on single agents (such as consumers dis-
tinguished by working conditions) who maximise their welfare indepen-
dently of social norms, and on technical progress that replaces labour time
with leisure time in a fundamentally static scenario, may be misleading.
Every activity of unpaid labour has a standard that should be considered
explicitly. In addition, these standards can be raised very rapidly thanks to
technical progress that sometimes, instead of increasing leisure time, creates
new standards and new activities. Our investigation reveals that, in the case
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of time devoted to laundry, technical progress incorporated into convenience
consumption, instead of reducing unpaid labour, actually increased it. The
explanation for this apparent paradox is simple: the standard of an activity can
rise – in this case people have more clothes and want them to be cleaner. The
standard of family care has also shown a dramatic increase over the years.
Thus increased standards and new activities of housework, together with
the pressures of ‘more time-consuming’ leisure time, can change the
‘rhythm’ of unpaid work in post-industrial societies, in the sense that they
can increase the number of housework activities per hour. This means that
an investigation of unpaid labour time should consider both total time
devoted to such labour and its intensity, defined as the number of activities
(or tasks) per hour. Unpaid labour has, indeed, an historical dimension that
should be explicitly taken into account; otherwise we shall not be able to
understand the new phenomena related to post-industrial vis-à-vis previous
societies.
Attention to the historical dimension may also be crucial in explaining
shifts in the standards of consumption due not only to technical progress,
but also to changes in consumption norms.22 Today, these norms seem less
and less related to local and/or national contexts and more to global ones,
thanks mainly to the effect of the media. In this different scenario, the
working conditions of unpaid workers can be irrelevant. In fact, housewives
may be much more receptive or vulnerable to those norms than women who
work outside the home, and the empirical results for the ‘use and throw it
away’ sector in Italy seem to support this idea. In this connection one should
also add that the adjustment process of individuals to consumption norms
requires the explicit introduction of qualitative variables such as the sense of
suitability, the ethics of responsibility, or simply the spirit of emulation of
those who do unpaid work; these factors can no longer be ignored. It is on
the basis of the idea of the standard as the state of a material and symbolical
process that one can understand that ‘demonstration effect’23 or that ‘image
effect’ of consumption which underpins new needs and new aspirations,
sometimes independently of the resources possessed.24 Thus one can easily
believe that convenience consumption is not only unable to reduce unpaid
labour and increase leisure time, but can command a greater quantity of paid
labour.25 If this is reasonable, then the assumption of ceteris paribus should
also be abandoned, since we are implying that paid work, unpaid labour and
leisure time (both for the single agent and society as a whole) are clearly
interrelated and not distinct, as a vast part of the economic literature claims
to be the case.26
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Notes
1 As we shall see later, in Figure 6.2, unpaid labour time includes the time devoted to
food preparation, home care, clothing and laundry, shopping and managerial tasks,
and family care.
2 See the contributions of Addabbo (ch. 2), and Addabbo and Caiumi (Chapter 3). It
is worth adding that the consumption figures provided by ISTAT are not very useful
for the construction of an index of convenience consumption since the disaggrega-
tion used does not allow us to understand its relationship with unpaid labour time.
3 See Sweezy (1942), and in particular Baran and Sweezy (1966: Chapter 5). They
argue that sales promotion is a very old phenomenon: it appeared in various forms in
Antiquity, it increased its importance in mediaeval times and extended its action
under capitalism.
4 See Graham 1999.
5 Between approximately 1860 and 1910.
6 See Strasser (1982: 7), in which she says, ‘Food, shelter, and clothing became
matters of social production, not private, created by profitable industrial manufac-
ture’. See also Cowan (1989: 5), in which she defines this phenomenon as ‘the indus-
trialization of the home’.
7 See Strasser 1982: 9.
8 On this issue, see Gross and Sheth 1989.
9 For a more detailed disaggregation of unpaid labour time, see n. 1 and Figure 6.2.
10 On this relationship, see Voss 1967.
11 Voss and Blackwell claim that they examine the implications of a theory of time
resources ‘for marketing strategy’ (1979: 297).
12 For the single housewife, unpaid labour time may be ‘bought’ through convenience
consumption or ‘saved’ through the actual work of other members of the family,
particularly the partner or the children.
13 Includes disposable napkins, plates and glasses.
14 One should add that for many housewives this period represents the transition from
living in the countryside to living in town and consequently factors other than con-
venience consumption contributed to reducing unpaid labour time, such as the
availability of utilities (in particular electricity, running water and gas) and the
reduction in the number of children.
15 Women working outside the home show instead a reduction in unpaid labour time.
16 A comparison of these results with the Italian case is not straightforward, not only
because of the different disaggregation of unpaid work activities, but also because of
the lack of time series for such activities. Addabbo’s and Addabbo and Caiumi’s
contributions (Chapters 2 and 3, this volume) suggest that, in the case of Italy, the
time devoted to food preparation represents a consistent share of the total time spent
on domestic activities.
17 With regard to the technological systems that presently dominate our households,
Cowan argues that they ‘were built on the assumption that a full-time house-wife
would be operating them, since very few people in the last one hundred years (when
the foundations for these systems were being laid) wanted adult women to leave
their homes in order to work in the labor market, or believed that adult women
themselves would ever want to go out to work’ (Cowan 1989: 211). Another very
interesting issue analysed by Cowan is the different impact of technical progress on
men’s and women’s household tasks; she concludes that ‘industrialization served to
eliminate the work that men (and children) had once been assigned to do, while at
the same time leaving the work of women either untouched or even augmented’. See
Cowan 1989: 63, 64.
18 See Bose et al. 1984.
19 See Cowan 1989: 100.
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20 It is worth adding that the nature of leisure time also changes over time: in post-
industrial societies, not only does it assume a greater relevance, but it also involves
more activities (e.g. sports, theatre, cinema, travelling and goods such as books and
records), the characteristic of which is to be ‘time consuming’. See Voss 1967.
21 See, in particular, the contributions of Picchio and Chiappero-Martinetti which
stress the importance of the study of unpaid labour of a welfare concept defined in a
multidimensional space.
22 On this issue, see Brown 1987.
23 On the importance of consumption as a symbol of respectability and power, one
should recall the seminal work of Veblen (1912: ch. 4).
24 The object of many businesspeople was and continues to be to stimulate popular
aspirations towards higher and higher levels of consumption in order to increase
demand, without any consideration of the possible gap between consumption pat-
terns and effective resources. This phenomenon could explain another interesting
paradox related to consumption in the USA according to which ‘Overall, half of the
population of the richest country in the world say that they can not afford every-
thing they really need’ (Schor 1998: 6). Another interesting example of this paradox
is represented by the following title of a newspaper article quoted by J. Schor:
‘Feeling poor on 100,000 dollars a year’ (Schor 1998: 12).
25 This might partly explain the constant increase of time devoted to paid labour time
which – according to Schor – occurred in the USA during the 1980s. See Schor
1992 passim.
26 On this point see the Introduction to this volume.
References
Baran, P.A. and Sweezy, P.M. (1966) Monopoly Capital. An Essay on the American Economy
and Social Order, New York: Monthly Review Press.
Bartos, R. (1978) ‘What every marketer should know about women’, Harvard Business
Review, 56(2): 73–85.
Becker, G.S. (1966) ‘A theory of the allocation of time’, Economic Journal, 75(3):
493–517.
Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New
York: Basic Books.
Bellante, D. and Foster, A.C. (1984) ‘Working wives and expenditure on services’,
Journal of Consumer Research, 11(4): 700–7.
Berkowitz, E.N., Walton, J.R. and Walker, O.C. (1979) ‘In-home shopper: the market
for an innovative distribution system’, Journal of Retailing, 55(2): 15–33.
Berry, L.L. (1979) ‘The time-buying consumer’, Journal of Retailing, 55(4): 58–69.
Bose, C.E., Bereano, P.L. and Malloy, M. (1984) ‘Household technology and the social
construction of the household’, Technology and Culture, 25(1): 53–82.
Brown, C. (1987) ‘Consumption norms, work roles and economic growth, 1918–80’, in
C. Brown and J. Pechman (eds) Gender in the Work Place, Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
—— (1994) The Standard of Living, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Bryant, K.W. (1988) ‘Durables and wives’ employment – yet again’, Journal of Consumer
Research, 15(3): 37–47.
Cowan, R. (1989) More Work for Mother, London: Free Association Books.
Cross, G. (1993) Time and Money: The Making of Consumer Culture, New York: Routledge.
Gillett, P.L. (1976) ‘In-home shopping: an overview’, Journal of Marketing, 40(4): 81–8.
‘Convenience consumption’ and unpaid labour 169
Graham, L.D. (1999) ‘Domesticating efficiency: Lillian Gilbreth’s scientific management
of homemakers, 1924–1930’, Sign, 24(3): 633–75.
Gross, B.L. and Sheth, J.N. (1989) ‘Time oriented advertising: a content analysis of
United States magazine advertising 1890–1982’, Journal of Marketing, 53(4): 76–83.
Kelley, E.J. (1958) ‘The importance of convenience in consumer purchasing’, Journal of
Marketing, 22(3): 32–8.
Linder, S. (1970) The Harried Leisure Class, New York: Columbia University Press.
McCall, S.H. (1977) ‘Meet the workwife’, Journal of Marketing, 41(3): 55–65.
Oropesa, R.S. (1993) ‘Female labor force participation and time-saving household
technology: a case study of the microwave from 1978 to 1989’, Journal of Consumer
Research, 19(2): 567–79.
Picchio, A. (1992) Social Reproduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reilly, M.D. (1982) ‘Working wives and convenience consumption’, Journal of Consumer
Research, 8(2): 407–18.
Robinson, J.P. (1990) ‘The time squeeze’, American Demographics, 12(2): 30–3.
Rosenburg, L.J. and Hirschman, E.C. (1980) ‘Retailing without store’, Harvard Business
Review, 58(4): 103–12.
Schaninger, C.M. and Allen, C.T. (1981) ‘Wife’s occupational status as a consumer
behaviour construct’, Journal of Consumer Research, 8(4): 189–96.
Schary, P.B. (1971) ‘Consumption and the problem of time’, Journal of Marketing, 35(2):
50–5.
Schor, J.B. (1992) The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure, New York:
Basic Books.
—— (1998) The Overspent American, New York: Basic Books.
Sharony, N. and Fox, K.D. (1983) ‘Buying time and saving time: strategies for manag-
ing household production?’, Journal of Consumer Research, 10(4): 197–208.
Strasser, S. (1982) Never Done, New York: Pantheon Books.
Strober, M.H. (1977) ‘Wives’ labor force behaviour and family consumption patterns’,
American Economic Review, 67(2), Paper and Proceedings: 410–17.
Strober, M. and Weinberg, C.B. (1977) ‘Working wives and major family expenditures’,
Journal of Consumer Research, 4(4): 141–7.
—— (1980) ‘Strategies used by working and non working wives to reduce time pres-
sure’, Journal of Consumer Research, 6(2): 338–48.
Sweezy, P.S. (1942) The Theory of Capitalist Development, New York: Monthly Review Press.
Vanek, J. (1974) ‘Time spent in housework’, Scientific American, 231(4): 116–20.
Veblen, T. (1912) The Theory of the Leisure Class, London: Macmillan.
Vesco, B. (1998) L’usa e getta per la tavola. Un settore ancora sconosciuto ma in forte espansione,
Unpublished BA dissertation, University of Bologna.
Voss J. (1967) ‘The definition of leisure’, Journal of Economic Issues, 1(2): 91–106.
Voss, J.L. and Blackwell, R.D. (1975) ‘Markets for leisure time’, in Advances in Consumer
Research, vol. 2, Chicago, IL: Schlinger. Association for Consumer Research.
—— (1979) ‘The role of time resources in consumer behaviour’, in O.C. Ferrell, S.W.
Brown and C.W. Lamb Jr. (eds) Conceptual and Theoretical Development in Marketing,
Chicago, IL: American Marketing Association.
Weinberg, C.B. and Winer, R.S. (1983) ‘Working wives and major family expenditures:
replication and extension’, Journal of Consumer Research, 10(4): 259–63.
Zyck, C., McCulloch, J. and Smith, K.R. (1996) ‘Trade-offs between purchased services
and time in single parent and two-parent families’, The Journal of Consumer Affairs,
30(1): 1–23.
170 Giuliana Campanelli
7 Young people living with
their parents
The gender impact of co-residence
on labour supply and unpaid work
Gianna Claudia Giannelli and Chiara Monfardini
Introduction
In Southern Europe young adults leave home much later than they do in
Northern Europe. This problem has implications both for the labour market
and for the intra-household distribution of unpaid work. Although unpaid
work remains almost exclusively a female duty, it is observed that the later
young people leave home, the larger the burden of domestic work for older
women compared to younger women.
Let us define co-residence as adult children living in the parental home.
This chapter analyses young adults’ decisions concerning family co-
residence, study and work, with the objective of studying the implications
for unpaid work. We investigate the behaviour of young people on the
assumption that the decisions concerning human capital investment, labour
market participation and family status are interrelated. The aim of the
analysis is to focus on the determinants of the different pairs of combinations
of the activity status (being a student, worker or neither of the two, e.g.
housewife), and the family status (living with parents or with a partner away
from parents).
The existing economic literature on this subject is not extensive. To our
knowledge, only a few studies assume paid work and family status to be
determined jointly. One of the few economic models of leaving the parental
home is by McElroy (1985), who estimated a multivariate probit model of
the joint determination of paid work and family status of young American
men. Her model indicates that at a sufficiently low offered wage, a young
man lives with his parents and does not work. When the offered wage rises,
he works in the market but remains in his parents’ household; finally, if the
offered wage is sufficiently high, he works and quits the parental home. The
conclusion is that parents insure their sons against poor market opportun-
ities.
Another set of studies, leaving aside work decisions, focuses on co-
residence as an implicit voluntary transfer of parents to their children.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) introduce the decision on human capital
investment while treating co-residence as a voluntary intergenerational
transfer. Their article focuses on parents’ decisions, but also has implications
for the study of the decisions of the young men themselves. In particular,
they find that young American men in school were more likely to receive
contemporaneous parental support, particularly in the form of shared resi-
dence. In addition, Ermisch (1997) explores the issue of the support for
human capital investment by young British adults from their parents’
perspective. He finds that richer parents are more likely to support their
sons’ human capital investment through monetary transfers rather than
through shared co-residence, but that shared co-residence is more likely to
be offered to young working people.
We focus on Italy. Other studies for this country find a positive relation
between unemployment of young co-resident people and family income
(Belli 1997), or take a sociological perspective (Ongaro 1998). The question
for policy-makers is whether this behaviour is related to the structure of the
Italian labour market and welfare system: the former would tend to ensure a
job for the middle-aged heads of household while the latter would be biased
by a too generous pension system. A too rigid labour market together with
the absence of subsidies for students would, moreover, constrain young
people who decide to undertake further educational investment to live in
their parental home until they complete their education. This system leads
to obvious economic and social distortions such as, to mention a few
examples, the delayed formation of new households which in turn leads to a
decrease in fertility, an ageing population and an ever increasing pressure on
the pension system (see e.g. Padoa Schioppa 1997).
We wish to measure the relative contribution of the individual, family
and market characteristics to the probabilities in the choice made. Adopting
a gender perspective, we distinguish between male and female behaviour, a
fundamental distinction for the implications for unpaid work.
1 Co-residence in Italy
Italy is a country where the phenomenon of young people delaying their
departure from the parental home even beyond the age of 30 is massive and
increasing, even compared to other Mediterranean countries.
According to a multipurpose survey conducted by the Italian National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT 1990, 1998), 52 per cent of Italians aged 18 to
34 lived with their parents in 1990 and the percentage rose to 59 per cent in
1998. Even young adults in their thirties tend to leave their parental home
later: in 1990 18 per cent of males aged between 30 and 34 still lived with
their parents, rising to 29 per cent in 1998. The corresponding percentages
for females are 10 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively.
The data for our analysis are drawn from the Bank of Italy sample survey
on family budgets of Italian households in 1995. The survey, covering 8,135
households and 23,924 individuals, provides information on a number of
relevant variables, some relating to the household, some to the individual.
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We looked at young people aged 18 to 32, with a high school diploma,
not unemployed (because of the assumption that young people choose their
status). Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the sample frequencies of the different pairs
of outcomes by sex.
The status ‘not member of parents’ household’ in practice means living
with a partner, since the state of ‘living alone’ seems not to be chosen by
young Italian people. In substance, the decision to leave the parents’ house-
hold in Italy coincides with the decision to live with a partner.
The frequency distribution indicates the outcomes that are relevant for
the analysis. Males may decide to work and live with their parents, study
and live with their parents or work and form a new household. Females have
an additional option, namely to become housewives. The most frequent state
for both sexes is to be a student and co-reside with parents. Males choose to
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Table 7.1 Observed sample frequencies (and percentages) for males aged 18 to 32
Members of Not members of Total
parents’ household parents’ household
Working 377 135 512
37% 13% 51%
Studying 485 0 485
48% 0% 48%
Out of the labour force
and not studying 12 2 14
1% 0% 1%
Total 874 137 1,011
86% 14% 100%
Source: BI survey (1995).
Table 7.2 Observed sample frequencies (and percentages) for females aged 18 to 32
Members of Not members of Total
parents’ household parents’ household
Working 284 179 463
26% 16% 43%
Studying 490 10 500
45% 1% 46%
Out of the labour force
and not studying 23 101 124
2% 9% 11%
Total 797 290 1,087
73% 27% 100%
Source: BI survey (1995).
work and co-reside with parents more than do females, and the difference is
almost the same as the percentage of females who choose to form a new
household and become housewives.
2 Variables
Our objective is to measure separately the effects on the choice of status of
the individual’s own human capital and of family background (human
capital of the parental family). The first variable is approximated by the type
of high school diploma while the second is approximated by the educational
level of the father of the young person (either university degree or lower) and
by his professional qualification (essentially a sectoral dummy for working in
public administration and for holding a managerial position at the age of his
adult children in 1995: see Appendix 7A). A dummy variable for fathers
aged over 65 should capture the effect on adult children’s decisions of
having a retired father. Controls for mothers’ human capital have turned out
to create turbulence in the results on the effects of family background (e.g.
the introduction of mothers’ education reversed the sign of some of the coef-
ficients of fathers’ education). Family income is usually proxied by fathers’
human capital and position in the labour market, and those are the variables
to be used if one is convinced that the effect of parents’ education on adult
children’s choices operates mainly through income (the lack of data on
parents’ income does not allow us test this hypothesis). Furthermore, the
variable on mothers’ participation in the labour market could not be used,
since it relates to a point in time (at their adult children’s age, for example)
and the careers of the cohorts of mothers of adult children in our sample (if
they participated) are very likely to be interrupted.
A demographic variable for the number of sons and daughters present in
the parental family takes account of the size of the family of origin with the
hypothesis that the number of children is correlated negatively with the
income that parents allocate to raise each child.
The performances of the labour and housing markets are the two main
constraints on young peoples’ choices.1 It is assumed that a poor labour
market performance, proxied by a high unemployment rate for young
people, might oblige some young people to go on investing in education or
to become inactive (through a discouraged worker effect). The current
(1995) youth unemployment rate by sex and region controls for this effect
on the hypothesis that the participation decision may be revised at any point
in time.
High prices for housing is likely to cause some young people to delay
leaving their parental home. Since the decision to leave the parental home,
once taken, is assumed to be irreversible, prices for housing in the year of
marriage (or the year of beginning to cohabit with a partner) is the relevant
variable for the group of non-co-resident young people.2 Co-resident young
people, instead, are assumed to be able to revise their decision at each point
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in time, and for them the current price of housing (in 1995) is the variable
chosen to proxy this effect on their cohabitation decisions.
The Italian socio-economic system is split sharply between North and
South: some regional dummies are therefore introduced to capture other
unobserved characteristics of young people. This allows us to test more
firmly some empirical evidence which states, for example, that working and
cohabiting with parents is a widespread phenomenon in North-eastern Italy.
3 Results
We estimate a multinomial logit model of the relevant states. The coeffi-
cients and standard errors derived from the multinomial estimation pro-
cedure are reported in Appendix 7B. Tables 7.3 to 7.5 present the results in
terms of marginal effects, elasticities and effects on probabilities of the cate-
gorical variables.
Table 7.3 shows the characteristics of the reference individual (i.e. the
average values of the continuous variables and the modal value for the cate-
gorical variables in the sample). The reference male is about 25 years old, he
has a technical high school diploma, he has one brother (or sister), lives in
the South, his father is between 50 and 60 years old and has an elementary
school diploma, he faces an average unemployment rate of about 20 per cent
and a housing price index that is higher than the cost of living. The
Young people living with their parents 175























reference female is slightly younger, but has the same characteristics as her
male counterpart, with the exception of the unemployment rate, which is
nearly 33 per cent.
Table 7.4 reports the estimated marginal effects and elasticities of the
continuous variables. The high elasticity with respect to age of leaving the
parental home reflects the fact that the reference individual is around 24
years old, an obviously critical starting age for the probability of getting
married. More interestingly, it is found that if the unemployment rate
increases by 1 per cent, the probability of working and getting married
decreases by 86 per cent for women and by 71 per cent for men. By contrast
with the reference state of being a student and living with parents, it is
more probable to choose to be a student when the unemployment rate
increases.
The price of housing has a substantial effect on the probability of getting
married for both men and women: the probability falls by between 6 and 7
per cent for an increase of 1 per cent. Since the effects are very similar in the
event of working and getting married and of not working and getting
married (for women), it may be concluded that this variable influences only
the decisions about family arrangements.
Turning to the categorical variables, Table 7.5 presents the effects on the
predicted probabilities of variations in the categorical variables with respect
to the reference individual. As already shown in Table 7.4, the probability of
the different states varies with age (this becomes evident as the reference
levels of age increase), but here it is interesting to note that while the
probability of all the other states goes in the same direction for both sexes,
the probability of working and co-residing decreases with age for females,
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Table 7.4a Marginal effects and elasticities – women
Work and co-reside Work and married House and married
m.e. Elast. m.e. Elast. m.e. Elast.
Eta 0.0205 1.1163 0.0682 14.5714 0.0431 14.2594
DIS1528 0.0038 0.2764 0.0038 0.8671 0.0004 0.1890
Indabit 0.8441 2.0325 0.7158 6.7675 –0.4160 6.1192
Table 7.4b Marginal effects and elasticities – men
Work and co-reside Work and married
m.e. Elast. m.e. Elast.
Eta 0.0827 3.8815 0.0220 15.2532
DIS1529 –0.0028 –0.1074 –0.0013 –0.7142
Indabit 0.3567 0.7479 –0.2344 –7.2612
whereas for males it increases from the age of 24 to the age of 28, and then
starts to decrease again.
The main objective of the analysis is to compare the relative variation in
probabilities of individual and family background variables. Starting with
the variables that approximate parental family income, it is found that if the
father has a university degree, the probability of being a student and living
with parents nearly doubles for men and increases by 20 per cent for women.
A father with a university degree reduces the probability of working and co-
residing, but even more the probability of getting married (especially of
becoming a housewife). A father whose job involves managerial tasks
increases the probability of studying. The probability of studying dimin-
ishes steadily if the father has lower educational levels. If the father is
retired, the probability of co-residing and working increases (more for
women).
If the number of children in the family of origin is believed to be corre-
lated negatively with the share of parental income allocated to each child,
the result concerning the number of brothers and sisters of the young person
shows that family size is negatively correlated with the state of co-residing,
either working or studying, for both sexes.
These results may be compared with those concerning the predictor of
expected own income, i.e. the type of high school diploma attained by the
young person. A vocational school diploma decreases the probability of co-
residing and studying, and increases the probability of working and 
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Table 7.5 Effects on probabilities of variations in categorical variables
Women Men
Work Work Study House Work Work Study
and and and and and and and
co-reside married co-reside married co-reside married co-reside
Average 0.4493 0.1144 0.3624 0.0739 0.5242 0.0355 0.4403
Età 26 0.4301 0.2356 0.1866 0.1469 0.6192 0.0773 0.3035
Età 28 0.3434 0.3728 0.0713 0.2126 0.6651 0.1739 0.1611
Età 30 0.2906 0.4535 0.0309 0.2249 0.6258 0.2937 0.0805
Studprof 0.4772 0.1889 0.1711 0.1629 0.7330 0.0607 0.2063
Studmag 0.4011 0.0980 0.4379 0.0629
Studlic 0.0870 0.0177 0.8768 0.0187 0.0901 0.0051 0.9048
Padpens 0.5225 0.0879 0.3511 0.0385 0.6796 0.0427 0.2777
Coop1 0.3616 0.0871 0.4930 0.0583 0.5798 0.0492 0.3711
Medinfp 0.4724 0.1135 0.3645 0.0496 0.4820 0.0272 0.4908
Medsupp 0.4480 0.0602 0.4717 0.0201 0.3637 0.0313 0.6050
Laureap 0.3754 0.0398 0.5772 0.0076 0.2005 0.0022 0.7873
Padamm 0.4688 0.0670 0.3624 0.0739 0.4190 0.0298 0.5512
Padalt 0.3462 0.0882 0.4856 0.0800 0.4977 0.0128 0.4894
2 frat 0.3383 0.2491 0.2235 0.1891 0.5193 0.1148 0.3650
3 frat 0.1796 0.3823 0.0971 0.3410 0.4323 0.3123 0.2553
co-residing, especially for males. A lyceum diploma (academic high school,
which predicts the highest expected income level) has the highest positive
effect on the probability of studying and co-residing with parents.
Table 7.6 presents the average probabilities by region of residence. These
have been calculated by associating the corresponding regional average
unemployment rate and housing cost index to the reference individual of
each region.
Young people living in the South have the highest probability of studying
(the lowest of working and co-residing) and young people living in the
North-west the lowest (but the highest of working and co-residing). It is
interesting to compare the probabilities for the South with the averages of
Table 7.4: the probability of co-residing and studying increases from 36 per
cent to 49 per cent for females, and from 44 per cent to 50 per cent for males.
This effect is driven entirely by the unemployment rate, which reaches dra-
matic levels in the South (53 per cent for females and 36 per cent for males).3
A simple simulation sheds more light on the dimension of the discouraged
worker effect. If young females in the South experienced the unemployment
rate of the North-east (around 17 per cent), their probability of studying and
co-residing would drop to 26 per cent. If young males in the South experi-
enced the unemployment rate of the North-east (around 8 per cent), their
probability of studying and co-residing would drop to 39 per cent.
Traditionally, young people in the South used to marry earlier than in the
other Italian regions. In the context of this analysis, our results show instead
that young women in the South have the lowest probability of marrying and
working, and that result does not change much, even when the probabilities
of being a worker or a housewife are added. The same result applies to young
men. In sum, unemployment discourages not only participation but also
new household formation, and our model allows us to measure these effects
in terms of probabilities.
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Table 7.6 Average probabilities by region of residence
Work and Work and Study and House and
co-reside married co-reside married
Men
South 0.4749 0.0205 0.5046
North-west 0.5496 0.0368 0.4134
North-east 0.5676 0.0434 0.3890
Centre 0.5099 0.0545 0.4357
Women
South 0.3512 0.0680 0.4939 0.0860
North-west 0.5156 0.1250 0.3020 0.0576
North-east 0.5288 0.1416 0.2737 0.0559
Centre 0.4185 0.1576 0.3321 0.0918
4 Conclusions and implications for unpaid work
The above analysis has shown that parental income has a major role in deter-
mining young people’s choices. Even compared to the effects of the pre-
dicted own income of the young, these factors are extremely relevant. In
particular, high parental income increases the probability of being a student,
i.e. undertaking further educational investment and co-residing with
parents. Lower parental income tends to increase the probability of co-
residing and working, working and getting married for both sexes, and also
of getting married and becoming a housewife for females. High levels of
youth unemployment and increasing house prices tend to discourage labour
force participation and departure from the parental home.
What are the implications for unpaid work? Using the ‘Multipurpose
survey on domestic work’ (ISTAT 1993), we derive the distribution of
unpaid work for a sample of young adults selected with the same criteria as
Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Table 7.7 shows this distribution.
Co-residing young women do about three times the amount of domestic
work compared with men of the same age. Married working women do more
than three times the amount of domestic work done by unmarried women,
and five times that of married men. Married males do only two hours more
domestic work than unmarried co-residing young adult males.
Co-residing young adults imply a number of hours of unpaid work which
may be compared to that implied by younger children: the results show, in
fact, that young adults with two siblings have the highest probability of
marrying (we interpret this as a result of an income effect, but also as evid-
ence of an excessive burden of domestic work for the mothers).
We also tested for the hypothesis that working mothers imply a lower
probability of co-residing for young adult children than non-working
mothers: the dummies for the mother’s state, however, do not turn out to be
significant. Working mothers and non-working mothers of adult co-residing
children do the same amount of unpaid work.
Finally, high unemployment (especially in the South) and high housing
costs tend to delay departure from the parental home. The ‘discouraged
worker’ effect that transforms potential workers into poorly motivated stu-
dents helps to keep the burden of domestic work high for mothers well into
old age.
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Table 7.7 Domestic hours of work – people aged 18 to 32 with a high school diploma:
weekly average hours
Work and co-reside Study and co-reside Work and married
Females 8.16 8.93 27.4
Males 2.72 3.79 05.54




STUDPROF: vocational school diploma
STUDTEC: technical school diploma
STUDLIC: lyceum diploma
NW, NE, C: regional dummies; North-west, North-east, Central Italy.
South is the base.
Family background variables
PADPENS: father retired (born before 1931)
COOP1, COOP2: cohort of the father; up to 1936, 1936 to 1946
LAUREAP: father with a university degree
MEDSUPP: father with a high school diploma
MEDINFP: father with middle school diploma
PADAMM:* father working in the public administration
PADALT:* father with a managerial job (any position with a managerial
content, i.e. manager, executive, professional, entrepreneur; the base is
unskilled, skilled and clerical workers)
*These two variables are not fully comparable for both co-resident and non-co-resident young
people. This is because fathers’ position in the labour market for: (1) co-resident young people
refers to the time of the interview, since it is derived from the matching of fathers and adult
children in the same family (so that this piece of information is reported by fathers them-
selves as members of the sample survey); (2) non-co-resident young people refers to fathers’
position at the age of their adult children in the year of the interview (so that this piece of
information is reported by young people living in a newly formed household in the section
devoted to their family background). For some members of the sample, therefore, these vari-
ables record fathers’ current position, and for others fathers’ position at the age of their adult
children.
Given this inconsistency, it has not been possible to exploit the available information on
fathers’ sector of employment. As far as the father’s professional position is concerned,
however, one could exploit the information on the managerial content of the job collapsing
all positions with some managerial content in the dummy PADALT. The measurement error
mentioned above is reduced under the assumption that, since non-co-resident young people
are on average older than their co-resident counterparts, if their fathers are managers at the
date of the interview (which is not known), their position at their children’s age (which is
known) should already have some managerial content (it is likely that the transition from
blue collar to manager, for example, has low probability). The same line of reasoning applies
to PADAMM, with the justification that in Italy it is usually observed that a person who has
started a career in public administration tends to remain in that sector for the rest of his
working life (see Bardasi and Monfardini 1997). Entering any kind of public administrative
job, in fact, requires passing a public competitive examination which involves an investment
in human capital. Therefore, if fathers of non-co-resident young adults were employed in the
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public administration when they were fairly young, it is conceivable to assume that they are
still there at the date of the interview. On the other hand, if they had started a career in the
private sector, it is conceivable to assume that they have not switched to the public sector
later on.
NFRATTOT: total number of siblings in the parental home. This variable
may be gendered, i.e. disaggregated into number of brothers and sisters.
Since the estimated coefficients of the gendered variables were not signific-
antly different, the total number of siblings has been used instead.
It should be noted that the way the sample has been constructed has the
drawback of over-representing siblings among co-resident young adults with
respect to non-co-resident ones, since co-resident siblings, being members of
a surveyed family, are all members of the sample; the number of siblings of
non-co-resident young adults, instead, not being members of the sample, is
derived from the dedicated section on family background. This has the
unfortunate consequence of reducing the variability of family background
variables for co-resident young people (siblings have the same family back-
ground).
Market-specific variables
These are constructed using official statistics provided by the Italian Statisti-
cal Office (ISTAT).
DIS1529: the unemployment rate by region and sex of people aged 15 to
29 (Source: ‘Rilevazione delle forze di lavoro – media 1995’, ISTAT). Unem-
ployed people in the rate are: strictly unemployed, looking for their first job,
other people looking for a job (see Eurostat definitions).
INDABIT: the ratio of the housing cost index over the total consumption
price index. The housing cost index is included in the group for the calcula-
tion of the general consumption price index. It is therefore a relative
measure of housing costs over total consumption costs. The housing cost
index takes account of the following: rent, water, maintenance and repair of
domestic equipment (see Metodi e Norme, Consumption prices, base 85 
100, Series A, no. 23, ISTAT). The time series used cover the years 1981 to
1995 and refer to the main town in each Italian region.
The construction of this variable comprises several steps.
1 Distinction by region, in order to approximate the housing costs by
region of residence. This is an approximation because the ISTAT index
is calculated only for the main town in the region (i.e. Florence for
Tuscany).
2 It is assumed that co-resident young people may revise their decision to
form a new household at each point in time. The relative housing costs
variable for them is therefore measured in the year of the interview.
3 For non-co-resident young people who have already formed a new
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household, it is assumed that the relevant housing costs measure is that
of the year of their marriage or union (in other words, their cohabitation
decision after having left the parental home is assumed to be irreversible
at least until they reach the age of 32). Since the year of marriage is not
recorded in the survey, the non-co-resident sample has been divided into
two groups: married with children and married without children.
Married with children: the year of marriage is derived assuming that they had
the first child two years after their marriage i.e. 1995 (year of the interview)
– age of first child (available in the survey)  2;
Married without children: the year of marriage is derived imputing to each
individual the modal age at marriage of his or her age cohort by region of
residence. This has required the collection of the following official statistics:
number of marriages by sex, age cohort at marriage and by region for the
years 1981 to 1995 (Source: ‘Annuario di statistiche demografiche’, years
1981 to 1983 and ‘Annuario matrimoni, separazioni e divorzi’, years 1985,
1987 to 1995, ISTAT). The time series was needed in order to take account
of all possibilities ranging from being 32 in 1995 and having married at 18
(year of marriage 1981) to being 18 and having married in 1995.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 See Appendix 7A for the description of these two variables.
2 The information on the year of marriage or beginning of cohabitation is not available
in the survey and had to be predicted. See Appendix 7A for details.
3 The probabilities for the South are derived by substituting the average level of unem-
ployment and housing cost index for the Southern regions for the overall Italian
average reported in Table 7.3. If only the regional unemployment rate is replaced, the
result does not change.
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8 Unpaid and paid caring
work in the reform of
welfare states
Elisabetta Addis
1 Symmetric and asymmetric welfare regimes
The standard of living each person can enjoy depends on the sum total of
available resources of time and money that she or he can control indepen-
dently. The set of practices and institutions that we call the welfare state has
a key role in reallocating money and time between people of different ages,
wealth and sex, thus allowing them to achieve a given standard. It does this
either by providing cash transfers or by providing public services, thus
affecting the proportion of paid versus unpaid care work. By such redistribu-
tion the welfare state has contributed to reshaping women’s roles, to chang-
ing the traditional division of labour within and outside of the family, and
has affected gender relations between men and women in a variety of ways.
The social notions of gender have changed as a result of these processes.1 We
may therefore discuss not just a ‘welfare state’, but a ‘welfare regime’, i.e. the
configuration of practices producing care, including care produced in the
home and by the market, as relevant for standards of living.
Redistribution between the rich and poor is a classic topic of debate on
welfare systems.2 The original purpose of the welfare state was to create a
safety net, an insurance against the risk of becoming poor due to illness,
accident or old age. Redistribution between generations, both young and old
people, is a more recent and less fully debated topic which emerged among
economists when some financial pitfalls of existing pension regimes were
subject to analysis by means of overlapping generations of identical
‘representative agents’.3
In this chapter I shall leave aside these two topics. I shall focus instead on
redistribution of time and money among people of different sexes, a topic
that has still not been fully explored. In order to understand it, we need an
analytical framework that explicitly takes into account the economic value of
the services produced within the household, mostly by women, and how this
redistribution influences gender roles and relations. Transfers of resources by
the welfare state may be in cash or in the form of services. Cash may be used
to purchase care, and public services may be substituted for domestically
produced ones. In both cases, caregivers are hired to provide care and paid
work is a substitute for unpaid work. Thus the size and form of public trans-
fers determine gender relations. This produces a particular configuration in
the distribution of work, between paid and unpaid labour, between public
employment and private employment. It determines how much care will be
provided domestically, purchased on the market, or provided by public ser-
vices. It will therefore influence the status, economic independence and rela-
tive power of men and women.
Issues of redistribution between the sexes and its effects on gender may be
obscured in many ways.4 First, there is a long tradition of measuring poverty
and of redistributing wealth using the family, as opposed to the individual,
as the relevant reference unit. This implies that within each family resource
allocation is, by definition, equitable and not an object of policy inter-
vention. Resources accruing to individual members are not even measured.
This ‘patriarchal’ assumption has been challenged in economic literature.5
Second, often only money and goods are taken into account when measuring
welfare: time is not. An equal sharing of money and goods could still mask
an uneven distribution of welfare due to an uneven distribution of free
versus working time, and time spent in domestic work is not counted as
time spent working.6 Third, welfare provisions often make reference to one
particular model of family, taking it as the norm, and, by doing so, assign-
ing it normative value. Families and gender relations that do not correspond
to this norm are not supported, while behaviour corresponding to the model
is rewarded. Often, but not always, this model is the traditional family: a
heterosexual family where the parents are married, the father is the exclusive
breadwinner and the mother the exclusive housekeeper. Gearing provisions
to this particular model of the family, as is done in Italy, means that those
who break with this model, in particular women wishing to enjoy a ‘double
presence’ as mothers and caregivers at home and as workers in the market,
end up carrying a ‘double burden’.7
In the past decade, a growing body of literature examined the most
important aspects of the relationship between gender and welfare policies,
helping to penetrate this obscurity.8 My discussion below draws on that
literature, summarising some of the findings in a general scheme in order to
provide tools for the evaluation of public policies from this point of view.
Redistribution by wealth and by gender is very different in each of the
three main models of welfare state (i.e. ‘Liberal’, ‘Nordic’ and ‘Bismarckian’),
identified in sociology and political science following the seminal work of
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996). These models differ in terms of main
sources of financing for care (private purchase, income taxation, pay-roll tax-
ation), main places where care takes place (private services, public services,
the family) and the amount and channels of resources directed to the needy
(cash transfers or transfers in kind by the state, private intra-family
transfers).9
Each model has to provide the basic functions that constitute care, once
produced entirely within families. These include the provision of food,
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clothing and clean shelter for all members of the family, care for the chil-
dren, education, care for the sick, care for the frail elderly and resource trans-
fers in the event of lack of income. This care may be produced by the home,
the state or the market, and substitution among the three modes of care pro-
vision happens all the time.10 The chosen mix determines the condition of
the caregiver: he or she may be a public employee, a private employee, or a
relative with no formal employment ties.
Each model has a chosen, but never unique, way to provide for care, and
each operates under a chosen ‘mix’. A model is only a basic scheme, but each
country uses all three ways of funding, all three channels of redistribution
and all three places of care, each in different proportions. The ‘Liberal’ model
is centred upon the market: care may be purchased, thus funding is private
and care is provided in private, but not domestic, premises. Transfers of
resources to the needy may be private (charities) and when public, they are
in cash rather than in the form of services. The ‘Nordic’ model is centred on
the state, uses income taxation to provide care, which is provided in public
premises, and transfers by the state are in kind. The Bismarckian model is
centred on the family, care is provided in the home and may use public or
private sources or finances, because public transfers are in cash rather than in
kind.
Italy, for example, fits best in the Bismarckian (Continental) model, with
some particular Southern European characteristics, mostly absence of what
Ferrera calls ‘statualità’ (roughly translated as respect for the state). That is,
Italians do not trust the state (perhaps with good reason) and lack respect for
rules (Ferrera 1998). Each model is developed with and within a correspond-
ing political culture: liberalism, social democracy and Catholic social thinking
(social-market economics), respectively. Each model is a ‘regime’, i.e. a set of
coherent practices, fitting together in different ways to satisfy care needs.
The concept of ‘welfare regime’ is useful in that it underlines the fact that
in each regime the parts fit together in a coherent way to satisfy care needs.
This has strong implications for the possibilities of reform. It means that it
is not always possible to copy ‘best practices’, to import single welfare pro-
grammes from other countries. When doing this, policy-makers should con-
sider spill-over effects on the entire regime. Such spill-overs shift the burden
of adjustment to policy reforms from one subset of citizens to another.
When budget cuts decrease cash and services available to families, adjust-
ment also involves the substitution of market- or state-produced care for
home-produced care.
‘Nordic’ and ‘liberal’ welfare regimes, albeit very different in size and in
other dimensions of equity, are similar in one way: they are relatively more
‘symmetric’, while Bismarckian regimes are ‘asymmetric’. By ‘symmetric’ I mean
that they treat men and women alike – differently in each regime, but both
sexes in the same way. Bismarckian regimes are asymmetric in that they try to
induce men and women towards different work: domestic unpaid work for
women, paid work in the labour market for men.
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Major pathologies of the Southern European welfare systems arise from
this asymmetry. On the other hand, this asymmetry has some positive by-
products that produce strong resistance towards reform. Moreover, attempts
to reform the Bismarckian welfare regimes by mimicking reforms enacted in
symmetric welfare regimes may worsen the asymmetry of the Bismarckian
regimes, with unwelcome results in terms of equity, efficiency and financial
soundness.
To make clear what I mean by symmetric, I shall resort to a graphic
presentation of the flows of economic resources. However, the reader should
bear in mind that diagrams necessarily simplify the complexity of an argu-
ment. The first diagram represents traditional social reproduction, after
industrialisation but before the introduction of welfare provisions. We may
think of the rural household in pre-industrial times as a place where people
of both genders provided goods and services in kind to other family
members and sold some of the family’s surplus products. Industrialisation
and urbanisation changed work and care arrangements. Young people and
men sold their labour for a wage, and women of reproductive age specialised
in domestic production of care in exchange for an informal intra-family
transfer of resources, which we label ‘unpaid work’. This arrangement is por-
trayed in Figure 8.1.
This arrangement became sufficiently widespread in industrial societies in
the past two centuries to shape the notion of what we now call ‘traditional’,
even though it reflects a situation that prevailed for a relatively short period
of time in a relatively small part of the world and which, in its pure form,
may have never actually existed. Young working-class women always
worked for money, and men always provided some of the care. Yet its arche-
typal form lives in the minds of most people and is a very powerful mental
attractor, even to people who reject it as a normative model.
The diagram focuses on unpaid care work and use of time of men and
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Figure 8.1 No welfare state.
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women. ‘Unpaid care work’ is defined loosely so as to include all those activ-
ities needed to keep people fed, clean, and looked after both physically and
psychologically according to a commonly accepted standard. It is the activ-
ity that is needed to transform goods into well-being, production into con-
sumption. In this arrangement, care is produced within the family, using, as
input, women’s time and men’s money. Men’s time is used in the labour
market to earn money to purchase the goods that are then used by the
women to produce actual welfare, for the children, for the adults and for
anybody who needs care. There is no welfare state. This arrangement is
called ‘familist’, because care is produced within the family. It is also ‘patri-
archal’, because men earn all the money and therefore have greater power
than other members to decide how resources are allocated. Within the
family there is bargaining and exchange. Money, earned by the men in paid
work, is exchanged for time devoted by women to unpaid work, by combin-
ing their time and goods purchased in the market.11 Children and the frail
elderly, who cannot provide for themselves, are the recipients of care, as are
the adult men who provide the household with the money.
The arrangement is completely asymmetric: women perform all the unpaid
work, men all of the paid work. Only men earn money, and therefore they
may have more say as to how it is spent. However, not much care is available
outside the household. The situation is one of co-dependency: women are
very dependent on family men for money resources and men are very
dependent on family women for care provision. In the past, for the average
male worker who wanted his children and himself to be fed and clothed day
in day out, a good wife could probably offer the best price/quality deal in
town, if not the only one available. Women and men were very different
social and economic actors; each specialised in one kind of work.
This arrangement has been changed dramatically by the introduction and
expansion of public expenditure devoted to the satisfaction of care needs and
by the parallel development of a private marketable personal services sector.
Part of the unpaid work once performed by women within the household is
now performed by women and men who are either public or private
employees. Women have entered paid employment in the public or private
sector. Their labour force participation rates have become almost equal to
men’s in some countries.
The second diagram (Figure 8.2) represents a welfare regime where repro-
duction and care are produced by unpaid work of men and women, public
services (provided by men or women who are public employees), or bought
on the market. Money earned by family members of both sexes in paid
employment is used to purchase private services (provided by men and
women who are private employees).
The diagram shows how the arrangement for care provision changed 
dramatically with the parallel developments of market-provided personal
services and the expansion of public expenditure devoted to the satisfaction
of care needs. In the diagram, the square shape (‘services’) represents public
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or private services. The welfare state (a hexagon) can finance itself by income
taxes or pay-roll taxes, and can deliver either cash or services. Part of the
unpaid work once performed by women within the household is now per-
formed by women and men who are either public or private employees. Care
is provided within the public and private market spheres, institutions regu-
lated by law open to any citizen either as buyer or seller according to agreed
norms, as opposed to the private family sphere. Women enter paid employ-
ment in the public or private market sector. Their labour force participation
rates climb to become almost equal to men’s in some countries. They have
some independent access to money through their own earnings or through
cash transfers. The economic exchange of money for care that once happened
within the household has also moved to the public sphere, and the economic
value of time spent in household production becomes more evident.
Nordic and liberal welfare states are undoubtedly very different from each
other in many respects. One of the most evident is size, especially in terms
of relative size of market-provided versus public service-provided care. Yet
they are very similar in one respect: they can both be represented by Figure
8.2 simply by altering the relative size of the welfare state, the two shapes
representing services and cash transfers.
When personal services, no matter whether public or private, are avail-
able as an alternative to domestically produced care, the position of men and
women becomes more symmetric: they both perform paid work, they both
earn money and they can both purchase part of the care. The time of both
has an economic value, and so both may be required to perform domestic
production. Both can choose not to perform unpaid care work themselves.
Children and the frail elderly still require money that they cannot earn,
which has to come either from the state or from adults of either sex. The














Figure 8.2 Symmetry in welfare states.
is done. But the economic reason for the internal exchange of money for care
between adult men and women weakens. The road is open for a more diver-
sified set of personal choices, by people of both sexes. Care can be shifted out
of domestic production. The specific productive skills of the housekeeper,
such as how to clean and cook, go the same way as the skills of spinning and
embroidering. The core of the care work, namely responsibility for the well-
being of somebody else, can be requested more easily and performed inde-
pendently of the sex of the caregiver. The ‘single’ lifestyle, where a single
person is capable of earning enough and providing enough care for her or
himself, is one of the products of this new arrangement, as are public and
private nursery schools and dual career couples with a nanny. Data on the
use of time show most clearly the difference. In symmetric countries, time
spent in unpaid work by women decreases and time spent in unpaid care
work by men increases, even though they never converge completely
(Gershuny 1995).
When there is family formation, unpaid care work does not disappear.
First of all, as Giuliana Campanelli shows in her contribution to this book
(Chapter 6), the standards of care change. What is commonly understood as
being properly fed, clean and so on moves with technological and social
change. Second, there is a managerial aspect of care that cannot be avoided
totally, even by the more advanced professional two-income family which
has all the laundry taken care of outside of the home and buys prepared
meals in gourmet shops every night. Somebody has to make sure that things
are done properly and take responsibility for the final outcome of the process
of caring for other people who cannot do it by themselves. The need to care
and the need to be cared for are strong needs by themselves. Personal rela-
tions are also exchanges of reciprocal care, and of the time taken to care. And
the time must be directly delivered, not completely transformed into goods
or money.
How much care will remain within domestic production, and how much
will be allocated respectively to the market and to the state, depends on the
details of the institutional arrangements. This mainly involves the method
of financing of public provisions (income taxes, pay-roll taxes levied on
earnings, fee-for-service), the method of disbursement (cash or in kind) and
entitlement to the benefits.
Methods of financing are important. Mandatory contributions levied on
earnings (pay-roll taxes), in particular, have two important features. First,
they constitute a tax on the use of labour, increasing labour costs and redu-
cing employment. Take two economies with the same features, the first of
which finances public expenditure from general income taxation, the second
from pay-roll taxes. In the second economy, the same amount of money
must be raised on a narrower base, from workers only, rather than from the
economy as a whole. Labour costs are made up of net wages in the pocket of
the worker, plus pay-roll taxes. So labour costs will be higher in the second
country and therefore, in that country, only jobs with higher productivity
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will be undertaken. This means that fewer people, overall, will be employed,
activity rates of the overall population will be lower and fewer women will
be attracted into the labour force. It also means that low productivity jobs,
as care jobs are perceived to be, will not be undertaken. Thus employment
opportunities will be fewer for all, and in particular for women.
Second, with pay-roll taxes, it is the worker, rather than the citizen, who
is entitled to welfare, usually the male head of the household, whose wife
and children are designated as ‘dependants’. Whether or not distribution
within the family is then fair and whether the care needs of all the members
are met becomes a private family matter which does not concern the state.
On the one hand, this regime fosters family unity. Italian out-of-wedlock
birth rates are extremely low in comparison with those prevailing in liberal
and Nordic countries. On the other hand, if the family is dysfunctional,
there is no security whatsoever. The weak members of dysfunctional famil-
ies, namely battered spouses, abused or neglected children, have nowhere
to go.
Methods of disbursement also matter. If transfers are in cash, they may be
used either to finance the women in the family to be full-time or part-time
housekeepers or to purchase care outside of the home to substitute for
domestically provided care. So, the person who will ultimately provide the
care, wipe the nose of the child, empty the bedpan of the frail elderly rela-
tive, will probably still be a woman. She will be either a housewife, entitled
to benefits either directly or through her husband, or a private employee,
subject to whatever employment protection exists in her country and the
prevailing wage rates, which may be high or low depending on the care
work provided and the labour market situation. If the transfers are in kind,
i.e. a public service is provided free of charge to the user or at subsidised,
below-cost rates, then the person providing care will most likely still be a
woman, a public employee subject to employment protection and wages
prevailing in the public sector, where protection is usually higher and wages
have a more compact distribution than in the private sector. The condition
of the caregiver, and therefore her social status, is likely to be most secure
and better rewarded in the Nordic regimes and next best in a liberal regime.
In Bismarckian regimes, the amount of monetary resources and the status of
the caregiver depend on the functionality of her family and, in practice, may
be very high or very low.
Other institutional details count. First of all, we have what economists
call ‘traps’:12 particular features of both taxation and disbursement designed
with the traditional arrangement in mind create particular ‘traps’ which
reproduce that same arrangement and foster women’s dependency. Tax
allowances for those who have a non-earning spouse create incentives for
spouses to remain non-earning. Income thresholds for access to benefits cal-
culated in terms of joint earnings of the family, which means the family
loses the benefit when, with the additional income of the second earner, that
threshold is reached, also cause women to exit the labour market. Many
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econometric studies in different countries documented the presence of these
effects, which Tindara Addabbo and Massimo Baldini measure for Italy in
Chapter 9, this volume.
Under the heading of ‘family policies’, different provisions transfer
resources for families with children. Relevant in evaluating these policies
from a gender point of view is the concept of ‘vulnerability’ to poverty,
developed by Ann Orloff. The idea here is that people may enjoy a given
level of material well-being using resources provided by the welfare state
without having direct entitlement to them. Thus young unemployed people
who live off their parents’ high pension are not poor. In Italy they may even
be quite rich if we look at consumption standards, as Gianna Giannelli doc-
uments in her contribution to this book (Chapter 7). Yet they are vulnerable
to poverty should the parents decide to cut the funding. Family policies may
be quite effective in transferring resources to the family, yet they may still
be quite ineffective in making the caregivers in the family less vulnerable to
poverty if the entitlement of the benefit belongs to the male breadwinner.
Recent research suggests that it does matter, from the point of view of
expenditure patterns, whether cash benefits for poor families are given
directly to one or to the other parent (Woolley 2001). Family policies under
which the caregiver depends for cash on the male breadwinner reconstruct
that inner link of care in exchange for money characteristic of traditional
arrangements. They lift the family as a whole out of poverty, but do not
make the caregiver feel safe and non-vulnerable to poverty. This concept of
vulnerability to poverty is extremely important in relation to fertility.
Labour market policies also matter, as they influence the length of time
that is spent in paid work and how much money is obtained by it. If the
standard labour contract calls for a weekly working time of nearly forty
hours and no part-time or other ‘friendly’ flexibility is available, mothers
may drop out of the labour force more easily. If mandatory retirement is too
early, they may never re-enter.13 Even administrative arrangements about
opening hours of shops and offices matter: if they are strictly regulated they
may make it impossible for men and women to reconcile working life and
family life.
Thus, by a particular mix of institutional details, Bismarckian and South-
ern European welfare regimes have tried to preserve and superimpose tradi-
tional arrangements for care provisions on modern ones. Using pay-roll taxes
rather than income taxation, cash disbursement rather than in-kind provi-
sions and other policies riddled with traps, or provisions that eliminate
poverty but leave vulnerability to poverty fully in place, they create an
incentive to adopt an arrangement that may be represented by Figure 8.3.
The old, asymmetric structure is artificially preserved, including the exchange
of care for money internal to the family. There is an evident attempt to re-
create the specialisation of women in unpaid care work and men in paid
work, as in the traditional arrangement.
The ‘structures of constraint’, as Nancy Folbre (1994) brilliantly defines
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them, are very different in each of the three models of welfare. Men and
women make daily choices about how to spend their time and money. These
choices are made under a complex set of constraints, created by available
resources and by the alternatives that are effectively in place. The constraints
are a result, among other things, of the political choices made by men and
women about the amount of public spending and how it should be alloc-
ated. Today they are very different in Sweden, in Italy and in the USA. In
symmetric regimes women and men are, to some extent, more at liberty not to
provide care. If they have enough money and/or are willing to pay enough
taxes, they need not perform care directly and personally. In asymmetric
regimes, the market for care is not broad enough. If you do not care person-
ally for your relatives, nobody else will.
The symmetric/asymmetric distinction is most relevant from the gender
viewpoint. Gender is a set of physical and mental characteristics. It includes
the proper, normal behaviour that each culture attributes to people on the
basis of their biological sex, which we know varies widely between cultures
and over time. Gender, in advanced industrialised democracies today, is the
result of political choices on how much to tax, how much to spend and the
institutional details of how to spend it. There is very little that is ‘natural’ or
‘traditional’ in how much unpaid work women do in relation to men. It is a
matter not only of individual choice, but also of how constraints are set by
public policy and how they operate for men and women.14
Though different symmetric regimes put different structures of constraint on
people, a symmetric regime puts the same set of constraints on men and women,
within which they are then ‘free to choose’. Only in symmetric regimes do men
and women similarly located in terms of income, age and so on benefit from
the same opportunities. A prerequisite of symmetry in welfare arrangements is












Figure 8.3 Pathologies of the continental welfare state.
2 Italy as an example of welfare asymmetry
In a previously published work (Addis 1999), I gave an institutional
description of how Italian welfare works with respect to gender. The general
framework of Italian welfare penalises women’s paid work and gives recogni-
tion to women’s unpaid work only if it is an exclusive choice made as a
‘dependant’ of a man. Benefits are linked to the job, but only to the job of
one earner.15 Family policies, pension policies, unemployment policies and
newly introduced means-testing combine to depress activity rates, give
incentives to dependent housekeeping as a lifelong choice, shift care on to
the family and force traditional roles in an otherwise ‘mature’ society. The
majority of women who still perform unpaid care work within their family
set the standards of care, such as how clean and well kept a house should be,
how well dressed members of the family should be and how tasty the meals
should be. In functioning families with average family income, these stand-
ards are extremely high. This demand for high standards of living was one of
the ingredients for Italian success in producing fashionable clothing, furni-
ture and interior decoration.
Italy is an extreme case of women’s low participation, high unemploy-
ment, dependency on work or marriage for access to welfare benefits and low
fertility. Compared to other countries with similar per capita income,
women’s participation in the labour market is much lower (see Table 8A.1)
and there is greater women’s unemployment and difference between men’s
and women’s unemployment rates (Table 8A.2). Notwithstanding the
abnormally high public debt, the Italian state does not spend more on
welfare than the European average (Table 8A.3). What is above average is
the ratio between cash transfers (especially pensions, which are higher than
in the rest of Europe) and services, which are fewer and of lower quality
(Tables 8A.4). Participation in the labour market is low due to lack of ser-
vices substituting for women’s traditional caregiving work, which means
that women, and in particular mothers, work at a high personal and family
cost. In addition, some of the direct transfers are regulated so as to give
incentives for non-participation. Unemployment and the unemployment
difference between the sexes are high because both private and public service
sectors, which in most countries are the main source of women’s employ-
ment, are underdeveloped: Bettio and Villa (1996) estimate the missing jobs
in services at over 2,500,000.
In addition, there are specific labour market policies in place, which I call
‘handicap privileges’, which very effectively prevent hiring and promoting
women in the private sector. They include:
• Long mandatory maternity leave (a total of five months before and after
the birth at 80 per cent pay, plus there is the option, if taken within the
first two years, of another six months at 20 per cent of the wage), which
discourages the hiring of young married or marriageable women. Recent
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changes have introduced a non-mandatory parental leave for the father
as well, making this provision less asymmetric.
• Mandatory retirement age was set at 55 for women in the private sector,
which prevented employment of older women willing to re-enter the
labour force after child-bearing age. This provision was changed later by
the Dini reforms, but there is some remaining asymmetry.
• The fact that the weekly working hours mandated by national labour
contracts in the private sector are long and other forms of shorter time
commitment to employment are strongly penalised, so that family life
and childcare for a couple where both are employed is severely curtailed.
This has been changing slowly with the introduction of non-standard
work (lavori atipici): in addition to standard contracts (lavoratori protetti)
there are non-standard contracts with more flexible schedules, pay and
working conditions that have eroded these rigidities, although at a cost.
Recent research by Addabbo shows that the flow of people of both sexes
into non-standard jobs is about the same, but many more men than
women go on to a standard type of employment (Addabbo 2000).
Thus, in terms of labour market policies, the asymmetry has been eroded
somewhat in recent years, introducing aspects of a liberal labour market
model. This means that more women will be able to enter the labour force
and to have independent access to money, but at the price of lower on-the-
job protection.
However, the asymmetry has changed very little in terms of transfers.
The imbalance in favour of cash transfers rather than services is compounded
by the fact that direct monetary transfers in the Italian welfare state are
highly job-based. They are basically of three kinds:
1 Family allowances, which may be based either on pay-roll taxes (such as
the assegni familiari) or on relief from income taxation (detrazioni), paid
to workers for their spouse and children.
2 Unemployment transfers, divided into three main categories: ‘Cassa Inte-
grazione Guadagni’ (CIG, redundancy), ‘Mobilità’ (mobility), which
companies with more than ten employees may request for their workers,
and ordinary individual unemployment benefit, which is very low. CIG
is so job-based that in Italy those affected are still notionally employed,
albeit in CIG, whereas in other countries they would be considered as
temporarily unemployed.16
3 Pensions, with the exception of the ‘social pension’ analysed below, are
strictly work-based. They are paid either to people who cannot work
(disability pensions) or survivors of workers (widow and widower bene-
fits) or those who worked and paid pay-roll taxes for a sufficient number
of years (seniority and retirement pensions).
These transfers are described in detail below. I will discuss the extent to
200 Elisabetta Addis
which they induce traditional patterns and indicate what change, or lack of
it, took place in the 1990s.
Family allowances
In Italy there are two policies which may be classified as family-related cash
transfers. The first applies to any citizen who presents an income declaration
and has a ‘dependant’. The second holds for those who are employed and
have a ‘dependant’. ‘Dependant’ is defined as a spouse or other family
member living in the same household with an income of less than 5,500,000
lire (£2,840) per year, and children below 18 years of age or below age 26 if
they are at school.
The first is a tax credit: people have a right to deductions from tax due
otherwise for the ‘dependent’ spouse and for each child or other dependant.
The 1996 budget set the amount of this deduction to 336,000 lire (£174)
per child or other dependants and a maximum of 1,057,552 (£546) (for the
income bracket below 30,000,000 (£15,500) and a minimum of 817,552
lire (£422) (for the income bracket over 100,000,000 (£51,650)).
The second are known as ‘assegni familiari’ (family allowances). They are
paid out by a special fund of the INPS, the National Institute for Social Pro-
vision, which is funded from pay-roll taxes paid by all employees in pre-
scribed amounts linked to the wage, except of course in the ‘underground’
economy. ‘Assegni familiari’ are given to workers, included in their monthly
pay cheque, but they are means-tested and based on a family income thresh-
old. There are sixteen brackets. The threshold of the upper bracket, at
92,500 million lire (£48 million) per year, is rather high. An amount is
given for the dependent spouse and an amount is given for each child. The
amount given varies with the income bracket of the worker and with the
number of dependants. The amount given for each dependant changes with
the order number of the dependant. Table 8A.5 shows the entire scale as of
July 1998.
The programme of the Olive Tree (Centre-Left) coalition called for an
increase in the ‘assegni familiari’ because they were presented as a good
‘family policy’ to deal with the demographic crisis of an ageing population
and a falling birth rate, in particular by one group in the coalition, the
‘Social Christians’. They were increased markedly in 1994 and in 1995
(20,000 lire (£10.30) per month per child after the first, 84,000 lire
(£43.40) after the second). The 1996 budget increased the expenditure on
the ‘assegni’ by 1,900 billion lire (£0.98 billion). In the case of a disabled
person, the income brackets have been shifted so that the thresholds are
higher but they are still calculated on the joint income. Most of the increase
in expenditure is due to a 25 per cent increase in the sums given to single
parents. Given that most single parents are mothers, the latter is a small
step in favour of single working mothers, which goes towards the recogni-
tion of women’s work.
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With the exception of the recent increase of benefits to single parents
who are workers, the pattern of the ‘assegni’ mirrors the gender relations in
the family and in the society of the 1950s and 1960s. Being means-tested on
the joint income of the family, the ‘assegni’ are lost if the wife’s earnings
take the family income above the thresholds. Thus they discourage women
from seeking paid employment and may constitute a form of ‘poverty trap’.
There are many problems with the ‘assegni’ as a way of fighting poverty.
They would work as a means to achieve a more equitable distribution of
income between rich and poor people if most families were bi-parental, with
a continuously employed man and a housekeeping woman, and if the worker
were willing to redistribute his earnings fairly to wife and children. But
unemployment is high, especially among young men and women in child-
bearing years; therefore linking provision for poor children to the job of the
head of the family is not an ideal solution, since children of the unemployed
receive nothing. Furthermore, the ‘assegni’ cannot assist labour market
transitions from one job to the next, with short spells of unemployment in
between which characterise the youth labour market and the labour market
of an economy undergoing continuous technological change.
Besides being job-centred, the ‘assegni’ are patriarchal, in that they
assume that whatever is given to the head of the family will be redistributed
fairly to the wife and to other members of the family – which is not always
the case. Moreover, because of this patriarchal bias, they are inadequate to
deal with a situation of family instability, separation and divorce. If the
couple splits up, the unemployed spouse of a worker has no independent
right to them. In the event of family breakdown, they may accrue to the
father who has a job, even if, in over 90 per cent of cases, courts give custody
to the mother. Even though a woman also has a legal right to them when
she works, she will lose them for the entire family if she pushes family earn-
ings above a certain threshold. There is no programme designed to help the
children of people who divorce or become single parents and who do not
have a job. The ‘Olive Tree’ coalition government attempted to create an
experimental programme of family guaranteed income in a few cities, but
the five-year term of government ended before the results of the experiment
were even officially accounted for. It is clearly a case of flow of money going
directly from the state to the male breadwinner, so that the internal
exchange money/care can be perpetuated, with an added incentive for
women to stay out of the labour force, thus remaining in need of such an
exchange.
Unemployment benefits
The regime is based on a host of schemes. In the past, the centre-piece was
CIG, ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’ (redundancy benefits), divided into
Ordinary and Special. The CIG remains the largest scheme. Introduced in
1968, ‘CIG Ordinaria’ (CIGO) is a mandatory contribution fund (i.e.
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financed with a pay-roll tax), provided by INPS, to finance labour hoarding
by firms facing temporary declines in demand. The request for CIGO must
be made by the company and must be accepted by the local job inspectors.
CIGO pays 80 per cent of the wage, for a period from between three to
twenty-four months. The employment relation between the firm and the
worker is never broken; at the end of the period in CIGO, supposedly when
the temporary problems of the company are solved, the worker goes back to
work at the same firm.
‘CIG Speciale’ (CIGS) was intended for firms with over 200 employees,
purportedly to deal with those cases in which problems were long term,
such as restructuring of plants. It was intended to last for up to four years,
but it has been known to last, with legal and bureaucratic pretexts, for up to
ten years. Since 1988 it has been financed directly by the Treasury. In fact, it
was, and still is, a very generous programme for collectively dismissed
workers, who are, however, still formally employed and therefore prevented
from looking for a new job.
In 1991 Law no. 233 introduced some changes, reducing the duration of
the benefit, introducing the ‘indennità di mobilità’ (mobility benefit) and a
programme of early retirement for people at the end of CIG. Mobility
benefit is similar to CIG, except that it applies officially to firms with more
than fifteen employees, lasts twelve months and it is paid in cases where it is
acknowledged that the firm will not rehire the workers. It is also paid after
the end of CIG benefits for firms with more than 200 employees.
Other forms of collective benefits recently introduced are special benefits
for construction workers, who used to rely heavily on CIG for the winter
months and are now under a separate programme. The ordinary benefit for
individual lay-offs, for people who do not belong to the collective, firm-
managed programmes, pays only 30 per cent of the last wage for six months;
the worker must have worked legally and paid pay-roll taxes for two years
before qualifying.
By subsidising labour hoarding, CIG boosts Italian firms’ productivity
and biases competition with other European firms. It is therefore under
attack by the European Union. CIG is a job-based, age- and gender-biased
scheme. It favours those who have a job against those who have never held a
stable job. In practice it favours the old against the young. CIG favours
people who work in large firms against people who work in small firms or
individually, such as domestic helpers. Since women are on average younger,
may never have held a stable job and are on average employed in smaller
firms, it is biased against women. A study by Trifiletti (1996) shows that
the changes introduced in 1991 further decreased women’s access to CIG
benefits. It is a clear example of a reform that, while improving the overall
quality of public intervention in the labour market, worsened its bias
against women.
Proposals to eliminate CIG altogether and the ‘mobility’ benefit associ-
ated with it, in favour of an individually based, rather than collectively
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based, unemployment subsidy, or in favour of some form of minimum guaran-
teed income, are opposed both by employers and trade unions. An unemploy-
ment subsidy programme would provide general improvements for women
through measures based on citizenship and having universal coverage. Such
measures acknowledge a citizen’s rights to a security net independently from
their performance in paid employment and, therefore, implicitly acknowledge
unpaid domestic and caregiving work. Conversely, fragmented careers, shorter
hours, withdrawal from participation due to unpaid caregiving work and re-
entry into a different job, which once characterised the female labour market,
is now becoming more widespread for both sexes. Retraining is a constant
necessity in times of fast technological change.
Men are insured against unemployment more than women are. Therefore,
in hard economic times, they have the money to exchange for care. Women’s
unemployment insurance lies in the fact that they perform unpaid care for
the family in exchange for family money. The absence of a universal unem-
ployment subsidy strengthens the money/care exchange within the family.
Overcoming the job-centred model would make the welfare regime more
symmetric and, at the same time, it would adjust public intervention to the
needs of a changed labour market.
Pensions
Until the early 1990s, this familist, patriarchal welfare state, stingy in
family assistance and unemployment benefits, was quite generous in its
pension regimes. The ratio between pay-roll taxes and benefits was very low
with respect to the European average. It was very generous to workers and,
as a consequence, also to their dependent wives. Survivors’ benefits were
high with respect to the European average. The work performed by women
in the household was never recognised explicitly as a source of citizens’
rights. However, the benefits devised for workers have been stretched, some-
times beyond legality, to subsidise women’s work in the household, by pro-
viding them with semi-fake disability pensions, very early retirement,
voluntary contributions to pension schemes after work interruptions and so
on. Early retirement was the peculiar way in which the Italian state coped
with (men’s) unemployment problems and the need to provide (women’s)
care work to the family.
Before the recent wave of reforms, the Italian regime provided for the end
of the working life through two programmes: voluntary seniority pensions
(‘anzianità’), linked to the number of years the employee paid pay-roll taxes,
and mandatory old age pensions (‘vecchiaia’) for all at a prescribed age. It
was a ‘pay-as-you-go’ regime: today’s pensions are paid out of the pay-roll
taxes that today’s workers pay; when these are not sufficient the Treasury
makes up the difference. The regime was acknowledged to be financially
unsustainable in the medium term before reforms were introduced. Argu-
ments about its sustainability continue today.
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Before the reforms, the seniority pension allowed retirement on request as
early as after fifteen years, six months and one day of contributions in the
public sector, while twenty-five years of contributions were needed in the
private sector. The amount of benefits ceased to increase after forty years of
contributions, even if the worker kept working beyond forty years until
mandatory retirement age. Those who drew seniority benefits could get a
second job before mandatory retirement age. Early retirement was in fact the
security core over which a number of elderly women provided free services to
their family and a number of elderly men provided cheap labour, working
with no pay-roll taxes in the underground economy of small firms or in self-
employment.
In the private sector mandatory retirement age was set at 55 for women
and 60 for men, and in the public sector at 60 for both sexes, although in
some careers it was possible to obtain an extension to 65. To obtain the
maximum benefit in the private sector a woman would have had to work
from the age of 15. This obvious bias was offset partially by the fact that
women, but not men, could pay voluntary contributions, in addition to the
normal amount, to cover one year for each child and thus obtain slightly
larger benefits. It still resulted in a distribution of pensions in which most
women received pensions of 1,000,000 lire (£516) per month, while men’s
pensions ranged from 1,000,000 to over 5,000,000 lire (£2,583) per month.
The labour market effects of the mandatory retirement age at 55 were
heavy. In the few instances when a woman in the private sector was con-
sidered for the higher echelons of a career, she would be obviously passed
over because she was about to retire. The cost of hiring and training a
woman of 45 coming back to work after child-bearing age was not recover-
able in the ten years before retirement; thus women were not hired in
middle age. However, with a typical insider/outsider effect, trade unions
traditionally opposed increasing women’s mandatory retirement age, even
voluntarily, and notwithstanding the fact that if women wanted to retire
before the mandatory age, they could, of course, get seniority benefits.
Reforms were enacted in waves, by the governments of Amato (1992 to
1993), Ciampi (1993 to 1994) and Dini (1995 to 1996). The final reform is
gradually phasing in a new regime, which will be fully operational only for
those who are newly hired. In the new regime, benefits will not be earnings-
related but contribution-related. Rules defining retirement age have been
changed to make the regime financially viable: age of retirement may vary,
but the mandatory character of retirement at age 65 has been retained. This
is common practice in Europe, as opposed to the USA.
Under the new law, approved under the Dini government, the mandatory
retirement age is set at 65, allowing retirement from the age of 57 with a
penalty of 3 per cent of the pension per anticipated year. The years of contri-
butions required for seniority benefits increased to thirty-five. Early retire-
ment in one form or another is therefore eliminated. People who had made
more than eighteen years of contributions could retire according to the old
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rules. People hired for the first time after the reform were subject to the new
rules. People who had been working and contributing for less than eighteen
years would have their pension calculated in accordance partly with the old
rules and partly with the new rules. In order not to penalise people who
were about to retire and who had made plans and choices based on that
expectation, the recent reforms created a gradual regime, in which the age of
mandatory retirement and the number of years of contribution required
move forward one year at a time.
For the part that is at present earnings-related, benefits have been
reduced. They are now calculated over the entire working life, rather than on
the last five years of working life. They will be lowered progressively from
80 per cent to a lower percentage. The possibility of most voluntary contri-
butions was eliminated. In addition, survivors’ benefits have been curtailed
subject to means-testing. It used to be that a widow or widower received 80
per cent of the benefits accruing to the worker. Now, if a widow/widower’s
income from any source, including work or retirement pension, is above
26,755,950 lire (£13,820), the survivors’ benefits are cut by 25 per cent; if
the income is above 35,674,600 lire (£18,427), they are cut by 40 per cent;
above 44,593,250 lire (£23,034), they are cut by 50 per cent. As an excep-
tion to the general rule of no change for people who had already begun to
enjoy the benefits, benefits for survivors who were already receiving them,
and whose income was over the level of 26,755,950 lire mentioned above,
were frozen at the present level.
From the gender point of view, equalisation of the mandatory retirement
age for the two sexes, while a positive labour market measure, leaves an open
problem. Who will now provide the childcare services that elderly women
have been providing until now, and who will deal with the typical bureau-
cratic quagmire of the public services in Italy? Minding grandchildren and
queuing in various offices is typically the grandmother’s task at present. The
lack of an available retired grandmother, in addition to the lack of affordable
good-quality nursery schools, may squeeze further young working mothers’
already tight time resources and therefore hamper further young women’s
fertility or their participation rate.
Lengthening the years of contributions required for seniority pensions is
gender-biased, because women tend to have shorter contribution histories
with gaps in their working careers due to family-related events. This should
be balanced by the fact that the regime will become entirely contribution-
based, allowing people with as few as five years of contributions to draw old
age pensions.
Reductions in survivors’ benefits are of course particularly adverse to
women, since women have a longer life expectancy than men, marry men
who are older and are the beneficiaries of most survivors’ pensions. It is, in
addition, a blatant violation of equity between women who work for a wage
and women who are full-time housekeepers. A woman who still works and
therefore has a wage, or who has a substantial pension from her own job, will
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be penalised and will see her survivors’ benefits cut. As a limiting case, a
working widow with children should notionally subtract from her wage the
cost of whatever services she uses to replace her own domestic work, the
benefits she loses because of means-testing and the amount of survivor’s
pension that she loses by going to work. It may well be that she is better off
by choosing to stay at home, because her extra-domestic work adds very
little to the wealth of her family. The fruits of her work will be literally
taken back by the state.
Means-testing survivors’ benefits may be construed as equitable between
people with different incomes, because it cuts benefits to elderly
widows/widowers who are already sufficiently well-off; but it may also be
construed as inequitable in failing to distinguish between women who
worked only inside the home and women who both worked inside the home
and earned a wage income. Women’s earned income is treated as if it was
unearned rent from property; no allowance is made for the fact that in order
to earn it, women have to make an alternative use of their time, taking it
from other socially productive uses in their home.
There is a clear example of double standards at work. In the case of sur-
vivors’ pensions, the consensus is that the duty of the welfare state is to
provide only a decent minimum. Women who work and earn are already
quite well-off; therefore it is fair and legitimate to cut survivors’ benefits,
even if this breaks the equity between work effort and social recompense,
and between contributions made into the pension funds and receipts accru-
ing from those contributions. In the case of high seniority pensions accruing
to relatively young men, the same reasoning did not apply; the argument
that the welfare state should provide only a decent minimum was rejected.
Proposals to apply a cap on higher pensions, in the form of a proportional
cut to be applied after means-testing, never gained any support, on the
grounds that they would break the relationship between contribution
history and pension, which the policy regime aimed to preserve. Yet these
are pensions that accrue to elderly men who are already well-off. Contribu-
tions by a man whose wife does not hold a job are thus worth more than for
a man whose wife does work. These provisions concerning survivors, so bla-
tantly unfair to women workers, went almost unnoticed in the public debate
over the pension regime. Elderly women and women who work have very
little public voice, or, perhaps, women are the only ones who may be per-
suaded to accept sacrifices for the common good.
The underlying logic for this double standard is again related to persis-
tence of the traditional circuit. Men’s work is the source of money for the
family, so high pensions of elderly men should not be cut, for they are
needed by him to pay for himself and his wife. Women receive money from
the male breadwinner in exchange for care. Survivors do not have a husband
in need of care, so the money they receive from the state can be cut.
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Minimum pension and ‘social benefit’
In the past, people who, at the mandatory retirement age, did not have a
long enough contribution history had the right to a minimum pension. The
same minimum pension accrued to people who worked for fifteen years
(‘minimo’) or under (‘integrata al minimo’). After the fifteenth year the
pension increased with job seniority. In 1996 minimum benefit was equal to
659,000 lire (£340) per month. It was means-tested: if there was no other
income, the INPS paid the full amount; if there was other income from any
other source (excluding severance pay) greater than twice this minimum, the
right to this benefit was lost.
A wave of reforms introduced by Amato’s first government brought some
changes: the number of years after which benefits began to rise was changed
from fifteen to twenty years and the means test was changed from personal
income to family income. The rule was that a single person should not have
an income of double the benefit and a couple three times as high as the
benefit, in order to maintain the right to the benefit.
These moves were again clearly gender-biased: it is women who tend to
have short contribution histories and therefore to be claimants of these pen-
sions. Means-testing based on the couple’s income eliminated the pensions
of those women who had worked for a short period of time and whose hus-
bands were still working or had a modestly high pension.
The second wave of reforms, under the Dini government in 1995, elimi-
nated altogether the right to minimum integration for those with fewer
than eighteen years of contributions. People who had worked fewer than
eighteen years by 1995, reaching retirement age before twenty years of con-
tributions, would not get the ‘minimum pension’. They would have the
right only to social benefit (‘assegno sociale’), which in 1998 was equal to
6,593,000 lire (£3,405) per year. This is not classified legally as a pension
but as ‘assistance’.
Dini partly adjusted back the threshold for those already receiving the
‘minimum pension’. It kept the reference to joint rather than single income,
but the threshold for the couple receiving the minimum benefit was set to
four times the minimum benefit, i.e. double the threshold for single pen-
sioners. This was an improvement from women’s point of view.
People who, at the age of 65, had no contribution history whatsoever
because they did not pay any contributions, either because they did not
work or because they had always been employed illegally, had the right to
this ‘social pension’. It was the only form of guaranteed minimum income
existing in Italy. The amount is lower than that of the ‘minimum pension’.
In 1995 it was set at 357,000 lire (£184) per month. In the past twenty
years the number of recipients of these benefits decreased, from 840,000 in
1974 to 718,000 in 1995, as women began to make enough contributions to
receive the ‘minimum’. Seventy-eight out of 1,000 elderly citizens receive it,
80 per cent of them women. Forty-one per cent of recipients live in the
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South, 22.3 per cent in the Centre and 36.2 per cent in the North. As shown
by Monacelli (1996), the threshold for this ‘social pension’ was set in a
rather peculiar way. The target set for a couple was more than three times
the target set for a single person. Couples or families with many members
received enough to live near the poverty line; single, divorced and widowed
people were heavily penalised. For a couple where both partners have a social
pension, the death of one of the spouses could mean sudden further impover-
ishment for the survivor. It appeared that the state preserved the family unit
as long as two elderly people were living together. Once an elderly person
remained alone, she – since most ‘social pensioners’ were women – had no
option but to join another family, typically her children’s.
As of 1996, the ‘social pension’, too, was replaced by the ‘social benefit’,
which then became the single measure by which the Italian state deals with
the poorest part of the elderly population. In 1998, the yearly amount of
‘social benefit’ was 6,593,600 lire (£3,406) (507,200 lire (£626) per month
over thirteen months), for single people over 65 with zero income. If income
was between 0 and 6,593,600 lire, people had the right to integration up to
an income of 6,593,600 lire. Above that amount they had no right to the
benefit. If people were married, then a joint income threshold exactly double
that amount applied. If person X earned 0 and the spouse less than
6,593,600, person X received the benefit. If the spouse earned between
6,593,600 and 13,187,200 lire, person X received a reduced amount to
make up an income of 13,187,200 for the couple; if the spouse earned more
than 13,187,200, person X received nothing. Again, the logic of the tradi-
tional circuit is more than evident. The money/care exchange is upheld and
made into an institution. The source of money for the person in this situ-
ation, usually a woman, is the care she provides. The Centre-Right govern-
ment in power since 2001 promised during the electoral campaign to
increase this pension to 1,000,000 lire (£516) per month. If enacted, this
measure would be an improvement for poor families, but would reinforce
the underlying traditional circle.
The incentive effects of this measure are not easily evaluated and they are
not particularly important from the point of view of increased efficiency of
the regime. Yet fairness is still a value in society, even when the con-
sequences of unfairness will be borne only by those who suffer it. Because of
the difference in the average age of marriage between men and women, hus-
bands reach 65 before wives. At that age, if a wife has a small wage income,
this may make the husband lose the benefit. When both spouses are over 65,
then the fact that one of the two, usually the husband, qualified for a low
pension implies that he has lost the benefits for the spouse and is now as
well-off as the person who did not work at all. He must be willing to share
his already low income evenly with his spouse and she cannot in any way
make sure that this happens. Moreover, a couple where nobody ever worked
is as well-off as a couple where each worked with low wages for as many as
nineteen years before reaching retirement. One may argue that if we want to
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lift the very lowest end of an income distribution to a given minimum level,
we will always be unfair to those who had reached that level by themselves.
Yet, in my opinion, this is one of the clearest cases in which it would not
have been at all unfair to allow some couples be slightly better off than
others. Here, at the poorest end of the income distribution, treating each
individual, married or not, as single is the only way to avoid leaving elderly
married women in a position of total dependency on their husbands.
The last item in the pension reform is the institution at INPS in 1997 of
a voluntary fund for home-makers (‘casalinghe’). People who had no other
job and were therefore full-time home-makers, or anybody else, were given
the possibility of insuring themselves against job accidents and earning the
right to a pension at the age of 65 by paying voluntary contributions into
this fund. The symbolic value of this act is certainly highly positive, because
it affirms the citizenship of women who are full-time housekeepers and,
taken in perspective, may weaken the money/care exchange. However, the
financial value of starting such insurance may be questionable for women
who are married, given that survivors’ benefits are then means-tested. Thus
those contributions may ultimately be lost.
Means-testing
Italy has recently witnessed the gradual expansion of a variety of local means
tests for access to many services, ranging from some medical procedures to
nursery schools. Testing at the local level has often been quite crude; the
unit chosen for means-testing was the nuclear family, with no consideration
of possible alternatives, no allowance for the number of people who have to
live on the income, its source, or the kind of service requested. All families
earning more than a certain amount per month pay; all below do not.
The Ministry of Finance proposed a general ‘means-test’ scheme to be
used nationally by local administration, with or without modifications, to
regulate access to services. The scheme was presented by the media as ‘ric-
cometro’ (‘wealth indicator’), but it is known more formally as ISE, ‘Indica-
tore della Situazione Economica’ (economic situation indicator), which
became law in March 1998. According to ISE, a family requiring social ser-
vices or exemptions, such as nursery school, exemption from co-payments for
physicians’ care, drugs, or medical tests, should answer a questionnaire that
includes an income declaration and information on other aspects of family
composition and wealth. The scheme uses an equivalency scale based on
income reported in the questionnaire, taking into account the number of
people living on that income, whether the parent is single and whether there
is any handicapped person in the family. A small allowance is made if both
parents with children under 3 work, in the form of a slight increase in the
parameters of the equivalency scale.
This is probably an improvement over the rough means-testing men-
tioned above. In a related paper (Addis 1998) I discussed the gender effects
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of means-testing and the use of different techniques to address the issue of
women’s poverty trap. In general, the means-test fails to take into account
the number of earners, other than for children under 3, and therefore does
not include a higher threshold for families with two wage earners and no
‘housekeeper’. The need for care is denied, as is the value of the unpaid work
performed. Thus women’s work outside the household is penalised and non-
participation by the wife becomes a more attractive option.
Again, as in the case of the threshold for the ‘assegni familiari’, ISE takes
into account only the number of people who have to live on a given income,
not the source of that income. It thus gives incentives for non-participation
and assumes that the money for care exchange within the family takes place.
Again, it artificially imposes the traditional circuit.
It must also be noted that, from an economic point of view, the increase
in the parameters of the equivalency scale for families where both parents
have a job works in the opposite direction to tax deduction for a dependent
spouse mentioned above. The deduction is given to all families where the
wife does not have a job; the second is given to low-income families where
the wife does have a job. Excluded are women who work in families where
income is not too low.
How much care work is shifted to the market and the state is a matter of
political choice, as is the amount that remains within the family as unpaid
work. There is nothing natural and no ‘backwardness’ in terms of natural
progress towards market-provided or state-provided care in the arrangement
that has prevailed in Bismarckian regimes. Only one element emerged unex-
pectedly in the last decade of the twentieth century and helped, by chance
and not by choice, to preserve the central role of domestically produced care
in the Italian regime: the inflow of cheap domestic labour from the former
Soviet bloc. By the 1980s the shortcomings of market and state care induced
rich households with two working spouses to import domestic labour from
the Philippines and Cape Verde. The opening of the Eastern European fron-
tier created an abundant supply of babysitters and cleaning ladies, cheap and
affordable even by lower-middle-class families, thus weakening the demand
for high-quality public services.17 By shifting some of her and the bread-
winner’s money to the cleaning lady, the Italian working woman can hope
to preserve for her family, adult men included, the high standards of care
mandated in a regime where the majority of women still perform only
unpaid care work.18
3 A comparison of welfare regimes: is there a trade-off
between symmetry and person-specificity?
While we can imagine an archetypal world in which the family provides all
the care, it is very hard to envisage a world where all the care is provided
either by the market or the state. Some form of free private care among
people, who may or may not be blood relatives, will probably be chosen
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freely by most people. Human relations also involve reciprocal unpaid care,
and care that is given freely by people who have time and money tends to be
of very high quality. There is an element here that is under-researched, what
I call the need for ‘person-specificity’ of some care.19 For many people, to
receive care from a specific person has a higher value than to receive the same
care from a public or private employee who is not that specific person. Care
may be given professionally by a public or private employee, but tender,
loving care is that which is given freely because of affection, or love, that
runs reciprocally between people.
The wish for ‘person-specific’ services may be different for the caregiver and
the care recipient. Asymmetric regimes enforce a particular kind of person-
specific care by the woman of the house towards everybody else. This, in
some cases, may be a gentle or not so gentle coercion of the will both of the
care receiver and of the caregiver. In other cases it corresponds to what the
care receiver wants, even if the requested caregiver, the woman of the house,
does not. In other cases, it corresponds to a reciprocal, person-specific need: the
need for a child to be looked after by his or her own parents and of the
parents to look after their own child, or of a frail elderly person to be looked
after by his or her own children.
In the traditional model, the women of the house provided person-specific
care and spent all of their working time, unpaid, in doing so. The men spe-
cialised in paid work and spent all their working time performing it. If both
men and women spend all their working time in doing paid work, person-
specific care shrinks and eventually disappears. Most or all care work will be
done by professionals in a precise exchange of time for money. The
opportunity cost of person-specific care becomes too high for people to indulge
in it. There is no more time to care.
This fact is of some relevance from the gender point of view. To be the free
care provider was a characteristic feminine attribute. Being properly female
was being the unpaid caregiver of one’s family. If unpaid care shrinks or disap-
pears, one characteristic considered formerly as feminine disappears. The lives
of men and women become more similar; both are as men’s lives used to be.
All their working time is spent in paid employment, often in a competitive
working environment where the values and the skills that are rewarded are
those traditionally associated with the male. Gender roles converge, but they
do not converge to an average, in which both genders perform some unpaid
and some paid work, in equal proportions. They converge towards the old
male gender figure. Assimilation, understood as women fitting in with the
male model, is a process underway in other sections of society as well, such as
female soldiers and policewomen, which represents welcome and positive
advancement for women. However, so far, it does not appear to correspond
with parallel assimilation of men to female models and values.20 Society as a
whole becomes more ‘masculine’.21 The real world evolves towards the old
model of neoclassical economic theory, a world and a model where there is
only paid work and leisure, and no productive care work.
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Unpaid working time produces person-specific services, services that are of
higher quality because of the special relationship existing between two
human beings. In this framework, higher standards of care, some of it still
provided by unpaid women, may be interpreted as the result of the need for
person-specific care by the care receiver, combined with women’s desire to con-
tinue to maintain an identity that is somewhat different from men’s and to
create, maintain and restore personal relations.
Person-specificity, if chosen willingly by care receiver and caregiver, is a
positive characteristic of a welfare arrangement and produces care of
extremely high quality. Leaving time available for person-specific unpaid care
is a positive characteristic of a welfare regime, from a feminist point of view.
The traditional arrangement, bad as it is and was for women’s independence,
may be preferred by many women to a symmetric arrangement where person-
specificity and the availability of time for care are squeezed out.
In the end, a welfare regime must be judged by its financial soundness, by
the various dimensions of equity, by how well caregivers fare and by how
well people who receive care fare. How do the different prevailing modes of
providing care – market, family and public services – compare in terms of
quality of care?
Quality of care provided in both rich and poor households is likely to be
very different, as care is a combination of time, skills and goods, and the rich
obtain better goods. In addition, if they like person-specific care, the rich can
always choose to perform more unpaid work and give up some income. The
poor do not have this choice. Their time must be spent in paid work to earn
the money to purchase the goods. Quality of care is very different in func-
tional families and in dysfunctional families. The quality of personal rela-
tionships matters. In well-to-do, loving families, the quality of care
provided may be extremely high. Otherwise it may be very low. In regimes
that are asymmetric, low-quality family care is the only available alternative.
Thus care provided through unpaid work is of uneven quality, touching the
extremes of very high and very low. The condition of the caregivers in the
family depends on the symmetry of the regime. If the regime is symmetric,
they can opt out of caregiving and buy the care outside of the home or resort
to public services.
Care that is given outside of the household is by definition not person-
specific, although one may choose one’s restaurant, one’s physician, or the
school for one’s children, and it is usually more likely to be through the
market than through the state. The quality of care provided in welfare
regimes that act principally through the market depends on the wealth of
the purchaser. It is very high for the rich and very low for the poor, so it is
also very uneven. The condition of the caregivers who sell care through the
market as employees of a care-providing firm depends on the conditions of
the labour market. In tight labour markets where they can obtain a higher
wage it will be better than when there is high unemployment. In highly
regulated labour markets, workers can enjoy excellent working conditions,
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as long as the labour market does not split into insiders versus outsiders,
where the outsiders may end up in a position even worse than the average
condition in unregulated labour markets. The condition of caregivers
who act independently, such as maids, at-home nurses and so on, is usually
at the lowest end of the scale of desirable jobs in terms of earnings and job
protection.
The quality of care provided by public services generally does not depend
on the wealth of the care receiver, but is uniform along the wealth dimen-
sion. However, this quality may be very good, average or bad. Believers in
competition claim that lack of it in the long term would undermine the
quality of public services. Although there is certainly a grain of truth in this
claim, the quality of care in some Nordic countries and in parts of the Bis-
marckian regime22 is such that one may believe that, with proper adminis-
trative policies and political pressure at local level, an excellent quality of
care may be achieved.
The condition of caregivers who are public employees is usually good in
terms of salary, job protection and working conditions. Excess protection of
caregivers in some situations may interfere negatively with the quality of
care. In this respect, providing care through public services creates the need
for an efficient regime of checks and balances between the status of the care-
giver and the quality of care. Cultural factors may play an important role,
but perhaps an overestimated one.
Whether through lack of either appropriate culture or appropriate admin-
istrative procedures, one of the distinguishing features of the Southern Euro-
pean version of the Bismarckian model is what Ferrera (1998) labelled lack
of ‘statualità’. What is lacking is a consciousness that public services belong
to all and should be performed according to the wishes of the care receivers.
Lack of ‘respect for the state’ makes public employees slack in doing their
duty and lowers the quality of care provided. Thus Southern European
regimes in a time of financial crisis have a built-in tendency to move away
from public services and towards family or market care, in search of quality
care. If the quality of public services is uniform for rich and poor at about
the same standards that the market can provide for the rich, all is well. If the
quality of care in public services deteriorates for all, then letting the rich
have better care becomes Pareto optimal, demand for family- or market-
provided care grows and the welfare regime moves away from the Nordic
and towards one of the other models. The very high quality of home-pro-
vided care becomes an element of resistance to the introduction of a prevail-
ing public or market-oriented regime.
What we have discussed so far may be used to build a grid of parameters
that characterise different models of the welfare state. Although bearing in
mind that such a grid cannot contain many nuances of a complex reality, I
believe it is useful to evaluate the performance of different welfare regimes
and to focus on needed changes. Table 8.1, representing such a grid, classi-
fies the three models of welfare, plus the Southern European variant. Con-
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sider initially the first four columns of Table 8.1. These represent the exist-
ing models of welfare. The first three rows (Financing, Disbursement, and
Where and who cares) are purely descriptive. The subsequent columns are
my evaluation of these regimes relative to a series of relevant parameters.
The condition of the caregivers is evaluated according to the prevailing
mode in each regime, level of autonomy, earnings and job protection. Where
the family prevails as a mode of giving care, autonomy of women is low.
Earnings are uneven: high for wives of rich husbands and low otherwise. Job
protection is nil. Earnings, autonomy and job protection are best in Nordic
regimes. Quality of non-domestic care depends on wealth in market regimes
and is high both in the Nordic and Bismarckian regimes. The difference
between the Bismarckian and the Southern European models emerges only
in the quality of non-domestic care. The lack of ‘statualità’ (respect for the
state), characteristic of these models, implies that the quality of public ser-
vices tends to be uniformly bad for the rich and the poor, rather than uni-
formly good, while the market regime remains underdeveloped.
Nordic and liberal regimes score high in symmetry, while Bismarckian
and Southern European regimes give incentives to asymmetry. The latter
two, however, score high on person-specificity, while, especially in liberal
regimes, people of both sexes spend a very large amount of time in paid
employment, making person-specific care expensive and hard to get, espe-
cially for the poor.23 Liberal and Bismarckian regimes leave more people
vulnerable to poverty, although for different reasons: the liberal regime
because it is stingy in benefits and fearful of poverty traps; the Bismarckian
and Southern European regimes because the security net is for families:
women and young people are left vulnerable.
Freedom not to provide care is high in symmetric regimes and low in
others. Freedom to care is high in Bismarckian and Southern European
regimes, but only if people choose to devote their entire working time to
unpaid care, or retire early. It is very low for women who choose to enter
paid employment and who have to carry a ‘double burden’, so it is unevenly
distributed between people of different sex, age and gender.24
The exercise shown in Table 8.1 may be useful because it allows us to
focus on the characteristics of a welfare regime that is equitable from the
gender point of view. Such a regime should respect both women’s equal
rights and women’s ‘differences’, i.e. those values that in the traditional
gender division of attributes were associated with the female role. It should
therefore be simultaneously symmetric and person-specific. The characteristics of
such a regime would be, roughly speaking, those described in column 5.
Even though existing welfare regimes are either too asymmetric or too
lacking in person-specificity, there is no reason for this to be the case. There is
no necessary trade-off between person-specificity and symmetry. Imagine a suit-
ably large welfare regime based on income taxation rather than pay-roll
taxes, redistributing a proper mix of cash and kind, with a competitive
framework of market and public services. It should moreover avoid the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































perverse incentives that induce asymmetry, disadvantages for women, lack of
autonomy, vulnerability to poverty and so on. Such a model need not have
any internal imbalance. Existing welfare regimes offer women either assimi-
lation with the male model or continuing civil inferiority, but this is not a
necessary evil. Welfare regimes may be designed which include the need for
person-specificity and give incentives to time spent in caregiving by people of
both sexes. This regime, however, must be symmetric; otherwise the attempt
to induce person-specificity will reinforce traditional patterns with their related
problems.
This type of welfare regime has a coherent structure that could be func-
tional. However, its political feasibility, nowadays, is not very high. For
many reasons which lie beyond the scope of this chapter, the political
climate works strongly against it.25 One of the reasons, in my opinion, is a
lack of clarity on the issues that are at stake. I hope this chapter may have
contributed to this clarification.
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Table 8A.1 Participation rates by sex, selected years
1973 1983 1993 1996
F M Total F M Total F M Total F M
Australia 47.7 91.1 69.8 52.1 85.9 69.3 62.3 85.0 73.7 64.9 85.4
Austria 48.5 83.0 65.1 49.7 82.2 65.6 58.9 80.8 69.9 62.1 81.0
Belgium 41.3 83.2 62.2 48.7 76.8 62.8 54.1* 72.6* 63.8 56.1 72.1
Canada 47.2 86.1 66.7 60.0 84.7 72.3 65.3 78.3 71.8 67.9 81.7
Denmark 61.9 89.6 75.9 74.2 87.6 80.9 78.3 86.9 82.6 74.1 85.1
Finland 63.6 80.0 71.7 72.7 82.0 77.4 70.0 77.6 73.6 70.5 77.5
France 50.1 85.2 67.8 54.3 78.4 66.4 59.0 74.5 66.7 59.9 74.3
Germany 50.3 89.6 69.4 52.5 82.6 67.5 61.4 78.6 70.2 61.0 80.0
Greece 32.1 83.2 57.1 40.4 80.0 59.9 43.6 73.7 58.6 45.9 74.4
Ireland 34.1 92.3 63.5 37.8 87.1 62.7 39.9* 81.9* 61.2* 49.4 78.1
Italy 33.7 85.1 58.7 40.3 80.7 60.1 43.3 74.8 58.9 43.2 75.1
Japan 54.0 90.1 71.7 57.2 89.1 73.0 61.8 90.2 76.1 62.2 90.7
Luxembourg 35.9 93.1 64.8 41.7 85.1 63.3 44.8* 77.7* 61.5* – –
Netherlands 29.2 85.6 57.6 40.3 77.3 59.0 55.5* 80.8* 69.4 58.3 84.2
New Zealand 39.2 89.2 64.5 45.7 84.7 65.3 63.2 83.3 73.2 67.1 84.2
Norway 50.6 86.5 68.7 65.5 87.2 76.5 70.8 82.0 76.5 74.3 84.8
Portugal 57.3# 90.9# 64.0 56.7 86.9 71.4 61.3 82.5 71.7 64.1 81.5
Spain 33.4 92.9 62.7 33.2 80.2 56.6 42.8 74.5 58.6 46.2 74.4
Sweden 62.6 88.1 75.5 76.6 85.9 81.3 75.7 79.3 77.5 73.7 78.0
Switzerland 54.1 94.6# 77.7 55.2 93.5 74.5 57.9 92.5 75.3 67.1 96.8
U. Kingdom 53.2 93.0 73.0 57.2 87.5 72.4 64.7 83.3 74.1 66.4 83.1
United States 51.1 86.2 68.4 61.8 84.6 73.1 69.0 84.9 76.9 71.0 84.5
North America 50.7 86.2 68.2 61.1 84.6 73.0 68.7 84.2 76.4 – –
OECD Europe 44.7 88.7 67.1 49.8 82.3 65.8 60.6 80.1 69.0 – –
OECD Total 48.3 88.2 68.2 55.1 84.3 69.3 61.6 81.3 70.3 – –
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1996; OECD Main Economic Indicators, July 1998.
Notes
* Last available 1992.
# First available 1979.
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Table 8A.2 Unemployment rates by sex, selected years
1983 1993 1997
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Belgium 19.0 8.6 12.7 6.9 11.9 7.9
Canada 11.1 11.2 10.6 11.7 – –
Denmark 10.5 8.2 13.7 11.3 7.8 7.3
Finland – – 15.7 19.5 14.9 13.2
France 10.8 6.3 13.8 9.9 14.4 10.7
Germany (W.) (8.0) (8.7) (8.4) (8.0) 10.6 9.0
Greece 11.7 5.8 14.2 5.4 14.9 6.2
Ireland 16.5 14.6 12.1 17.3 10.4 10.1
Italy 14.4 5.8 17.3 8.1 16.6 9.3
Japan 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 3.4 3.4
Luxembourg 5.3 2.6 1.9 1.5 5.2 2.7
Netherlands 14.7 11.1 10.5 5.7 6.9 3.9
New Zealand – – 8.9 10.0 – –
Norway 3.8 3.2 5.2 6.6 – –
Portugal 11.8 5.3 6.5 4.6 7.8 6.0
Spain 20.8 16.5 29.2 19.0 28.3 16.0
Sweden 3.6 3.4 6.6 9.7 9.7 10.6
Switzerland – – 4.7 3.0 – –
United Kingdom 9.9 11.9 7.5 12.4 6.0 7.9
USA 7.4 7.0 6.5 7.0 5.0 4.9
Source: Bonke (1995); Eurostat Labour Force Survey (1994, 1997).
Table 8A.3 Social expenditure in the EU countries as a percentage of GNP
Country 1980 1986 1992
Belgium 28.0 29.4 27.8
Denmark 28.7 26.7 31.4
Germany 28.7 28.1 26.6
France 25.4 28.5 29.2
Ireland 21.6 24.1 21.6
Luxembourg 26.5 24.8 28.0
Netherlands 30.8 30.9 33.0
UK 21.5 24.3 27.2
EU 12 24.4 26.0 27.1
Greece 12.2 19.4 19.3
Italy 19.4 22.4 25.6
Portugal 14.7 16.3 17.6
Spain 18.1 19.5 22.5
Source: Eurostat (1993).
Notes
1 I use ‘gender’ to indicate the set of physical and mental characteristics, and the
proper, normal behaviour that each culture attributes to people on the basis of their
biological sex. Gender therefore changes widely in time and space, through history
and in different cultures and civilisations. For a thorough discussion of the concept
of ‘gender’, see Nelson 1996.
2 There are, of course, many other dimensions of redistribution, between the healthy
and the sick, between the lucky and the unlucky, between regions, or ethnic groups
and so on that need to be considered in a full evaluation of the performance of a
welfare system. For a classic discussion of the various dimensions of equity, see Sen
1992.
3 In Italy, see the very influential work by Rossi 1997.
4 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Orloff 1996.
5 See Ferber and Nelson 1993; Addis 1997.
6 See Bonke 1993.
7 See Saraceno 1997; Bimbi 1997.
8 Of the main contributions to this literature, see Borchorst 1994; Brocas et al. 1990;
De Leonardis 1998; Fraser 1997; Gordon and Fraser 1994; Hobson 1990; Jenson
1986; Knijn and Ungerson 1997; Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; O’Connor et al.
1999; Ostner and Lewis 1995; Sainsbury 1993, 1996; Ungerson 1997.
9 In order to classify models, that of industrial relations is also relevant, with cen-
tralised or decentralised wage-setting, and with co-operation or conflict as the pre-
vailing wage-setting mode. We choose not to deal with these differences because
they are not relevant to our theme.
10 By market-provided care I mean the purchase of a service that was formerly available
within the household, such as childcare, a hot meal and laundry. 
11 Purchasing the time of a domestic worker is a short cut whereby home-produced
services are purchased in the market.
12 Traps are perverse incentives due to the ‘moral hazard’ that may be created by insur-
ance schemes. An often-used example is that of a person who has unemployment
insurance and so will not look for a job as long as the insurance payment lasts.
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Table 8A.4 Main categories of social protection expenditure in EU 12
Country Old age and Health Unemployment Disability Family
survivors’ pensions
Belgium 11.9 6.0 2.6 2.9 1.9
Denmark 11.0 6.0 4.1 3.0 3.3
Germany 12.7 7.7 2.0 2.2 2.0
France 12.1 8.0 2.0 3.5 2.2
Ireland 5.7 6.1 3.0 1.5 2.2
Luxembourg 11.2 5.9 0.2 3.5 2.7
Netherlands 11.9 7.1 2.9 7.2 1.6
UK 10.8 5.1 1.6 3.1 2.6
EU 12 11.9 6.5 1.9 2.4 1.8
Greece 10.2 2.3 0.5 1.5 0.1
Italy 15.4 5.4 0.5 2.2 0.8
Portugal 7.0 5.3 0.8 2.4 0.8
Spain 9.4 5.9 4.8 2.3 0.2
Source: European Commission 1995.
13 On these issues, see also Gornick et al. 1997.
14 This implies that analyses based on rational choice theories, albeit useful, have clear
limitations for comparative and evaluation purposes, since they take the structures
of constraints as given.
15 On linking welfare provisions to employment, see Castles 1994; Flora and Albers
1991.
16 See Dell’Aringa and Samek Ludovici 1996.
17 To my knowledge, nobody has analysed the effects, in terms of gender politics in
Western Europe, of the sudden availability of cheap domestic labour and sexual ser-
vices by immigrant women that took place in the 1990s.
18 Evaluating as a whole the provisions taken since 1992 by Centre-Left governments,
I think it is fair to comment that, although the welfare state was preserved, as
opposed to what might have been an attempt at severe retrenching by the right-
wing coalition, the asymmetry of the Italian welfare state was strengthened, rather
than weakened. The Left in power failed to grasp that this artificial attempt to pre-
serve/reproduce the traditional arrangement, with its patriarchal, familistic and job-
centred character, was the source of many of the pathologies of the Italian welfare
state.
19 An item is called ‘personalised’ when it is built to custom, unique and suited specif-
ically to one person’s needs, though it does not matter who builds it. I tried to find a
word indicating the opposite, the fact that a service, not unique but similar no
matter who performs it, is valued more by the person who receives the care or by the
one who gives it. For a child it is not the same to be fed by a parent or by a teacher;
for a frail elderly person it is not the same to be washed by a nurse or by one’s own
child.
20 See Gershuny 1995.
21 A ‘neutral but male’ society emerges, competitive, hierarchical, aggressive and rigid,
turning away from the values of which women have historically been the deposito-
ries. Solidarity, meekness, mediation and caring abilities lose value and become ever
rarer both in men and women.
22 In Italy, the region of Emilia Romagna is known internationally for its excellent
public childcare.
23 The tendency towards long working hours, documented by Schor (1992), has been
reinforced by the workfare provisions of welfare reform at the end of the 1990s.
24 See Plantenga (1998) for an excellent discussion of the terms of the double burden.
25 On the political setting of recent European welfare reforms, see also Addis 2000.
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9 The gender impact of
workfare policies in Italy and
the effect of unpaid work
Tindara Addabbo and Massimo Baldini
Introduction
The analysis carried out in this chapter may be set alongside the literature
which analyses the effect of public policy by gender, such as the research
conducted since the beginning of the 1990s by the UK Women’s Budget
Group,1 or by Budlender et al. (1998) in South Africa and Australia. Him-
melweit (1998) discusses how the different employment conditions and
working profiles over the life cycle of men and women can affect the impact
of the same public policy by gender, and states that ignoring these differ-
ences can noticeably reduce the efficacy of the policy itself. After acknowl-
edging the economic relevance of unpaid work,2 the effects of public policies
on its distribution and size need to be evaluated:
If the effect of budgetary policy is to move women’s time from unpaid
care economy to other sectors of the economy, the full ramifications have
to be recognized, planned and budgeted for. . . . This is not to argue that
women’s (or men’s) labour time should not be transferred between
sectors, but that the costs and benefits to society should be looked at
overall.
(Himmelweit 1998: 10)
The importance of acknowledging the gender impact of welfare policies is
addressed in Addis (1999), who stresses the discouraging effect on women’s
labour supply of the Italian welfare state system.
This chapter analyses the impact of a policy recently introduced in Italy
which is still in an experimental phase: minimum insertion income (here-
after MI). MI is aimed at very poor families and combines a cash transfer
with policies aimed at encouraging labour market participation by at least
one family member of working age. Section 1 describes the characteristics of
this policy and contains a simulation on how many households can benefit
from it. Section 2 evaluates how, by extending income to include unpaid
work, family labour supply decisions can change. This evaluation relates to a
sample with couples of working age, with or without children, from the
1995 Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (hereafter
SHIW). The 1995 SHIW data-set contains useful information on the house-
hold socio-demographic structure and on household income but does not
report information on unpaid work.3 It is therefore necessary to use a
matched data-set obtained by combining SHIW records with unpaid work
information estimated from the last available ISTAT time budget survey in
1989.4
1 The minimum insertion income
An experimental form of minimum insertion income (MI) has recently been
introduced in Italy, and the aim of this research is to evaluate the effects it
could have on the propensity of the women currently outside the labour
force to search actively for a job.
The receipt of minimum income is indeed conditional on joining an
insertion programme with the objective of reintroducing the beneficiary into
the labour market, through the acceptance of any job proposals, attendance
at training courses or involvement in socially useful activities. Women
belonging to households with incomes so low as to be eligible for MI,
however, are generally characterised by a low educational level, and the low
wages that they could probably earn once in the labour market are extremely
unlikely to compensate for the reduction in the component of extended
income produced by their unpaid work.
In general, the introduction of MI seeks to remedy the lack, in Italy, of a
last-resort safety net that may guarantee a minimum standard of living to all
needy households.5 Many local authorities provide some form of minimum
income, but in a totally uncoordinated and discretionary way.
In a first and experimental phase of three years, starting in 1999, MI has
been introduced into only thirty-nine local areas (among them Naples,
Catania, Genoa, Reggio Calabria), chosen according to a complex set of
social and economic characteristics, and concentrated mainly in Southern
Italy – the poorest region. The amount of minimum income for 2002 is set
at 0.55 million lire (i284) per month for a single person, while for other
households the levels are calculated by applying an equivalence scale simply
defined as the number of components raised to the power 0.65 (the elasticity
of the scale).6 Thus the household is the reference unit to evaluate the
welfare of an individual. The transfer is set so as to cover the difference
between minimum income itself and total disposable household income
(including other forms of social assistance); only 75 per cent of total earnings
are counted in total household income, to diminish the poverty trap, so that
the scheme reproduces a negative income tax with a marginal tax rate of
0.75, covering a constant share of the poverty gap (the difference between
minimum income and household income). Any amount of financial assets,
however small, is a sufficient condition for losing eligibility, a requirement
perhaps imposed by the nature of the scheme, aimed at alleviating situations
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of particularly harsh poverty and social exclusion; as for real assets, only the
ownership of the house where one lives is allowed, any other real asset
causing loss of benefit.
This scheme has been devised, following the French example fairly
closely, not only as a protection against poverty but also as an instrument to
promote the reintroduction of the poor into active social life: its receipt is
conditional on joining an insertion programme, through acceptance of any
job proposals, attendance at training courses, or involvement in socially
useful activities by one of the household’s members of working age. This
participation condition does not apply to households with children younger
than 3 or with seriously disabled members. If this measure is extended to
the whole population, some simulations on the SHIW sample have shown
that it will cost about 4,000 billion lire (i2,000 billion) per year. MI
should represent, at the end of the experimental phase, the third step of a
system of benefits aimed at contrasting situations of economic difficulty: if a
person loses his or her job, he or she may receive benefit from the wage sup-
plementation fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG), equal to a substan-
tial percentage of the previous wage, for not more than one year, then a
mobility allowance giving a lower share of the wage, and finally, if he or she
still fails to find a new job, the MI, a universal safety net open to all citizens,
not only to members of the labour force. MI, however, will be the only
transfer available to non-dependent workers, which in Italy represent a sub-
stantial share (nearly 30 per cent) of the labour force, and to people who
have never been employed.
For an analysis of the process which led to the experimental introduction
of MI in Italy, see Negri (1998) and Alti and Maino (1999), who discuss the
problems emerging during the first stages of the experimentation in a small
town in Northern Italy; too rigid formal requirements and the presence of
irregular workers who may find the amount of MI too low to apply for are,
according to the authors, the two most important reasons for the relatively
limited number of applications received so far by local authorities.
The introduction of MI is an important part of a wider reform process of
the Italian system of social assistance currently taking place, which is under-
going a complete revision of the targeting system: from an uncoordinated
and often irrational set of means-testing instruments, based largely on
taxable income, towards a single criterion to ascertain the economic con-
ditions of those wishing to apply for cash transfers or benefits in kind. A
new indicator of the economic circumstances of a household, called ISE
(Indicatore della Situazione Economica), has recently been introduced and
consists in a straightforward combination of the values of incomes and assets
of the family.7 The adoption of a new targeting system is seen as a necessary
precondition for the shift from a category-based to a universal welfare state,
since only with a reliable and efficient means test can a welfare system be
based on universal schemes open to all individuals, satisfying only the con-
ditions of citizenship and need. MI should actually represent the most
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significant move towards universalism in the pool of potential beneficiaries.
The normative aspect of ISE has been adopted only partially in the case of
MI: the definition of the family is the same, as well as the equivalence scale,
while the means test is different and more severe, since it excludes from the
set of potential beneficiaries those owning assets other than the house in
which they live, a point to which we shall return below.
Many obstacles can jeopardise the success of the new system, of which ISE
and MI are the first steps (provided, of course, that the resources necessary to
finance MI at the end of the experimental period are found); in particular, all
the criticisms raised against means-testing apply here (Atkinson 1996): the
risk of placing a substantial share of households in a poverty trap, the
problem of low take-up levels, the distortionary effects of the informal
economy, the inefficiency of public administration which should ascertain
the actual economic conditions of the applicants and organise the insertion
programmes for MI recipients. This latter problem seems to be the most rel-
evant for Italy, especially in the case of the local authorities of the South,
where most of the poor are concentrated. As for the disincentive effects,
little can be said for this particular case, but the literature has concluded so
far that disincentive effects from safety net schemes are certainly present,
although of limited quantitative significance (Atkinson and Mogesen 1993).
2 Extended standard of living and minimum insertion
income
In this section, using the microdata of the Bank of Italy survey for 1995, we
simulate the possible effects of MI on the division of labour within a couple,
considering how extended household income changes when at least one
member of the couple modifies his or her work status if the household wants
to satisfy the prerequisites for MI eligibility.
Characteristics of households eligible for MI
Table 9.1 shows the percentage distribution of two-partner households
whose male member is between 21 and 64 years old, with or without chil-
dren, into three groups: the first includes those households which, according
to their composition and their total income, would have had the right to
receive MI in 1995; the second includes those households with equivalent
income greater than the MI threshold, but by less than 10 per cent of its
value, and therefore singles out those households who run the risk of falling
into a situation of severe poverty; all other households are in the third
group. The last row converts the column totals into the actual number of
households in each group. Tables 9.2 and 9.3 contain the same information,
but focus on households with and without children, respectively.
According to our simulations, about 195,000 two-partner households
would be eligible for MI (for the whole Italian population, the number









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































would increase to around 500,000 households), and 324,000 other house-
holds would not present a significantly greater equivalent disposable
income. If at least one of the partners is employed, the probability of earning
a low income falls significantly, though if only the man works, about half a
million households would still have incomes not much greater than the MI
threshold. If both partners work, the probability of receiving MI actually
falls to zero.
Table 9.4 confirms the great concentration of poor households in South-
ern Italy, in particular in the South-west (which also includes, in our classifi-
cation, Sicily and Sardinia), while the number of households potentially
involved in the MI scheme is very low in the North-west. If those house-
holds that are close to the threshold are also included, about 145,000 house-
holds with both partners present would in any case be in a difficult
economic situation.8
Women living in the most difficult economic circumstances have low
levels of education (Table 9.5), and it is very likely that this will also be the
case for their partners. The reduced endowment of human capital implicit in
these low educational levels could represent a serious obstacle to the possi-
bility of finding jobs with satisfactory wages.
On the basis of Table 9.6, the probability of living in poverty decreases
steadily with respect to the age of the wife; this could be due to the greater
incidence of unemployment in the first stages of the life cycle, and to the
lower level of protection granted by the current structure of the welfare
system to households without pensioners.
Unpaid work and minimum insertion income
The average unpaid work of women who live in households eligible for MI,
or in households whose equivalent income is no higher than 10 per cent of
the income level required to enjoy MI, totals fifty-five hours a week, ten
hours more than the unpaid work of women living in households whose
income is at least 10 per cent higher than the MI level. This section contains
a simulation of the effects in terms of welfare changes of MI on different
family types, again looking at those who are eligible for MI.
Households with children aged under 3
The first group of households eligible for MI is made up of those with chil-
dren aged under 3. These households are eligible for MI without being
required to join training schemes or accept job offers. They can enjoy cash
transfers and, if the wife did not work in the market before MI, extended
income can increase without any change in unpaid work. However, one can
see how for the double-earner households closer to MI level (whose house-
hold income is no more than 10 per cent above MI, the MI cut-off) and with
children aged under 3, women may be encouraged to leave the labour



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































market. Given the lower level of education of these women with respect to
other women, and the higher discontinuity in their working profile
(Addabbo 1999; Bettio and Villa 1999), the probability that they will exit
the labour market is particularly high. The introduction of MI, together
with the low level of wages they can enjoy by working and the improvement
in extended welfare that the household can enjoy if the mother left the
labour market (and supplied more unpaid work), can therefore produce
a discouraging labour supply effect for the mother. In fact, their exit in
the presence of young children is very likely to be definitive rather than
temporary. Even if they had a continuous work profile it is probable
that their wages and career prospects would not noticeably improve, and
when re-entering the labour market they could not discount the years they
spent outside of it. However, one should note that these women are more
likely to leave the labour market completely once they exit for child-rearing
reasons (Bettio and Villa 1999) and therefore they are more subject to the
risk of social exclusion. The literature on the fixed costs connected with
working (Addabbo 1996) shows how the costs linked to the presence of
young children are higher when the individual is out of the labour market
than when she is employed. The former has to look for care services and the
costs of searching will add to the money costs of the service itself. One can
surmise that couples in this group of households will take the following
steps:
• Women will exit the labour market in order to enjoy MI without
having to work in the labour market and also to devote more time to
the care of their children in a particularly delicate phase of the family
cycle (as is also shown by the data on unpaid work).9
• When their child is older than 3 they may not return to the labour
market since the costs of market childcare could be too high, or because
the labour market situation could discourage the labour supply by a
potential worker whose weakness in the labour market has been wors-
ened by her being out of it for three years.
In order to avoid the risk of social exclusion the following policies could be
adopted:
• Increase childcare availability at low cost in order to reduce the problem
of constraints connected with the high fixed costs which could discour-
age women from returning to paid employment. This can be done either
directly (by increasing the availability of full-time public schools for
children over age 3) or by encouraging the provision of childcare ser-
vices by non-profit institutions and by arranging for low-income famil-
ies to use these services.
• Provide training programmes to help women to re-enter the labour
market.
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Households without children younger than age 3 and where neither partner
is employed
In most of the households which are eligible for MI, both partners are unem-
ployed (Table 9.1). If they received MI their extended income would
increase because of the cash transfer they would receive. However, in order
to enjoy MI, at least one of the household’s members of working age must
join training courses or must be available to accept a job if it is offered.
In order to check whether any discouraging effect on the labour supply of
one of the family members could arise, one can simulate the impact on
households’ welfare of the acceptance of a job (we assume a full-time job in
the service sector) by each one of the formerly non-employed partners. In
this case:
• Money income would increase because of the employed partner’s earn-
ings (which one can evaluate by multiplying the imputed wage
obtained by estimating a human capital wage equation with labour
demand variables by thirty-seven hours, the average number of working
hours of people in this sample who are employed in the service sector).10
Where labour earnings are not enough to reach the MI cut-off, the
amount necessary to bring the family income to the MI level should be
added to that income.
• The assumption is made that the non-employed partner will substitute
for the unpaid work of the employed partner by also providing the
necessary childcare. The money costs necessary to buy childcare services
in the market are not deducted here from the household welfare.
• Extended income changes depending on the unpaid work imputed by
using the equations estimated in Chapter 3 (this volume)11 and by
changing the characteristics of the partners.12
Table 9.7 shows the changes in money and extended income in the case
where the woman accepted a proposal of a white-collar job in the service
sector. As may be seen, in some cases the wife’s earnings do not even reach
the MI level, and in this case a cash transfer to the labour earnings had to be
added in order to reach the MI level.
As Table 9.7 shows, the increase in money income is on average
3,517,184 lire (i1,817), but the loss in welfare connected with the reduc-
tion in the wife’s unpaid work is 4,284,554 lire (i2,213), so the net loss for
this type of household if the wife accepted the job proposal would be
767,359 lire (i396). This may discourage the wife from accepting the job
offer. This result is connected with the low hourly wage of women who
belong to this group of households and also to the reduction in women’s
unpaid work.
These computations do not take account of the long-term effects of a
woman’s decision to work, assuming either that there are only low returns of

















































































































































































































































work experience on forward wages and on the working career of women with
a relatively low level of education (as in the case of women belonging to this
group of households) or short-sighted behaviour that prevents them from
evaluating the dynamic effects of their current choice.
If the husband entered the labour market while his wife continued to
provide unpaid work, the household’s welfare would increase on average by
14,118,690 lire (i7,293) per year. This is because money income will on
average increase more than in the case where the wife would have accepted
the job proposal and given that the reduction in unpaid work income is not
as great as in the previous case. If one compares the welfare losses and gains
connected with the choice regarding labour market participation, one can
see how it would be more likely that the husband will become employed.
If one adds the loss of self-esteem by the unemployed husband to these
evaluations based on the computations of money and extended income,
which has been found by researchers investigating the lower labour supply
by the wives of unemployed men (Barrère et al. 1985), it is even more likely
that the intensity of the husband’s job search will be greater than the wife’s
propensity to supply her labour. On the one hand, the employment choice
made by the family on the basis of the increase in the household’s welfare
may lead the husband to become employed, and on the other hand the
husband’s job search may be encouraged, given that the likely labour income
will be well above the MI level and there will be no need for further cash
transfers.
In this case one should adopt policies to increase women’s human capital
to promote the economic independence of family members (an aim that is
stated by the MI Decree Law itself).
One-earner households without children younger than age 3
Turning to one-earner households which are eligible for MI, if the wife were
to accept a white-collar job in the services sector, one may observe:
• An increase in money income by 5,404,220 lire (i2,791) if one disre-
gards the money costs connected with the care of children in such
households. However, unlike the case where both partners were unem-
ployed, in this household group one must compute a money cost for care
of children below age 10, which we have imputed on the basis of 10,000
lire (i5.16) per hour for 37 hours a week if the family contains children
from 3 to 5 years old, and on the basis of 10,000 lire (i5.16) per hour
for twenty hours a week if the family contains children from 6 to 10
years old. We surmise the use of a market service to substitute for
women’s care instead of the cost of a public service by assuming that
children under 6 do not attend a state school and that the education for
children over 6 is not full-time.13 If one also considers these costs, the
money income would decrease by 2,476,812 lire (i1,279) (Table 9.10).
















































































































































































































































• Unpaid work income evaluated at its opportunity cost will decrease by
6,075,152 lire (i3,138).
• The net decrease in extended income totals 670,932 lire (i346) (if one
excludes childcare additional costs; see Table 9.9) and 8,551,965 lire
(i4,417) (if one also considers the financial costs of childcare; see Table
9.10).
From these computations one may deduce a highly discouraging effect on
women’s participation in paid employment in poor one-earner households,
as a result of which women may either not engage in active job hunting or
refuse a job offer.
Conclusions
This chapter shows how, by considering extended income, households can
change their labour market behaviour in the presence of public policies,
with reference to a scheme (currently in an experimental phase in Italy) to
supplement the financial income of the poorest households.
The inclusion of unpaid work in household welfare highlights the poten-
tially discouraging effects on women’s labour supply in very low-income
households (households that are potentially eligible for MI). By means of a
computation based on the expected change in a household’s extended
income, this chapter shows how low-income households may prefer the wife
not to accept a job offer or to engage in job hunting. This can lead to a low
take-up of MI or to continuing social exclusion of women belonging to the
poorest households, who are already in a weak position as far as their labour
market work is concerned.14 Short-sighted behaviour (which may lead to
neglecting the long-term effects of the labour supply choice) together with
low education levels (which can reduce the possibility of being in a job with
good career prospects) may cause women to exit from the labour market or
not to accept MI if this involves accepting a job, and this can increase their
economic dependence either on the state or on their partners, with very bad
effects in cases of marriage breakdown.15 Moreover, the analysis of the loss in
unpaid work connected with the acceptance by women of a job shows how,
at very low levels of household income, women’s unpaid work is needed
particularly to sustain a household’s standard of living.
The knowledge of the effect on individuals’ choices of family constraints
should induce the public officers entrusted with the application of MI to pay
particular attention to the tensions and needs inside the households which
entered into the MI experimental phase, and to increase the incentives for
training of the weakest household members and for childcare provision.16
More information on the long-term effects of being out of the labour market
should also be provided.17
The data on unpaid work reveal the high total workload of women and
the unequal distribution of total work by gender inside the family. In house-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































holds which manage not to fall into poverty by means of paid work by both
partners, women have to pay in terms of a high total workload and of the
difficulties of finding affordable substitutes in the market for their inputs of
time or home-produced goods.
This analysis deals with a very low-income group of households.
However, the problem of making choices with regard to labour market par-
ticipation when there are young children or elderly family members requir-
ing care at home is also present for women in households with higher
incomes, and particularly with average income and with members who are
not employed: these households are more likely to be excluded from public
services or included by paying high tariffs. A subsequent extension of this
research will consider how access to childcare and public care services for the
elderly would be changed by using ISE, and how the discouraging effect on
women’s labour supply can be reduced by changing the parameters of the
ISE equivalence scale.
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Table 9A.1 Equations on married women’s housework on different days of the week
(OLS–Dep. Var.: logarithm of housework hours)
Weekdays Saturdays Sundays
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Constant 1.017 5.581 1.200 7.739 1.072 7.564
North-west 0.092 2.193
South 0.053 1.408 0.053 1.423 0.079 1.917
Wife’s age 0.008 1.699 0.010 4.013
Wife’s education 0.019 2.703 0.006 0.984 0.020 3.266
Wife not in labour force 0.806 5.593 0.139 1.747
Wife part-time 0.283 4.053 0.068 0.964 0.320 1.636
Wife self-employed 0.195 2.337 0.200 1.994
Wife managerial 0.248 1.503
Wife in agriculture 0.670 4.24 0.237 2.030 0.190 2.573
Wife in service sector 0.343 2.585 0.197 2.084
Husband’s age 0.004 0.858 0.008 2.739
Husband’s education 0.016 2.766 0.006 1.145
Husband not in labour force 0.063 1.183 0.049 0.737 0.062 1.144
Husband part-time 0.082 1.422 0.127 3.267 0.147 2.036
Husband managerial 0.196 1.582
Husband service sector 0.037 0.926
Children 0–2 years 0.083 1.283
Children 15–17 years 0.051 1.070
Children 18–24 years 0.077 1.753
Children aged over 18 0.073 1.289
Employee with low
education 0.114 1.233 0.132 2.076
Number of minority age
children 0.079 4.005 0.051 2.049 0.053 2.298
Number of majority age
children 0.063 2.94 0.044 1.597
Table 9B.2 Wage equations: second step, potential wage
Women Men
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-ratio Coefficient Std. error t-ratio
Constant 0.504 0.470 1.072 0.237 0.302 0.783
Education level 0.084 0.009 9.411 0.072 0.003 24.272
Age 0.030 0.019 1.556 0.089 0.014 6.249
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.001 0.000 6.042
Past work experience 0.064 0.019 3.373 0.078 0.011 6.824
South-east 0.103 0.057 1.812 0.152 0.026 5.792
South-west 0.164 0.057 2.855 0.155 0.029 5.287
Centre 0.109 0.038 2.880 0.043 0.023 1.848
Heckman’s lambda 0.175 0.106 1.649 0.449 0.073 6.111
Obs. 1290 2455
R2 0.27 0.30
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SHIW 1995 data. 
Wage equations by gender
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Table 9B.1 Employment probability (Heckman first step)
Women Men
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-ratio Coefficient Std. error t-ratio
Constant 5.177 0.538 9.621 4.800 0.632 7.599
Household’s income 0.001 0.002 0.625 0.014 0.002 8.248
Age 0.238 0.028 8.638 0.308 0.030 10.364
Age squared 0.003 0.000 9.095 0.004 0.000 11.927
Education 0.134 0.007 18.407 0.082 0.008 10.302
Children aged
under 3 0.343 0.088 3.905 0.107 0.111 0.958
Children aged 
3–5 0.231 0.064 3.602 0.019 0.080 0.234
Children aged 
6–17 0.183 0.036 5.136 0.141 0.038 3.681
Children aged 
18–24 0.157 0.044 3.550 0.088 0.045 1.951
Regional 
unemployment rate 0.049 0.006 8.735 0.040 0.006 6.601
Chronic disease 0.270 0.087 3.103 0.119 0.084 1.423
Partner not employed 0.156 0.106 1.465 0.159 0.170 0.934
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Notes
1 See Chapter 1 (this volume) above for an analysis and survey of women’s budget
studies, and Himmelweit (1999) for a report on the UK Women’s Budget Group
activities.
2 See Picchio (1996) and Chapter 1 (this volume).
3 Only in the 2000 SHIW survey has information on the average weekly number of
unpaid hours of work been included for a subsample of households (see Bank of Italy
(2002) for first results of this survey, and Chapter 2 (this volume) for comparison
with ISTAT 1989 time budget data).
4 See Chapter 3 (this volume) for details on the matching procedure.
5 Minimum income should not be confused with basic income (or citizen’s wage): the
latter is an unconditional and universal money transfer, provided for all citizens
without any means test, whereas minimum income is reserved for those who can
prove that they earn less than a threshold corresponding to a minimally decent stan-
dard of living. It is therefore a conditional and selective transfer, even if it is univer-
sal in the sense that it is potentially available to all households, and does not depend
on belonging to specific categories, occupational or otherwise.
6 Plus some corrections aimed at identifying particularly critical situations: the scale
is increased by 0.2 points if the head is a single parent, by 0.2 points if both parents
work and there are children younger than age 18 living in the household, and by 0.5
points for each seriously physically disabled member.
7 Briefly, ISE  Income  0.2 Wealth. See Baldini et al. (2002) for an analysis of the
institutional characteristics and distributive implications of ISE.
8 The geographical disaggregation is similar to that proposed, on the basis of many
socio-economic indicators, by Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991): South-east
(Puglie, Abruzzo and Molise); South-west (Calabria, Basilicata, Sicily, Sardinia,
Campania); North-west (Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, Valle d’Aosta); North-east
(Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige); Centre (Emilia Romagna,
Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio).
9 See Chapter 3 (this volume).
10 See Appendix for wage equations.
11 These equations are also reported in the Appendix.
12 Only the values of the variables on each partner’s characteristics will change, not the
parameters of the model.
13 There are obviously alternatives to a market service, such as family or state schools.
However, the data-set did not contain sufficient information to estimate the provi-
sion of childcare by other relatives, and as far as public childcare is concerned, it
must be borne in mind that the choice of private baby-sitting is consistent with the
fact that when the job offer arrives, it may be difficult for the family to find a place
for the child or to place him or her in school. One should also add the costs con-
nected with childcare search. Moreover, we have assumed that the hourly cost of
childcare would not change with the number of children in the family.
14 Apart from social exclusion, one should also consider (Robeyns 1998) the implica-
tions for the link between decision-making power and personal income in the family
(Ott 1995; Robeyns 1998), and the loss of social connections and identity that
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might be entailed by exiting from the labour market (in this connection see
Robeyns 1998).
15 On the effect of work experience on the work profile and on forward wages, see
Addabbo 1996. See Joshi and Davies (1994) and Robeyns (1998) on the effects of a
discontinuous work profile in terms of the loss of potential wages and on the low
rights in terms of retirement.
16 See Ward et al. (1996) and Robeyns (1998) on the effect of childcare services in
encouraging women’s paid work.
17 See Robeyns (1998) for an analysis of the factors affecting the ‘choice’ between paid
and unpaid work, and on the importance of analysing the effect on the introduction
of basic income by different groups of women characterised by a different labour
market work attachment and by a different level of potential labour income.
18 Here we report only the results of estimation of housework equations for married
women. Equations on different types of unpaid work, by gender and by day of the
week, have been run by using Heckman’s selection models in order to impute total
unpaid work. The complete set of equations run to impute unpaid work for men and
women in our sample may be found in Chapter 3 (this volume).
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